Andreas Diekmann

Green and Greenback: The Behavioral Effects of Environmental Attitudes in Low-Cost and High-Cost Situations

The low-cost hypothesis predicts that the strength of effects of environmental concern on environmental behavior diminishes with increasing behavioral costs. Thus, environmental concern influences environmental behavior primarily in situations and under conditions connected with low costs and little inconvenience for individual actors. In a first step, we develop and specify this hypothesis. Referring to two procedures, we then test it on the basis of an environmental survey of a random sample of 2307 respondents from the German population. The empirical evidence is positive. The low-cost hypothesis is not confined to the area of environmental research. It points to general limits of attitude-research (in high-cost situations) and to general limits of rational-choice theory (in low-cost situations), and suggests a strategy for integrating research in social psychology, sociology, and economics.

Volunteer's Dilemma

A conflict game simulating social traps in which a collective good can be provided by a volunteer is discussed and some solution concepts are analyzed. There is a greater incentive for “free riding” than for the production of the collective good at the cost of the volunteer. However, if everybody defects, all players will lose. Such a result is frequently produced by “diffusion of responsibility” as described by Darley and Latané (1968). In contrast to other social traps, a dominant strategy does not exist. Also, the mixed-equilibrium strategy yields very low payoffs. The expected gain is not greater than the payoff achieved by the nonequilibrium maximum strategy. Superrationality might be a way out of the trap. However, this concept lacks the desirable equilibrium property. Only in the free communication version of the game can a definitive answer to the question of a rational strategy be given.

The Wealth of Nations and Environmental Concern

ANDREAS DIEKMANN is a professor of methods of empirical research and social statistics and director of the Institute of Sociology at the University of Berne, Switzer land. His research interests are in statistics and game theory, with applications to so cial demography and environmental behavior. His publications in English include “Cooperation in an Asymmetric Volunteer’s Dilemma Game: Theory and Experi mental Evidence” ( International Journal of Game Theory , 1993, Vol. 22), Paradoxical Effects of Social Behavior: Essays in Honor of Anatol Rapoport (1986),Stochastic Modelling of Social Processes (1984) (both books edited with P. Mitter), “The Log Logistic Rate Model. Two Generalizations With an Application to Demographic Data” (Sociological Methods and Research , 1995, Vol. 24 [with Josef Brüderl]), and “Environmental Behavior. Discrepancies Between Aspirations and Reality” ( Rationality and Society , 1998, Vol. 10 [with Peter Preisendörfer]).

The Power of Reciprocity

In two experiments, the existence and extent of altruistic reciprocity is exploredin the context of a simple experimental game, “the sequential dictator.” Findings show that altruistic reciprocity is frequent and robust, and the reciprocity norm does not erode if stakes are raised. Implications of the findings for social theory and further empirical research are discussed.

The social inheritance of divorce : Effects of parent's family type in postwar Germany

The social inheritance of divorce is one factor contributing to the upward trend in marriage dissolution rates during the last few decades. Several studies confirm the transmission hypothesis for U.S. marriages. We investigate the intergenerational transmission of divorce risk among German first marriages using multivariate event-history techniques. Our data are from the 7,200 respondents of the German Family Survey. The historical circumstances of postwar Germany allow a comparison between families dissolved by war and families dissolved by divorce. Respondents whose parental families dissolved by the death of a parent have only slightly higher divorce risks than respondents who grew up in two-parent families. There is, however, a large gap in marital instability for respondents from divorced-parent families compared with respondents from two-parent families and families with a widowed parent. Hence, the inheritance of divorce cannot be explained simply by the absence ofa parent. The data suggest that differences in personal investments in the marriage partnership may partially explain the transmission effect

Not the First Digit! Using Benford's Law to Detect Fraudulent Scientif ic Data

Abstract Digits in statistical data produced by natural or social processes are often distributed in a manner described by ‘Benfords law’. Recently, a test against this distribution was used to identify fraudulent accounting data. This test is based on the supposition that first, second, third, and other digits in real data follow the Benford distribution while the digits in fabricated data do not. Is it possible to apply Benford tests to detect fabricated or falsified scientific data as well as fraudulent financial data? We approached this question in two ways. First, we examined the use of the Benford distribution as a standard by checking the frequencies of the nine possible first and ten possible second digits in published statistical estimates. Second, we conducted experiments in which subjects were asked to fabricate statistical estimates (regression coefficients). The digits in these experimental data were scrutinized for possible deviations from the Benford distribution. There were two main findings. First, both digits of the published regression coefficients were approximately Benford distributed or at least followed a pattern of monotonic decline. Second, the experimental results yielded new insights into the strengths and weaknesses of Benford tests. Surprisingly, first digits of faked data also exhibited a pattern of monotonic decline, while second, third, and fourth digits were distributed less in accordance with Benfords law. At least in the case of regression coefficients, there were indications that checks for digit-preference anomalies should focus less on the first (i.e. leftmost) and more on later digits.

