Andreas Darmann

Paths, trees and matchings under disjunctive constraints

Abstract We study the minimum spanning tree problem, the maximum matching problem and the shortest path problem subject to binary disjunctive constraints: A negative disjunctive constraint states that a certain pair of edges cannot be contained simultaneously in a feasible solution. It is convenient to represent these negative disjunctive constraints in terms of a so-called conflict graph whose vertices correspond to the edges of the underlying graph, and whose edges encode the constraints. We prove that the minimum spanning tree problem is strongly NP -hard, even if every connected component of the conflict graph is a path of length two. On the positive side, this problem is polynomially solvable if every connected component is a single edge (that is, a path of length one). The maximum matching problem is NP -hard for conflict graphs where every connected component is a single edge. Furthermore we will also investigate these graph problems under positive disjunctive constraints: In this setting for certain pairs of edges, a feasible solution must contain at least one edge from every pair. We establish a number of complexity results for these variants including APX-hardness for the shortest path problem.

The Subset Sum game

Highlights • A game theoretic version of the Subset Sum problem is considered.• Two agents take turns to fill a shared knapsack with their items.• Natural heuristic strategies are proposed and analyzed from a worst-case perspective.

How hard is it to tell which is a Condorcet committee

This paper establishes the computational complexity status for a problem of deciding on the quality of a committee. Starting with individual preferences over alternatives, we analyse when it can be determined efficiently if a given committee C satisfies a weak (resp. strong) Condorcet criterion–i.e., if C is at least as good as (resp. better than) every other committee in a pairwise majority comparison. Scoring functions used in classic voting rules are adapted for these comparisons. In particular, we draw the sharp separation line between computationally tractable and intractable instances with respect to different voting rules. Finally, we show that deciding if there exists a committee which satisfies the weak (resp. strong) Condorcet criterion is computationally hard.

Maximizing the Minimum Voter Satisfaction on Spanning Trees

This paper analyzes the computational complexity involved in solving fairness issues on graphs, e.g., in the installation of networks such as water networks or oil pipelines. Based on individual rankings of the edges of a graph, we will show under which conditions solutions, i.e., spanning trees, can be determined efficiently given the goal of maximin voter satisfaction. In particular, we show that computing spanning trees for maximin voter satisfaction under voting rules such as approval voting or the Borda count is -complete for a variable number of voters whereas it remains polynomially solvable for a constant number of voters.

The Shortest Path Game: Complexity and Algorithms

In this work we address a game theoretic variant of the shortest path problem, in which two decision makers (agents/players) move together along the edges of a graph from a given starting vertex to a given destination. The two players take turns in deciding in each vertex which edge to traverse next. The decider in each vertex also has to pay the cost of the chosen edge. We want to determine the path where each player minimizes its costs taking into account that also the other player acts in a selfish and rational way. Such a solution is a subgame perfect equilibrium and can be determined by backward induction in the game tree of the associated finite game in extensive form.

Determining a Minimum Spanning Tree with Disjunctive Constraints

For the classical minimum spanning tree problem we introduce disjunctive constraints for pairs of edges which can not be both included in the spanning tree at the same time. These constraints are represented by a conflict graph whose vertices correspond to the edges of the original graph. Edges in the conflict graph connect conflicting edges of the original graph. It is shown that the problem becomes strongly

Proportional Borda allocations

\mathcal{NP}

Stable and Pareto optimal group activity selection from ordinal preferences

-hard even if the connected components of the conflict graph consist only of paths of length two. On the other hand, for conflict graphs consisting of disjoint edges (i.e. paths of length one) the problem remains polynomially solvable.

On the Shortest Path Game

In this paper we study the allocation of indivisible items among a group of agents, a problem which has received increased attention in recent years, especially in areas such as computer science and economics. A major fairness property in the fair division literature is proportionality, which is satisfied whenever each of the n agents receives at least