Andrea M. Noack

Methodological K/nots Designing Research on the Enforcement of Labor Standards

This article traces methodological discussions of a multidisciplinary team of researchers located in universities and community settings in Ontario. The group designed and conducted a research project on the enforcement of labor standards in Ontario, Canada. Discussions of methodological possibilities often began with “nots”—that is, consensus on methodological approaches that the team collectively rejected. Out of these discussions emerged suggestions and approaches through which we navigated dilemmas in research design. The purpose of this article is to illustrate the following: (a) epistemological tensions around mixed methods and the politics of mixing, (b) the attempt to capture the relationships between research and its impact, and, (c) the need to develop interviews which both establish respondents as knowers, and simultaneously focus on that which is unsaid/normalized.

The compliance model of employment standards enforcement: an evidence-based assessment of its efficacy in instances of wage theft

This article critically assesses the compliance model of employment standards enforcement through a study of monetary employment standards violations in Ontario, Canada. The findings suggest that, in contexts where changes to the organisation of work deepen insecurity for employees, models of enforcement that emphasise compliance over deterrence are unlikely to effectively prevent or remedy employment standards violations.

Using tickets in employment standards inspections: Deterrence as effective enforcement in Ontario, Canada?

It is widely agreed that there is a crisis in labour/employment standards enforcement. A key issue is the role of deterrence measures that penalise violations. Employment standards enforcement in Ontario, like in most jurisdictions, is based mainly on a compliance framework promoting voluntary resolution of complaints and, if that fails, ordering restitution. Deterrence measures that penalise violations are rarely invoked. However, the Ontario government has recently increased the role of proactive inspections and tickets, a low-level deterrence measure which imposes fines of CAD295 plus victim surcharges. In examining the effectiveness of the use of tickets in inspections, we begin by looking at this development in the broader context of employment standards enforcement and its historical trajectory. Then, using administrative data from the Ministry of Labour, we examine when and why tickets are issued in the course of workplace inspections. After demonstrating that even when ticketable violations are detected, tickets are issued only rarely, we explore factors associated with an increased likelihood of an inspector issuing a ticket. Finally, we consider how the overall deterrent effect of workplace inspections is influenced by the use or non-use of deterrence tools. JEL Codes: J88