Andreas Ufen

Political party and party system institutionalization in Southeast Asia: lessons for democratic consolidation in Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand

Abstract Is a higher degree of party and party system institutionalization positively correlated with the consolidation of democracy, defined here as the prevention of democratic breakdown? In order to answer this question, it is useful to compare different levels and types of institutionalization in three Southeast Asian electoral democracies. Institutionalized party systems are characterized, according to Mainwaring and Torcal, by ‘stability of interparty competition.’ Moreover, the distinction made by Levitsky (‘value infusion’ versus ‘behavioural routinization’) with reference to the institutionalization of individual parties will be employed. The empirical research of this paper finds that most Indonesian parties are better institutionalized than those in the Philippines and Thailand with reference to ‘value infusion.’ In addition, the interparty competition is more stable in Indonesia. Therefore, the probability of a collapse of the party system in the Philippines and Thailand is much higher. This, in turn, renders the democracies in these countries more fragile and prone to political crises or even sudden breakdowns. The early organizational consolidation of social cleavages, such as in Indonesia, enhances institutionalization. A few of the most important parties are socially rooted and have strong linkages to civil and/or religious organizations. Furthermore, the relationship between central and local elites appears to be essential: strong bosses or cliques undermine institutionalization in the Philippines and in Thailand, respectively. However, in recent years there has also been a tendency towards convergence. There are signs of regression in Indonesia, such that the future of the party system is open to question. This article calls for caution with respect to the stated causal relation between institutionalization and democratic consolidation, and it questions some aspects of the concept.

The Transformation of Political Party Opposition in Malaysia and its Implications for the Electoral Authoritarian Regime

Malaysias electoral authoritarian system is increasingly coming under pressure. Indicators of this are the metamorphosis of opposition forces since 1998 and, in particular, the results of the 2008 parliamentary elections. From 1957 until 1998 political party opposition was fragmented. An initial transformation of political party opposition began at the height of the Asian financial crisis, after a major conflict within the ruling United Malays National Organization in 1998. However, the regime was able to weaken the opposition, resulting in its poor performance in the 2004 elections. Afterwards, in a second transformation that has continued until the present time, an oppositional Peoples Alliance (Pakatan Rakyat) has emerged that now has a serious chance of taking over the federal government. This article argues that the increase in the strength and cohesion of political party opposition since 1998 has been caused mainly by five combined factors: the emergence of pro-democratic segments within a multi-ethnic and multi-religious middle class; the intensified interaction of political parties and civil society forces; the impact of new media; the eroded legitimacy of the United Malays National Organization and other parties of the ruling coalition; and the internal reforms within the Islamist Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (Parti Islam SeMalaysia). Consequently it has become conceivable that the country will incrementally democratize in a protracted transition. Although the 1999 and 2008 elections were not foundational, they have been transitional. They may not have inaugurated a new democratic regime, but they have marked important phases in the struggle for democracy in Malaysia.

Political Party and Party System Institutionalisation in Southeast Asia: A Comparison of Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand

It is generally acknowledged that a higher degree of party and party system institutionali-sation is positively correlated with the consolidation of democracy. It is, thus, useful to compare different levels and types of institutionalisation. In this article the distinction made by Levitsky (‘value infusion’ vs. ‘behavioural routinisation’) with reference to party institutionalisation will be employed. Moreover, institutionalised party systems are char-acterized, according to Mainwaring and Torcal, by ‘stability of interparty competition’. The empirical research of this paper finds that the early organisational consolidation of so-cial cleavages, such as in Indonesia, enhances institutionalisation. Furthermore, the rela-tion between central and local elites appears to be essential: strong bosses or cliques un-dermine institutionalisation in the Philippines and in Thailand respectively. Most Indone-sian parties are better institutionalised than those in the Philippines and Thailand with reference to ‘value infusion’. In addition, the party system in Indonesia is better institu-tionalised in terms of ‘stability of interparty competition’.

Laissez-faire versus Strict Control of Political Finance: Hegemonic Parties and Developmental States in Malaysia and Singapore

ABSTRACT This article compares the financing of political parties and candidates in two Southeast Asian countries. In Malaysia, some political finance regulations exist only on paper, and political financing is for the most part not restrained at all. In contrast, the financing of candidates and parties has always been tightly circumscribed in Singapore. These different strategies, “laissez-faire” versus “strict control,” are the consequence of various factors. In Malaysia, the New Economic Policy has effected a close, often economically unproductive linkage between the state, the ruling Barisan Nasional coalition, and business. The rise of businesspeople has resulted in the commercialization of competition within (the United Malays National Organisation. Additionally, increasing competition between the ruling coalition and the opposition has resulted in growing expenditures for electioneering in the form of advertisements and electoral patronage. The laissez-faire style of regulation has been compounded by the difficult-to-control practices in East Malaysia (Sabah and Sarawak), where vote buying, electoral patronage based on the largesse of oligarchs, and obvious nonobservance of the rules have been typical. In contrast to Malaysia as a whole, the costs for parties and candidates are still relatively low in Singapore. As a cadre party, the PAP (Peoples Action Party) is relatively autonomous from private business interests, and intraparty competition is not commercialized; the developmentalist state is highly productive, and the ties between the state, the PAP, and business are not characterized by cronyism. Moreover, electioneering is not very commercialized because the opposition is still relatively weak.

The Evolution of Cleavages in the Indonesian Party System

The basic patterns of the initial Indonesian party system have reemerged after more than four decades of authoritarianism. The cleavage model by Lipset and Rokkan is well-suited to analyzing the genesis of and the most salient features of this party system. However, in applying the approach, some adjustments have to be made. For instance, the national and industrial revolutions have to be conceived of differently. Moreover, it is useful to distinguish critical phases in the formation of parties. The four cleavages have to be reinterpreted and additional ones need to be identified. In Indonesia, economic cleavages are hardly significant in conflicts between political parties (especially the “capital” versus “labour” cleavage) or are expressed in terms of religion or allegiance to political leaders based in a specific region (“urban” versus “rural”). In addition, in comparison with 1999 and particularly with the 1950s, today’s cleavages are less marked. Thus, the Lipset- Rokkan model has to be combined with other approaches which underline the importance of clientelism and the dealignment of parties.

Participation without democracy. Containing conflict in Southeast Asia, by Garry Rodan

In this excellent book, Garry Rodan develops a new approach on modes of political participation (MOP). He differentiates between four MOPs according to sites of participation (state and trans-state...

Political Finance Regimes in Southeast Asia: Introduction

ABSTRACT The three articles in this themed collection investigate the interplay between political finance regimes and the quality of democracy in Southeast Asia. Andreas Ufens piece on political finance in Malaysia and Singapore argues that the semi-authoritarian regimes in both states have blocked the reform of campaign and party funding regulations in order to keep their opposition in check. The article on Indonesia, authored by Marcus Mietzner, showcases the countrys dysfunctional political finance system as a major hurdle toward further democratization. In their contribution on Thailand, Napisa Waitoolkiat and Paul Chambers show that weak political finance regulations have contributed significantly to the shallowness of Thai parties. Overall, the collection demonstrates that without meaningful political finance reforms, Southeast Asias democratic stagnation is likely to persist for many years to come.