Andrei P. Tsygankov

If not by tanks, then by banks? The role of soft power in Putin's foreign policy

Abstract This article considers the benefits of the recently developed concept of ‘soft power’ in understanding Russias foreign policy. It argues that claims that Moscow is exercising a form of soft power imperialism in the former Soviet region cannot be fully supported by the existing evidence. To differentiate between the imperialist and stabilising objectives of Russian foreign policy the article analyses the Russian domestic discourse on exploiting soft power in foreign policy. It then compares the views of different schools of thought with Vladimir Putins philosophy and foreign policy record. Finally, it selects for closer investigation Russias policy in the Caucasus.

Mastering space in Eurasia: Russia’s geopolitical thinking after the Soviet break-up

This essay assumes the significance of spatial imagination in shaping the political and cultural boundaries of the post-Soviet Eurasia and reviews the newly emerged geopolitical arguments in Russia. Rather than perceiving Eurasianist views in Russia as relatively homogeneous, I argue that such thinking is highly diverse and varies from West-friendly versions to those that are openly isolationist and expansionist. To support my argument, I select six recently published Russian volumes and group them into five distinct schools of Russia’s geopolitical thinking, each with their own intellectual assumptions, worldviews, and bases of support in the society. While writing on the same subject of the Eurasian geopolitics, each author proposes principally different solutions to the problems that emerged over the 10 years of Russia’s post-communist experience. The argument invites us to rethink the nature of Russia’s spatial thinking and activities in Eurasia and to seriously consider engaging Russia as an equal participant in a larger collective security-based arrangement in the region. Geography may ‘matter’ … only as the moment in which abstract universal social processes, such as social stratification, state-building, and ideological hegemony, are revealed in space. John Agnew and Stuart Corbridge, Mastering Space (1995, 13)

Vladimir Putin's Vision of Russia as a Normal Great Power

A specialist on Russian foreign policy analyzes Putins international strategy. The author draws on the writings of Russias foreign policy decisionmakers, as well as on the commentary of Russian and Western analysts, to identify Putins vision and compare it with that of recent leaders. Three elements of Putins policies are examined: state concentration, cooperation with the West, and Russias projection of influence in the former Soviet region. The question of Western responses to Putins strategy is also addressed.

Vladimir Putin's last stand: the sources of Russia's Ukraine policy

The paper studies Russias Ukraine policy since the Orange Revolution. Russias policy toward its western neighbor has evolved from unhappy relations with Victor Yushchenko to rapprochement with Victor Yanukovich and then confrontation over the revolutionary power change in Kiev in February 2014. The paper argues that Vladimir Putins actions following February revolution in Kiev demonstrate both change and continuity in Russias foreign policy. Although these actions constituted a major escalation, relative to Russias previous behavior toward Ukraine, the escalation of relations with Kiev also reflected a broader policy pattern of Russias assertive relations with the Western nations adopted by the Kremlin since the mid-2000s. What made Russias conflict with Ukraine possible, even inevitable, was the Wests lack of recognition for Russias values and interests in Eurasia, on the one hand, and the critically important role that Ukraine played in the Kremlins foreign policy calculations, on the other. The paper provides an empirically grounded interpretation of Russias changing policy that emphasizes Russia–Ukraine–West interaction and a mutually reinforcing dynamics of their misunderstanding. It also addresses four alternative explanations of Russias Ukraine policy and discusses several dangers and possible solutions to the crisis.

Finding a Civilisational Idea: “West,” Eurasia,” and “Euro-East” in Russia's Foreign Policy

Civilisations are imagined, ratherm than real, and nations undergoing identity crises typically represent themselves through multiple civilisational visions. Scholars of geopolitics can hardly understand foreign policy without analysing those visions and social contexts, in which they rise and fall. This article selects for analysis three distinct civilisational ideas of Russia – “West,” “Eurasia” and “Euro-East” – associated with Boris Yeltsin, Yevgeni Primakov and Vladimir Putin, respectively. Russias foreign policy is best understood as reflecting those civilisational ideas rather than merely material power conditions.

National ideology and IR theory: Three incarnations of the ‘Russian idea’

In an attempt to broaden our perspective on IR theory formation, this article seeks to highlight the significance of ideology. Consistent with the recently revived sociology of knowledge tradition in international studies, we view IR scholarship as grounded in certain social and ideological conditions. Although some scholars have studied the political, ideological, and epistemological biases of Western, particularly American, civilization, in order to achieve a better understanding of global patterns of knowledge formation it is important to look at cases beyond the West. We therefore look at the formation of IR knowledge in Russia, and we argue that the development of a Russian theory of international relations responds to the old debate on the ‘Russian idea,’ and three distinct ideological traditions that had been introduced to the national discourse in the mid-19th century. Focusing on theories and concepts of the international system, regional order, and foreign policy, as developed by Russian scholars, we attempt to demonstrate how they are shaped by ideological and therefore pre-theoretical assumptions about social reality.

The heartland no more: Russia’s weakness and Eurasia’s meltdown☆

The Eurasian region continues to disintegrate, and neither Russia nor the West has been able to arrest the destabilizing dynamics. Evidence of rising instability throughout the region include the August 2008 Russia-Georgia war, terrorist attacks in the Northern Caucasus, the persistent failure of Western forces to stabilize Afghanistan, the inability of Central Asian rulers to reign in local clans and drug lords, and the paralysis of legitimately elected bodies of power in Ukraine and Moldova. The Wests attempts to secure and stabilize Eurasia after the end of the Cold War have not led to success. Russia too has greatly contributed to the Eurasian meltdown. The Soviet collapse and the subsequent retreat of Russia from the region have greatly destabilized the area. The relative recovery of the Russian economy during the post-Yeltsin decade began to revive Russias standing in Eurasia, yet Moscow could ill afford serious efforts to stabilize and pacify the region. Russias resurgence is a response to its lacking recognition as a vital power and partner of the West. If Russia chooses to dedicate itself to obstructing Western policies in Eurasia, we will see more of the collapsing dynamics in the region. Preventing this requires recognizing Russias role in stabilizing the region and working with Russia in developing a joint assessment of threat and establishing a collective security arrangement in Eurasia.

Preserving Influence in a Changing World: Russia's Grand Strategy

Under Putin and Medvedev, Russia has been creating flexible international coalitions in order to achieve its central objective of becoming an independent center of power and influence. This strategy will work only if the Kremlin can find a workable combination of assertiveness and international recognition.

Russia's International Assertiveness: What Does It Mean for the West?

The Kremlins new international assertiveness is an opportunity for cooperation, not confrontation.

Russia's Power and Alliances in the 21st Century

Russias power resources have recovered significantly since the start of the twenty-first century and with that recovery the Kremlin has become more assertive in pursuing its great power ambitions. To remain a great power, however, even a regional one, Russia has to recover its economy and learn to exploit its comparative advantages, such as expertise in energy and military affairs and memberships in international organisations.