Reputation formation and the evolution of cooperation in anonymous online markets

Theoretical propositions stressing the importance of trust, reciprocity, and reputation for cooperation in social exchange relations are deeply rooted in classical sociological thought. Today’s online markets provide a unique opportunity to test these theories using unobtrusive data. Our study investigates the mechanisms promoting cooperation in an online-auction market where most transactions can be conceived as one-time-only exchanges. We first give a systematic account of the theoretical arguments explaining the process of cooperative transactions. Then, using a large dataset comprising 14,627 mobile phone auctions and 339,517 DVD auctions, we test key hypotheses about the effects of traders’ reputations on auction outcomes and traders’ motives for leaving feedback. Our statistical analyses show that sellers with better reputations have higher sales and obtain higher prices. Furthermore, we observe a high rate of participation in the feedback system, which is largely consistent with strong reciprocity—a predisposition to unconditionally reward (or punish) one’s interaction partner’s cooperation (or defection)—and altruism—a predisposition to increase one’s own utility by elevating an interaction partner’s utility. Our study demonstrates how strong reciprocity and altruism can mitigate the free-rider problem in the feedback system to create reputational incentives for mutually beneficial online trade.

Diffusion and survival models for the process of entry into marriage

In this paper different survival models with a non‐parametric hazard rate function are applied to the process of entry into marriage. The hazard function of the Hernes model of the marriage process as well as the log‐logistic survival model are both derivable from a differential equation for a social diffusion process. The log‐logistic model might be appropriate for modelling the marriage rate because of its non‐monotonic hazard function. Moreover, in light of our analysis, application of this model to the marriage process can be justified by the theoretical rationale of a process of social diffusion. Both models are tested using German age‐at‐marriage data and the U.S. cohort data analyzed by Hernes (1972). It can be shown that the three parameter Hernes model yields a good fit while the log‐logistic model, with only two parameters, leads to a moderate approximation of the data.

Social Status and Aggression: A Field Study Analyzed by Survival Analysis

A field experiment was conducted in Germany to explore whether driver characteristics and the social status of cars are related to an aggressive response. Drivers waiting at a traffic light (N = 57) were blocked by an experimental car. The amount of time that elapsed until the drivers responded by honking their horns or beaming their headlights was recorded, and bivariate and multivariate methods of survival analysis were used to analyze the data. The status of the blocked cars was positively correlated with the tendency toward an aggressive response.

Umweltbewußtsein und Umweltverhalten in Low-und High-Cost-Situationen. Eine empirische Überprüfung der Low-Cost-Hypothese

Zusammenfassung Gemäß der Low-Cost-Hypothese wird eine negative Korrelation zwischen den Kosten ökologischen Verhaltens und der Stärke des Effekts von Umweltbewußtsein auf das Verhalten erwartet. Die Hypothese wird in dem vorliegenden Artikel präzisiert und anhand der Daten des Surveys „Umweltbewußtsein in Deutschland 1996“ empirisch überprüft. Wir verwenden dabei zwei Teststrategien. Methode 1 geht von der Annahme aus, daß die relative Häufigkeit einer ökologischen Aktivität als Indikator der Verhaltenskosten gelten kann. Bei Methode 2 werden dagegen die Angaben der Befragten zur Entscheidungssituation herangezogen und entsprechend diesen High-Cost- von Low-Cost-Situationen unterschieden. Die Befunde sind nicht nur für die Erklärung von Umweltverhalten von Interesse. Sie liefern allgemein einen Beitrag zur Debatte über den Einfluß moralischer Überzeugungen bzw. Einstellungen auf das Verhalten und demonstrieren deutlich, daß mit schwindender Kostenträchtigkeit einer Entscheidungssituation das restriktive Modell des Homo Oeconomicus an Erklärungskraft verliert.