Andreas Bartels

Animal Minds and the Possession of Concepts

In the recent literature on concepts, two extreme positions concerning animal minds are predominant: the one that animals possess neither concepts nor beliefs, and the one that some animals possess concepts as well as beliefs. A characteristic feature of this controversy is the lack of consensus on the criteria for possessing a concept or having a belief. Addressing this deficit, we propose a new theory of concepts which takes recent case studies of complex animal behavior into account. The main aim of the paper is to present an epistemic theory of concepts and to defend a detailed theory of criteria for having concepts. The distinction between nonconceptual, conceptual, and propositional representations is inherent to this theory. Accordingly, it can be reasonably argued that some animals, e.g., grey parrots and apes, operate on conceptual representations.

Modern Essentialism and the problem of individuation of spacetime points

In this paper Modern Essentialism is used to solve a problem of individuation of spacetime points in General Relativity that has been raised by a New Leibnizian Argument against spacetime substantivalism, elaborated by Earman and Norton. An earlier essentialistic solution, proposed by Maudlin, is criticized as being against both the spirit of metrical essentialism and the fundamental principles of General Relativity. I argue for a modified essentialistic account of spacetime points that avoids those obstacles.

Why metrical properties are not powers

What has the dispositional analysis of properties and laws (e.g. Molnar, Powers, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003; Mumford, Laws in nature, Routledge London, 2004; Bird, Nature’s metaphysics, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2007) to offer to the scientific understanding of physical properties?—The article provides an answer to this question for the case of spacetime points and their metrical properties in General Relativity. The analysis shows that metrical properties are not ‘powers’, i.e. they cannot be understood as producing the effects of spacetime on matter with metaphysical necessity. Instead they possess categorical characteristics which, in connection with specific laws, explain those effects. Thus, the properties of spacetime do not favor the metaphysics of powers with respect to properties and laws.

How Fundamental Physics Represents Causality

Russell’s dictum that there is no place for causality in fundamental physics (Russell B, On the notion of cause. Proc Aristotelian Soc 13:1–26, 1912/1913) has been revitalized in a recent debate (e.g. Price H, Corry R (eds) Causality, physics, and the constitution of reality: Russell’s republic revisited. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007). One of the main reasons Russell had for denying a genuine place for causality in physics was that the asymmetry of the causal relation has no counterpart in modern theories of physics because of the symmetry of determination relations as provided by fundamental equations. But there exists a further way of fundamental anchoring of causality. As we argue in our paper, despite the time-reversal invariance of fundamental laws it is possible that the solutions of those laws are typically time-asymmetric. In particular, it has been proven that almost all spacetimes that are solutions of the field equations of General Relativity and which allow for a universal “cosmic” time parameter and, furthermore, possess a matter field are time-asymmetric (Castagnino M, Lombardi O, Lara L. The global arrow of time as a geometrical property of the universe. Founda Phys 33(6):877–912, 2003b; Wohlfarth D. A new view of ‘fundamentality’ for time asymmetries in modern physics. In: Proceedings of the EPSA 11 conference in Athens, October 2011: recent progress in philosophy of science: perspectives and foundational problems. Springer, New York, 2012). We show that this result provides a new resource for anchoring the causal asymmetry in physics and thus diminishes the need for epistemic or even anthropocentric foundations of causality.

Functional role theories of representation and content explanation: with a case study from spatial cognition

The aim of this paper is to show that the widespread opinion, according to which functional role theories of representation fail to account for content explanations of human and animal behaviour, cannot be confirmed with respect to each type of functional role theory. Functional resemblance theories (as referred to by O’Brien and Opie in Representation in mind, Elsevier, 2004) allow for content explanations of successfully performed cognitive abilities as much as for explanations of systematic errors resulting from misrepresentation. How functional roles do their explanatory work in actual scientific research examples is shown by a detailed exploration of model assumptions about homing performances based on path integration mechanisms in humans and animals.

Chains of meaning : A model for concept formation in contemporary physics theories

The rationality of scientific concept formation in theory transitions, challenged by the thesis of semantic incommensurability, can be restored by theChains of Meaning approach to concept formation. According to this approach, concepts of different, succeeding theories may be identified with respect to referential meaning, in spite of grave diversity of the mathematical structures characterizing them in their respective theories. The criterion of referential identity for concepts is that they meet a relation ofsemantic embedding, i.e. that the embedding concept can be substituted by the embedded one in “classical limit” situations. Three case studies from contemporary physics theories will be used to show that the Chains of Meaning approach not only yields meaning comparisons for already established concepts (as for Newtonian and Schwarzschild mass) but is also well suited to characterize actual scientific strategies of concept formation in yet open cases such as black hole entropy or relativistic thermodynamics.

Themen aus der Physik

Die Entwicklung der modernen Physik seit der Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts beruhrt eine Vielzahl von Fragen, die traditionell der Metaphysik zugerechnet werden. So wird der Zweite Hauptsatz der im 19. Jahrhundert von Physikern wie Clausius, Lord Kelvin, Maxwell und Boltzmann geschaffenen Thermodynamik als Begrundung fur die Gerichtetheit der Zeit, und damit fur den Unterschied zwischen Vergangenheit und Zukunft aufgefasst (s. Kap. 35).

What a Theory of Knowledge-How Should Explain - A Framework for Practical Knowledge beyond Intellectualism and Anti-Intellectualism

We argue against both intellectualist and anti-intellectualist approaches to knowledge-how. Whereas intellectualist approaches are right in denying that knowledge-how can be convincingly demarcated from knowledge-that by its supposed non-propositional nature (as is assumed by the anti-intellectualists), they fail to provide positive accounts of the obvious phenomenological and empirical peculiarities that make knowledge-how distinct from knowledge-that. In contrast to the intellectualist position, we provide a minimal notion of conceptuality as an alternative demarcation criterion. We suggest that conceptuality gives a sound basis for a theory of knowledge-how which is empirically fruitful and suitable for further empirical research. We give support to this suggestion by showing that, by means of an adequate notion of conceptuality, five central peculiarities of knowledge-how as compared to knowledge-that can be accounted for. These peculiarities are its context-bound, impenetrable and implicit nature, as well as the automatic and continuous forms of processing that are connected to it.

Preparing the Ground for an Empirical Theory of Knowing-How

The commentary gives a clear and instructive summary of our main arguments against both, intellectualist and anti-intellectualist accounts of knowing-how. But the aim of our account is not correctly described as an attempt to give an explanation of certain cognitive capacities that are taken to be expressions of knowledge-how in terms of underlying mental representations. ( Glauer this collection , p.10). What we aim at is not an empirical theory of knowing-how, but a framework that would be useful for cognitive scientific research on phenomena of knowing-how.

Do Times Exist

Do Times exist? The answer to this question depends on what conception of reality the question assumes. Three forms of reality can be applied to physical entities: first, reality in the sense of actuality; second, reality in the sense of objectivity; and third, reality in the sense of causal activity. I will suggest that relativity theory renders implausible the first way to spell out the reality of time instances, whereas the second way is left open. The third way will not be discussed here, as no contemporary physical theory supplies time instances with causal agency.