Andrea Scarantino

Information Processing, Computation, and Cognition

Computation and information processing are among the most fundamental notions in cognitive science. They are also among the most imprecisely discussed. Many cognitive scientists take it for granted that cognition involves computation, information processing, or both – although others disagree vehemently. Yet different cognitive scientists use ‘computation’ and ‘information processing’ to mean different things, sometimes without realizing that they do. In addition, computation and information processing are surrounded by several myths; first and foremost, that they are the same thing. In this paper, we address this unsatisfactory state of affairs by presenting a general and theory-neutral account of computation and information processing. We also apply our framework by analyzing the relations between computation and information processing on one hand and classicism, connectionism, and computational neuroscience on the other. We defend the relevance to cognitive science of both computation, at least in a generic sense, and information processing, in three important senses of the term. Our account advances several foundational debates in cognitive science by untangling some of their conceptual knots in a theory-neutral way. By leveling the playing field, we pave the way for the future resolution of the debates’ empirical aspects.

Insights and Blindspots of the Cognitivist Theory of Emotions

Philosophical cognitivists have argued for more than four decades that emotions are special types of judgments. Anti-cognitivists have provided a series of counterexamples aiming to show that identifying emotions with judgments overintellectualizes the emotions. I provide a novel counterexample that makes the overintellectualization charge especially vivid. I discuss neurophysiological evidence to the effect that the fear system can be activated by stimuli the subject is unaware of seeing. To emphasize the analogy with blindsight, I call this phenomenon blindfright. Cognitivists may reply that blindfright is nothing but an unconscious judgment subcortically elicited. This reply is in line with the strategy commonly employed by cognitivists against their critics. I call it the Elastic Strategy, because it consists of ‘stretching’ the notion of judgment in order to accommodate counterexamples. This strategy, I argue, turns cognitivism into a theory that is at worst unfalsifiable and at best trivially true. The final portion of my article aims to rescue cognitivism from the damage done by the Elastic Strategy. I distinguish three varieties of cognitivism, one concerned with what emotions essentially are (Constitutive Cognitivism), one concerned with what causes emotions (Etiological Cognitivism) and one concerned with what emotions represent (Representational Cognitivism). I conclude that what cognitivism has to offer to emotion theory are primarily insights concerning the causes and representational content of emotions. The constitutive identification of emotions with judgments, on the other hand, does more harm than good. 1. Introduction 2. The Emergence of Cognitivism 3. Blindfright 4. The Master Argument Against Cognitivism 5. The Elastic Strategy 6. Three Varieties of Cognitivism 6.1 Constitutive Cognitivism 6.2 Etiological Cognitivism 6.3 Representational Cognitivism 7. Conclusion 1. Introduction 2. The Emergence of Cognitivism 3. Blindfright 4. The Master Argument Against Cognitivism 5. The Elastic Strategy 6. Three Varieties of Cognitivism 6.1 Constitutive Cognitivism 6.2 Etiological Cognitivism 6.3 Representational Cognitivism 6.1 Constitutive Cognitivism 6.2 Etiological Cognitivism 6.3 Representational Cognitivism 7. Conclusion

Contextually variable signals can be functionally referential

• We offer a new definition of functional reference that highlights the role of contextual cues.

How to Define Emotions Scientifically

The central contention of this article is that the classificatory scheme of contemporary affective science, with its traditional categories of emotion, anger, fear, and so on, is no longer suitable to the needs of affective science. Unlike psychological constructionists, who have urged the transition from a discrete to a dimensional approach in the study of affective phenomena, I argue that we can stick to a discrete approach as long as we accept that traditional emotion categories will have to be transformed in order to do any scientific work. I conclude by articulating some general rules for turning traditional emotion categories into suitable scientific tools.

Animal communication between information and influence

Please cite this article in press as: Scarant doi:10.1016/j.anbehav.2010.03.005 Rendall et al. (2009; henceforth, ROR) have offered a sombre diagnosis of the state of the information concept in the animal communication literature. In a nutshell, they have argued that it is woefully imprecise, covertly misleading in its implicit assumptions, and in some cases plainly incoherent. Their recommended therapy is to get rid of the information construct all together. Questions such as ‘What information do animal signals convey?’, they conclude, are ‘ill-posed’ (Rendall et al. 2009, page 238). As an alternative, they offer an account of animal communication in terms of influence. I agree (in part) with the diagnosis, but not with the therapy. If a bad information construct stands in the way of progress, so does its wholesale elimination. I argue that we can address ROR’s worries while preserving a theoretically useful notion of information, thereby combining the insights of information-based and influence-based approaches into a richer hybrid.

Don't Give Up on Basic Emotions

We argue that there are three coherent, nontrivial notions of basic-ness: conceptual basic-ness, biological basic-ness, and psychological basic-ness. There is considerable evidence for conceptually basic emotion categories (e.g., “anger,” “fear”). These categories do not designate biologically basic emotions, but some forms of anger, fear, and so on that are biologically basic in a sense we will specify. Finally, two notions of psychological basic-ness are distinguished, and the evidence for them is evaluated. The framework we offer acknowledges the force of some of the objections to basic emotion theory whilst demonstrating that the notion of a basic emotion, once properly reformulated, is still of scientific value.

Information as a Probabilistic Difference Maker

By virtue of what do alarm calls and facial expressions carry natural information? The answer I defend in this paper is that they carry natural information by virtue of changing the probabilities of various states of affairs, relative to background data. The Probabilistic Difference Maker Theory (PDMT) of natural information that I introduce here is inspired by Dretskes [1981] seminal analysis of natural information, but parts ways with it by eschewing the requirements that information transmission must be nomically underwritten, mind-independent, and knowledge-yielding. PDMT includes both a qualitative account of information transmission and a measure of natural information in keeping with the basic principles of Shannons communication theory and Bayesian confirmation theory. It also includes a new account of the informational content of a signal, understood as the combination of the incremental and overall support that the signal provides for all states of affairs at the source. Finally, I compare and contrast PDMT with other probabilistic and non-probabilistic theories of natural information, most notably Millikans [2013] recent theory of natural information as non-accidental pattern repetition.

Rethinking Functional Reference

The theoretical construct of functional reference is the main tool used by animal communication researchers to explore how animals refer to the world in the absence of a language. Functionally referential signals are commonly defined as signals elicited by a specific class of stimuli and capable of causing behaviors adaptive to such stimuli in the absence of contextual cues. I will argue that this definition is conceptually flawed and propose an alternative definition according to which signals can functionally refer to things that rarely cause them while relying on the essential contribution of contextual cues.

Core Affect and Natural Affective Kinds

It is commonly assumed that the scientific study of emotions should focus on discrete categories such as fear, anger, sadness, joy, disgust, shame, guilt, and so on. This view has recently been questioned by the emergence of the “core affect movement,” according to which discrete emotions are not natural kinds. Affective science, it is argued, should focus on core affect, a blend of hedonic and arousal values. Here, I argue that the empirical evidence does not support the thesis that core affect is a more “natural” category than discrete emotions. I conclude by recommending a splitting strategy in our search for natural affective kinds.

Do Emotions Cause Actions, and If So How?:

The main purpose of this article is to consider two of the most popular arguments offered in support of the view that emotions do not cause actions. One argument suggests that emotions come after actions and therefore cannot cause them (argument from timing). The other argument suggests that emotions are not necessarily followed by actions and therefore cannot cause them (argument from imperfect association). I argue that neither of these two arguments is compelling. At the same time, some of the concerns of causation skeptics can help us better understand what a theory of the causal connection between emotions and actions should explain.