Andreas Follesdal

Why There is a Democratic Deficit in the EU: A Response to Majone and Moravcsik

Giandomenico Majone and Andrew Moravcsik have argued that the EU does not suffer a ‘democratic deficit’. We disagree about one key element: whether a democratic polity requires contestation for political leadership and over policy. This aspect is an essential element of even the ‘thinnest’ theories of democracy, yet is conspicuously absent in the EU.

Politics, Products, and Markets: Exploring Political Consumerism Past and Present

the City University of Stockholm in 2001, captures the messiness of political consumerism both past and present. In their introduction, the editors define political consumerism as “the use of market purchases by individuals, groups, and institutions, who want to take responsibility for political, economic, and societal developments” (p. v). From my reading, the chapters wrestle with three overarching themes: (1) the individual versus collective functions of political consumerism, (2) the relative merits of different strategies for increasing the effectiveness of consumerist politics, and (3) using versus legitimizing the market as an arena for citizenship. Several chapters reveal a critical distinction between political consumerism that is motivated by individual or collective concerns. Bente Halkier’s chapter addresses a small sample of Danish consumers who are concerned with food safety issues and reveals that even the most identifiably political consumers did not have strong societal motivations. Rather, these consumers were taking personal responsibility for their individual and families’ food safety risks, and Halkier suggests that their actions fall short of the traditional tripartite framework (combining agency, community, and influence) for political action. On the other hand, Cheryl Greenberg’s and David Vogel’s chapters about historical boycott and disinvestment campaigns clearly illustrate direct attempts to change collective circumstances and public policies, whether fighting against African American oppression, South African apartheid, or the Vietnam War. Other chapters illustrate a complex interplay between individual and collective functions. For instance, Jørgen Goul Anderson and Mette Tobiasen report on the 2000 Danish Citizenship Study, arguing that political consumerism is linked to other political actions with collective intent, such as signing petitions and donating money, but not necessarily to protesting or other forms of collective action. They suggest that political consumers represent a hybrid mix of collective solidarity and individualized action. While they may draw the line in different places, all of these authors seem to accept that political consumerism is more than simply consumption guided by individualized noneconomic rationalities and that it needs to have some sort of collective component. Turning to effectiveness, Paul Kennedy’s chapter tackles the relative merits of mass and niche political consumerism with his study of “radical” versus “mainstream” green or ethical enterprises in Britain in the mid-1990s. His study reveals a partial convergence between the two categories owing to mainstream firms’ need to legitimize their ethical credentials against their radical competitors. Other chapters explore product standards and certification as means of institutionalizing consumers’ social and environmental concerns. Franck Cochoy uses the French standards movement of the early twentieth century to discuss the politics of standards. He shows that it is possible “to fix politics directly into products” (p. 158), yet cautions that standardization institutions do not always live up to their participatory principles. Andrew Jordan, Rüdiger K. W. Wurzel, Anythony R. Zito, and Lars Brückner’s chapter traces the development of the German eco-labeling scheme and shows that it has been more successful than other European ecolabels in generating a race to maintain market share by companies that operate within and export to Germany. The issue of relative legitimacy and influence is also taken up by Benjamin Cashore, Graeme Auld, and Deanna Newsom. These authors describe the Politics, Products, and Markets: Exploring Political Consumerism Past and Present

Survey Article: Subsidiarity*

The ‘‘principle of subsidiarity’’ regulates authority within a political order, directing that powers or tasks should rest with the lower-level sub-units of that order unless allocating them to a higher-level central unit would ensure higher comparative efficiency or effectiveness in achieving them. This principle of subsidiarity has recently come to political prominence primarily through its role in quelling fears of centralization in the Maastricht treaty on European Union. But it has also figured in discussions of the proper scope for local autonomy for social policies in Germany, the Netherlands and Scandinavia, and in Green party calls for decentralization quite generally. 1 The present survey of alternative interpretations and justifications of the principle of subsidiarity suggests that apparent consensus on it has been gained only by obfuscation. 2 Section I sketches the political backdrop of the debate within the European Union where, rather than reducing and removing fundamental political conflicts, the principle of subsidiarity increases and shapes such tensions. In Sections II and III, I delineate alternative conceptions of the principle of subsidiarity and its possible institutional role. The alternatives have strikingly different institutional implications regarding the objectives of the polity, the domain and role of sub-units, and the allocation of authority to apply the principle of subsidiarity itself. The need for a political theory of subsidiarity thus established, Sections IV through IX present and assess five alternative normative justifications of conceptions of subsidiarity, illustrated by reference to the European Union.

EU Legitimacy and Normative Political Theory

The aim of this chapter is to present some of the central research topics found in normative political theory relating to the EU.1 Normative political theory uses methods of normative reasoning to address concepts, arguments and theories about the substantive normative standards necessary for legitimate political orders, institutions and policies. Topics covered might include ‘democracy’, ‘fairness’, ‘equality’, ‘justice’, ‘citizenship’, and ‘virtue’.

The Distributive Justice of a Global Basic Structure: A Category Mistake?

The present article explores ‘anti-cosmopolitan’ arguments that shared institutions above the state, such as there are, are not of a kind that support or give rise to distributive claims beyond securing minimum needs. The upshot is to rebut certain of these ‘anti-cosmopolitan’ arguments. Section 1 asks under which conditions institutions are subject to distributive justice norms. That is, which sound reasons support claims to a relative share of the benefits of institutions that exist and apply to individuals? Such norms may require strict equality, Rawls’ Difference Principle, or other constraints on inequality. Section 2 considers, and rejects, several arguments why existing international institutions are not thought to meet these conditions.

