Andreas Landmann

Can health-insurance help prevent child labor? An impact evaluation from Pakistan

Child labor is a common consequence of economic shocks in developing countries. We show that reducing vulnerability can affect child labor outcomes. We exploit the extension of a health and accident insurance scheme by a Pakistani microfinance institution that was set up as a randomized controlled trial and accompanied by household panel surveys. Together with increased coverage the microfinance institution offered assistance with claim procedures in treatment branches. We find lower incidence of child labor, hazardous occupations and child labor earnings caused by the innovation. Boys are more often engaged in child labor in our sample, but also seem to profit more from the insurance innovation.

Contract Nonperformance Risk and Ambiguity in Insurance Markets

Insurance contract nonperformance relates to situations when valid claims are not paid by the insurer. We extend probabilistic insurance models to allow for such nonperformance risk as well as ambiguity regarding nonperformance and loss probabilities. We empirically test theoretical predictions from our model within a field lab experiment in a low-income setting. This is a persuasive context, since especially in emerging and poorly regulated markets there is a higher chance of contract nonperformance. In line with our predictions, insurance demand decreases by 17 percentage points in the presence of contract nonperformance risk and is reduced by a further 14 percentage points when contract nonperformance risk is ambiguous. It also seems that ambiguity does not easily disappear with experience. The results have implications for both industrialized and developing insurance markets.

Effects of Insurance on Child Labour: Ex-Ante and Ex-Post Behavioural Changes

Abstract In this paper we analyse possible effects of insurance on child labour. First, we develop a theoretical model that separates effects of insurance with and without a shock taking place. We then empirically test the hypotheses derived from the model by analysing the extension of a health insurance product in urban Hyderabad in Pakistan. Consistent with the theoretical model we develop in this paper, the reduction in child labour caused by the extension is largely due to an ex-ante feeling of protection as opposed to an ex-post shock-mitigation effect.

Self-governance and punishment: An experimental study among Namibian forest users

We use a framed field experiment to assess resource harvesting behavior and its interaction with prosocial and antisocial punishment in the Kavango woodland savannah of Namibia. We implement two treatments, one with external, centralized punishment and one with internal, decentralized punishment. Our findings suggest that institution type matters, as internal punishment is a more effective regime to discipline high harvesters compared with external punishment. We find that antisocial punishment (i.e., the sanctioning of people who cooperate by free riders) happens frequently, partly as revenge and especially in ethnically heterogeneous groups, but ultimately does not prevent cooperative self-governance.