Andrew B. Leber

Coordination of Voluntary and Stimulus-Driven Attentional Control in Human Cortex

Visual attention may be voluntarily directed to particular locations or features (voluntary control), or it may be captured by salient stimuli, such as the abrupt appearance of a new perceptual object (stimulus-driven control). Most often, however, the deployment of attention is the result of a dynamic interplay between voluntary attentional control settings (e.g., based on prior knowledge about a targets location or color) and the degree to which stimuli in the visual scene match these voluntary control settings. Consequently, nontarget items in the scene that share a defining feature with the target of visual search can capture attention, a phenomenon termed contingent attentional capture. We used functional magnetic resonance imaging to show that attentional capture by target-colored distractors is accompanied by increased cortical activity in corresponding regions of retinotopically organized visual cortex. Concurrent activation in the temporo-parietal junction and ventral frontal cortex suggests that these regions coordinate voluntary and stimulus-driven attentional control settings to determine which stimuli effectively compete for attention.

Made you blink! Contingent attentional capture produces a spatial blink

Previous studies have shown that the capture of attention by an irrelevant stimulus can be eliminated by foreknowledge of the spatial location of the relevant target stimulus. To explore whether spatial certainty is sufficient to eliminate capture, four experiments are reported in which the spatial location of the target is certain but the temporal position is uncertain. Subjects viewed a central rapid serial visual presentation stream in which a target letter was defined by a particular color (e.g., red). On critical trials, irrelevant color singletons appeared in the periphery. In Experiments 1 and 2, peripheral singletons produced a decrement in central target identification that was contingent on the match between the singleton color and the target color. Experiments 3 and 4 provided evidence that this decrement reflected a shift of spatial attention to the location of the distractor. The results suggest that spatial certainty is not sufficient to eliminate attentional capture and that attentional capture can result in a spatial “blink” that is conditional on top-down attentional control settings.

It’s under control: Top-down search strategies can override attentional capture

Bacon and Egeth (1994) proposed that observed instances of attentional capture by feature singletons (e.g., color) were the result of a salience-based strategy adopted by subjects (singleton detection mode) and, thus, were not automatic. They showed that subjects could override capture by adopting strategies based on searching for specific target features (feature search mode). However, Theeuwes (2004) has recently argued that Bacon and Egeth’s results arose from experimental confounds. He elaborated a model in which attentional capture must be expected when salient distractors fall within a spatialwindow of attention. According to Theeuwes’s (2004) model, there exist two essential criteria for examining stimulus-driven capture. First, search latencies cannot increase with display size, since the search must be parallel; second, the salience of the irrelevant distractor must not be compromised by characteristics of the search display. Contrary to the predictions of Theeuwes’s (2004) model, we provide evidence that involuntary capture can be overridden when both of these criteria are met. Our results are consistent with Bacon and Egeth’s proposal.

Effects of Task Relevance and Stimulus-Driven Salience in Feature-Search Mode.

Attentional allocation in feature-search mode (W. F. Bacon & H. E. Egeth, 1994) is thought to be solely determined by top-down factors, with no role for stimulus-driven salience. The authors reassessed this conclusion using variants of the spatial cuing and rapid serial visual presentation paradigms developed by C. L. Folk and colleagues (C. L. Folk, R. W. Remington, & J. C. Johnston, 1992; C. L. Folk, A. B. Leber, & H. E. Egeth, 2002). They found that (a) a nonsingleton distractor that possesses the target feature produces attentional capture, (b) such capture is modulated by bottom-up salience, and (c) resistance to capture by irrelevant singletons is mediated by inhibitory processes. These results extend the role of top-down factors in search for a nonsingleton target while arguing against the notion that effects of bottom-up salience and top-down factors on attentional priority are strictly encapsulated within distinct search modes.

Neural predictors of moment-to-moment fluctuations in cognitive flexibility

Cognitive flexibility is a crucial human ability allowing efficient adaptation to changing task challenges. Although a persons degree of flexibility can vary from moment to moment, the conditions regulating such fluctuations are not well understood. Using a task-switching procedure with fMRI, we found several brain regions in which neural activity preceding each trial predicted subsequent cognitive flexibility. Specifically, as pretrial activity increased, performance improved on trials when the task switched but did not improve when the task repeated. Regions from which flexibility could be predicted reliably included the basal ganglia, anterior cingulate cortex, prefrontal cortex, and posterior parietal cortex. Although further analysis revealed similarities across the regions in how flexibility was predicted, results supported the existence of multiple independent sources of prediction. These results reveal distinct neural mechanisms underlying fluctuations in cognitive flexibility.

