Andrew F. Smith

Political deliberation and the challenge of bounded rationality

Many proponents of deliberative democracy expect reasonable citizens to engage in rational argumentation. However, this expectation runs up against findings by behavioral economists and social psychologists revealing the extent to which normal cognitive functions are influenced by bounded rationality. Individuals regularly utilize an array of biases in the process of making decisions, which inhibits our argumentative capacities by adversely affecting our ability and willingness to be self-critical and to give due consideration to others’ interests. Although these biases cannot be overcome, I draw on scientifically corroborated insights offered by Adam Smith to show that they can be kept in check if certain affective and cognitive capacities are cultivated. Smith provides a compelling account of how to foster sympathetic, impartial, and projective role-taking in the process of interacting with others, which can greatly enhance our capacity and willingness to critically assess our own interests and fairly consider those of others.

Food Deserts, Capabilities, and the Rectification of Democratic Failure

Abstract Food deserts include any area in the industrialized world in which reasonably priced, nutritious food is difficult to obtain. They constitute a pressing public health concern insofar as food desert inhabitants disproportionately suffer from a variety of diet-related conditions. Amartya Sen has written extensively about famine as a failure of functional governance. I draw on these considerations to defend two claims. First, the perpetuation of food deserts also constitutes a breakdown specifically of functional democracy. Second, this breakdown is best addressed by implementing programs and policies that reflect Sens capabilities approach to justice. I challenge the proposition that resourcism or any other competing approach is preferable for this particular undertaking.

Religion in the public sphere Incentivizing reciprocal deliberative engagement

Commonplace among deliberative theorists is the view that, when defending preferred laws and policies, citizens should appeal only to reasons they expect others reasonably to accept. This view has been challenged on the grounds that it places an undue burden on religious citizens who feel duty-bound to appeal to religious reasons to justify preferred positions. In response, I develop a conception of democratic deliberation that provides unlimited latitude regarding the sorts of reasons that can be introduced, so long as one is prepared to defend them against criticism. Moreover, I contend that religious citizens have a powerful incentive, based on their religious convictions, to be fully responsive to criticism. I defend this proposition by drawing on Robert Erlewine’s account of Hermann Cohen’s ‘religion of reason’.