The Future Soul of Europe: Nationalism or Just Patriotism? A Critique of David Miller's Defence of Nationality

This article deals with one of the most basic issues pertaining to peace and conflict studies, namely, the need to secure stability and trust within and between nations. This is not least a challenge in Europe after a century which saw two world wars springing from unrest on the European continent. The article takes as its point of departure the claim that the challenges facing the European Union will require extensive and mutual trust to ensure compliance. Some have argued that a shared European-wide national identity is necessary to ensure such stability of practices and institutions. The philosopher David Miller is pessimistic about the prospects of European-wide nationalism of the appropriate sort. The present article provides an in-depth and critical discussion of Millers argument, and concludes that Millers defence of nationalism as the unique source of trust is unconvincing. Moreover, Millers pessimism regarding the European Union is premature, if relevant at all. Alternative grounds for supporting common institutions are available, and may be within reach for the European Union. The shared bases among citizens need not include a broad range of values and cultural belonging, but might plausibly be restricted to Just Patriotism of the kind suggested in the Liberal Contractualist tradition.

Human Rights and Relativism

Few governments today admit that they violate central human rights such as freedom of speech, or prohibitions against slavery and torture. Violations of human rights are denied or excused, but seldom defended (Schachter 1982: 336). The Bangkok Declaration of 1993 changed this. In this declaration, representatives of Asian states dismissed civil and political rights as contrary to “Asian values.” Their statement has received much attention, particularly since it appeared immediately prior to the 1993 Vienna World Conference on Human Rights. Human rights are universal and critical norms constraining the allocation and exercise of state power, so it should come as no surprise that some governments object to human rights. The Bangkok Declaration insists that states have the primary responsibility for the promotion and protection of human rights, and the primary responsibility to remedy human rights violations. It falls to the government to determine trade-offs where appropriate, and to secure rights through such institutions as each government decides. Human rights must be considered in the context of a dynamic and evolving process of international norm-setting, bearing in mind the significance of national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds. The Declaration insisted, in short, that national sovereignty entails noninterference in the internal affairs of the State, including the “non-use of human rights as an instrument of political pressure.”

Evaluating Trustworthiness, Representation and Political Accountability in New Modes of Governance

This chapter looks at the New Modes of Governance (NMG) from a normative perspective, assessing their democratic legitimacy. Of the four questions underlining the New Modes of Governance Project, therefore, we concentrate on evaluation, discussing only briefly and at the beginning how NMG emerged, evolved, and operate. Under NMG we consider a variety of forms, such as regulatory networks negotiating agreed standards, policy co-ordination through benchmarking and comparative analysis of policy performance, and independent regulatory authorities whose responsibility is to set standards and define the terms of compliance in particular industrial or service sectors. But we also consider, more generally, the way in which Committees and civil society organizations play a role in European social dialogue and more generally in European governance. From a normative perspective, the emergence of NMG has been supported on the basis of two main arguments. One is centred on considerations of effectiveness, suggesting that networks and private actors have greater expertise, which makes them able to respond more speedily and appropriately than public actors to changing circumstances in a given policy domain. The other is centred on the idea of credibility, and the way in which expert-based institutions and arrangements can make more credible long-term commitments than directly political institutions, since they are insulated from partisan politics and from the political cycles characterizing democratic government. But it would seem that NMG have emerged not only because of their alleged superiority in terms of effectiveness and credibility, but also as an effect of the weakness of traditional forms of democratic legitimacy at the EU level. Moreover, NMG have been promoted in areas where majoritarian politics at the European level is either unavailable or regarded as inappropriate. The more informal and less hierarchical ways in which NMG function have been seen, by political and societal actors, as providing more participative and negotiated ways of decision-making compared to the more hierarchical and authoritative mechanisms of traditional democratic politics present at the national level. This supposed superiority of NMG, however, is a rather contested issue, and one that poses difficult questions in terms of legitimacy, democratic representation, and political accountability. In this chapter, we shall assess how NMG fare from these three perspectives, but we start first with a brief discussion of the emergence and nature of NMG as part of European governance at large.

Towards a Stable Finalité with Federal Features? The Balancing Acts of the Constitutional Treaty for Europe

Abstract The Constitutional Treaty for Europe (CTE) strengthens federal features of the future European political order, and makes the federal tradition of political thought more salient. Stable and legitimate federal political orders require multiple forms of balancing, and many of the changes in the CTE are improvements on the Nice Treaty in these aspects. The CTE goes some way toward creating a European political order with federal features more likely to both merit and facilitate trust and trustworthiness among Europeans. Central features are the increased role of human rights, national parliaments, the European Parliament, and political parties, all operating under greater transparency. The gains in trust and trustworthiness may be worth some apparent efficiency losses in promotion of ‘the European interest’. Such trust is crucial if the institutions are to foster willing support and ‘dual loyalty’ toward the individuals member state and toward the union as a whole among the citizenry and officials.

The Principle of Subsidiarity as a Constitutional Principle in International Law

This paper explores subsidiarity as a constitutional principle in international law. Some authors have appealed to a principle of subsidiarity in order to defend the legitimacy of several striking features of international law, such as the centrality of state consent, the leeway in assessing state compliance and weak sanctions in its absence. The article presents such defenses of state-centric aspects of international law by appeals to subsidiarity, and finds them wanting. Different interpretations of subsidiarity have strikingly different institutional implications regarding the objectives of the polity, the domain and role of subunits, and the allocation of authority to apply the principle of subsidiarity itself. Five different interpretations are explored, drawn from Althusius, the US federalists, Pope Leo XIII, and others. One upshot is that the principle of subsidiarity cannot provide normative legitimacy to the state-centric aspects of current international law on its own. It stands in need of substantial interpretation. The versions of subsidiarity that match current practices of public international law are questionable. Many crucial aspects of our legal order must be reconsidered – in particular the standing and scope of state sovereignty.