Attention on autopilot: Past experience and attentional set

What factors determine the implementation of attentional set? It is often assumed that set is determined only by experimenter instructions and characteristics of the immediate stimulus environment, yet it is likely that other factors play a role. The present experiments were designed to evaluate the latter possibility; specifically, the role of past experience was probed. In a 320-trial training phase, observers could use one of two possible attentional sets (but not both) to find colour-defined targets in a rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) stream of letters. In the subsequent 320-trial test phase, where either set could be used, observers persisted in using their pre-established sets through the remainder of the experiment, affirming a clear role of past experience in the implementation of attentional set. A second experiment revealed that sufficient experience with a given set was necessary to facilitate persistence with it. These results are consistent with models of executive control (e.g., Norman & Shallice, 1986), in which “top-down” behaviours are influenced by learned associations between tasks and the environment.

Neural Predictors of Within-Subject Fluctuations in Attentional Control

Whether salient objects automatically capture attention has long been the subject of considerable controversy. A possible resolution, investigated in this functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study, is that observers vacillate between periods when attention capture is robust and when it is minimal. Human observers searched static displays for a target circle among nontarget squares; an irrelevant color singleton distractor appeared on 50% of trials. Behavioral results showed a distraction effect in which response times to distractor-present trials were slower than for distractor-absent trials. fMRI results confirmed that this distraction effect not only fluctuated within experimental sessions, but the momentary degree of distraction could be predicted in advance by pretrial activity in middle frontal gyrus. A second experiment ruled out an alternative account by which participants achieved resistance to capture by trading off search efficiency. Together, these data reveal that observers frequently exert the capacity to resist attentional distraction, although they do not to sustain this capacity for long periods of time.

Effects of search mode and intertrial priming on singleton search

There is no consensus as to what information guides search for a singleton target. Does the most salient display element capture attention, regardless of the observer’s attentional set? Do observers adopt a default salience-based search mode? Does knowledge of the target’s defining featural property (when available) affect search? Finally, can intertrial contingencies account for the disparate results in the literature? We investigated search for a shape singleton when (1) the target and nontarget shapes switched unpredictably from trial to trial, (2) the target feature remained fixed, and (3) the target was a singleton on only one third of the trials. We examined overall reaction times, search slopes, errors, and the magnitude of the slowing caused by a cross-dimensional singleton distractor. Our results argue against the idea that search is guided solely by stimulus-driven factors or that subjects adopt asingleton detection mode that is blind to feature information. They show also that intertrial contingencies, although potent, cannot account for the variety of results in the literature.

Top-down control settings and the attentional blink: Evidence for nonspatial contingent capture

Previous studies have shown that spatial attention can be “captured” by irrelevant events, but only if the eliciting stimulus matches top-down attentional control settings. Here we explore whether similar principles hold for nonspatial attentional selection. Subjects searched for a coloured target letter embedded in an RSVP stream of letters inside a box centred on fixation. On critical trials, a distractor, consisting of a brief change in the colour of the box, occurred at various temporal lags prior to the target. In Experiment 1, the distractor produced a decrement in target detection, but only when it matched the target colour. Experiments 2 and 3 provide evidence that this effect does not reflect masking or the dispersion of spatial attention. The results establish that (1) nonspatial selection is subject to “capture”, (2) such capture is contingent on top-down attentional control settings, and (3) control settings for nonspatial capture can vary in specificity.

Long-term Abstract Learning of Attentional Set

How does past experience influence visual search strategy (i.e., attentional set)? Recent reports have shown that, when given the option to use 1 of 2 attentional sets, observers persist with the set previously required in a training phase. Here, 2 related questions are addressed. First, does the training effect result only from perseveration with the currently active set or from long-term learning? Experiment 1 supported the latter alternative: When training and test were separated by up to 1 week, to prevent perseveration across the 2 sessions, the training effect was still obtained. Second, is the learning feature-specific (tuned to a precise set of colors) or more abstract? Experiments 2 and 3 supported the latter: When stimulus colors were switched between training and test to remove the possibility of feature-specific learning, the training effect again was obtained. These experiments indicate that attentional set is largely guided by long-term abstract learning.