Andrés Abeliuk

Practical Compressed Suffix Trees

The suffix tree is an extremely important data structure in bioinformatics. Classical implementations require much space, which renders them useless to handle large sequence collections. Recent research has obtained various compressed representations for suffix trees, with widely different space-time tradeoffs. In this paper we show how the use of range min-max trees yields novel representations achieving practical space/time tradeoffs. In addition, we show how those trees can be modified to index highly repetitive collections, obtaining the first compressed suffix tree representation that effectively adapts to that scenario.

Iterated crowdsourcing dilemma game

The Internet has enabled the emergence of collective problem solving, also known as crowdsourcing, as a viable option for solving complex tasks. However, the openness of crowdsourcing presents a challenge because solutions obtained by it can be sabotaged, stolen, and manipulated at a low cost for the attacker. We extend a previously proposed crowdsourcing dilemma game to an iterated game to address this question. We enumerate pure evolutionarily stable strategies within the class of so-called reactive strategies, i.e., those depending on the last action of the opponent. Among the 4096 possible reactive strategies, we find 16 strategies each of which is stable in some parameter regions. Repeated encounters of the players can improve social welfare when the damage inflicted by an attack and the cost of attack are both small. Under the current framework, repeated interactions do not really ameliorate the crowdsourcing dilemma in a majority of the parameter space.

The benefits of social influence in optimized cultural markets.

Social influence has been shown to create significant unpredictability in cultural markets, providing one potential explanation why experts routinely fail at predicting commercial success of cultural products. As a result, social influence is often presented in a negative light. Here, we show the benefits of social influence for cultural markets. We present a policy that uses product quality, appeal, position bias and social influence to maximize expected profits in the market. Our computational experiments show that our profit-maximizing policy leverages social influence to produce significant performance benefits for the market, while our theoretical analysis proves that our policy outperforms in expectation any policy not displaying social signals. Our results contrast with earlier work which focused on showing the unpredictability and inequalities created by social influence. Not only do we show for the first time that, under our policy, dynamically showing consumers positive social signals increases the expected profit of the seller in cultural markets. We also show that, in reasonable settings, our profit-maximizing policy does not introduce significant unpredictability and identifies “blockbusters”. Overall, these results shed new light on the nature of social influence and how it can be leveraged for the benefits of the market.

Assortment optimization under a multinomial logit model with position bias and social influence

Motivated by applications in retail, online advertising, and cultural markets, this paper studies the problem of finding an optimal assortment and positioning of products subject to a capacity constraint in a setting where consumers preferences can be modeled as a discrete choice under a multinomial logit model that captures the intrinsic product appeal, position biases, and social influence. For the static problem, we prove that the optimal assortment and positioning can be found in polynomial time. This is despite the fact that adding a product to the assortment may increase the probability of selecting the no-choice option, a phenomenon not observed in almost all models studied in the literature. We then consider the dynamics of such a market, where consumers are influenced by the aggregate past purchases. In this dynamic setting, we provide a small example to show that the natural and often used policy known as popularity ranking, that ranks products in decreasing order of the number of purchases, can reduce the expected profit as times goes by. We then prove that a greedy policy that applies the static optimal assortment and positioning at each period, always benefits from the popularity signal and outperforms any policy where consumers cannot observe the number of past purchases (in expectation).

Bargaining Mechanisms for One-Way Games

We introduce one-way games, a two-player framework whose distinguishable feature is that the private payoff of one (independent) player is determined only by her own strategy and does not depend on the actions taken by the other (dependent) player. We show that the equilibrium outcome in one-way games without side payments and the social cost of any ex post efficient mechanism can be far from the optimum. We also show that it is impossible to design a Bayes–Nash incentive-compatible mechanism for one-way games that is budget-balanced, individually rational and efficient. To address this negative result, we propose a privacy-preserving mechanism based on a single-offer bargaining made by the dependent player that leverages the intrinsic advantage of the independent player. In this setting the outside option of the dependent player is not known a priori; however, we show that the mechanism satisfies individual rationality conditions, is incentive-compatible, budget-balanced and produces an outcome that is more efficient than the equilibrium without payments. Finally, we show that a randomized multi-offer extension brings no additional benefit in terms of efficiency.