Andrew C. Kuchins

Russian Foreign Policy: Continuity in Change

The imminent return of Vladimir Putin to the presidency of the Russian Federation in 2012 raises many questions about the future of Russian foreign and security policy as well as U.S.—Russia relations. To what extent will Putin seek to continue and implement the goals of current President Dmitri Medvedev’s modernization program? Will Putin reform the political system in the direction of decentralization of power and pluralism? Will the ‘‘reset’’ in U.S.—Russia relations endure? Even with these issues up in the air, the return of Putin as president will not significantly alter the course of Moscow’s foreign policy. Some argue that Putin never relinquished authority over foreign policy in the first place, and that may well be true. But even if it is, there are deeper structural reasons involving debates among Russian elites about foreign policy and Russia’s place in the world that are more important in explaining why Putin’s return will not usher in a significant policy shift.

Afghanistan: Building the Missing Link in the Modern Silk Road

In the fall of 2009, the Obama administration undertook a lengthy review of its strategy for the war in Afghanistan that resulted in the controversial decision to increase the U.S. force presence by 30,000 troops in 2010 and to begin withdrawal in July 2011. Most of the spirited public debate revolves around security challenges, such as the number of troops, and choosing a balance between counterinsurgency or counterterrorism strategies. This is understandable given the major investments of blood and treasure the United States will continue to make in the effort to stabilize Afghanistan and root out terrorist threats. But even if U.S. and coalition forces are successful in bringing greater security to Afghanistan, these gains will be short-lived if the United States does not develop a more comprehensive regional strategy now. This strategy must go beyond ‘‘AfPak’’ and should make the longer-term economic viability of Afghanistan as high a priority as increasing its near-term security. In the first half of 2009, the United States established several new transit corridors to deliver nonlethal goods to its forces in Afghanistan. Collectively, these new supply lines have been termed the Northern Distribution Network (NDN). This label underscores the NDN’s demilitarized, commercial nature as well as an open-ended vision of a multiplicity of supply routes to Afghanistan. The logic is twofold: relying on multiple transit corridors increases both the security and the leverage of the consumer, in this case the U.S. military. The key point is

A Truly Regional Economic Strategy for Afghanistan

Two events in the past year have shifted the focus of efforts to stabilize Afghanistan as President Obama’s July 2011 deadline for beginning a drawdown of U.S. forces approaches. The first was the Kabul Conference, held July 20, 2010, where Afghan President Hamid Karzai announced that Afghanistan would take full responsibility for its sovereignty and security by the end of 2014. The November 2010 NATO conference in Lisbon the second event confirmed this benchmark for full transition to Afghan sovereignty as well as a longer-term commitment to a ‘‘strong partnership’’ beyond 2014. While there are certain caveats about ‘‘conditions-based’’ decisions regarding these benchmarks, this timeframe should guide the strategic planning of the Afghan government, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), and regional partners. The timeframe was then confirmed in the December 2010 summary of the Obama administration’s annual review of Afghanistan and Pakistan, declaring: ‘‘This review also underscores the importance of a sustained long-term commitment to the region . . . [with] the goal for Afghans to assume the lead for security across the country by 2014, and NATO’s enduring commitment beyond 2014.’’ The review pointed out some of the successes of the counterinsurgency strategy implemented in 2009, in concert with the surge in forces, but noted that these gains remain fragile. It also documented the improvement in U.S.—Pakistani relations and the role the Strategic Dialogue between the two countries has played in promoting ‘‘development objectives important to the people of Pakistan.’’ Bizarrely absent, however, was any mention of promoting development objectives important to the people of Afghanistan. In fact, there is no mention in the review at all about the status or importance of sustained economic growth