Andrew Fagan

Cultural harm and engaging the limits of a right to cultural identity

This article critically examines the limits of a right to cultural identity. Some have argued that human rights norms require a reformulation in the light of cultural diversity. One element of this approach will be examined: the right of exit, as it appears to provide an instrument by which legislative authorities can largely avoid the politically and conceptually fraught challenge of normatively evaluating traditions and practices. By analyzing the effects of domestic abuse, this article will argue that a human rights-based evaluation of rights to cultural identity cannot rely entirely upon the following principle: that an individuals lack of overt opposition to key defining and binding relationships provides a secure basis for a rights-based response to cultural identity. The article will demonstrate that some domestically-abused womens ability to exercise their right of exit has been effectively disabled by the highly restrictive identities which their communities accord to them.

Human Rights: Between Idealism and Realism

Like the previous two editions of Christian Tomuschats highly impressive book, this edition is best suited for readers who already possess some knowledge of and familiarity with the theory and pra...

The challenge of cultural diversity: the limited value of the right of exit

Abstract This article traces recent trends in British politics, liberal political theory and human rights law in order to demonstrate why the right of exit – made famous in the political theory of multiculturalism by Chandran Kukathas – may be able to mediate tensions between them. I argue that the right of exit is an insufficient test for consent because some cultures may render some members incapable of effectively exercising their autonomy. I use empirical evidence drawn from legal cases and social science in conjunction with a philosophical account of agency as fundamentally ‘relational’ to unpack and defend this controversial claim. Understanding agency in relational terms sheds light on precisely how oppressive culturally permitted relationships can simultaneously constitute some individuals’ primary identities while serving to harm those very same individuals in the process. This account of agency and culture also avoids both the liberal assumption of a sovereign self and also any essentialism or reification of culture. I suggest that for an individual to have the capacity to effectively use of the right of exit, they must be able to conceive of themselves as an agent, which includes having a sense of their own moral worth and the ability to imagine the possibility of living a different kind of life.

Defending corporate social responsibility: Myanmar and the lesser evil

This article examines an enduring issue in human rights scholarship generally, through the perspective of my recent experiences of undertaking corporate social responsibility (CSR) training in Myanmar. The relationship between theory (in the form of conceptual reasoning and analysis) and practice (the legal and political application of human rights principles) is complex and, on occasion, contradictory and paradoxical. Conceptually a strong and critically coherent argument can be made against CSR as being fundamentally incompatible with the moral objectives of human rights. In many ways, I share the view that, conceptually, CSR and human rights are incompatible. The implication of this standpoint is to refrain from undertaking any forms of CSR promotion and training and thereby remain consistent with ones intellectual principles. However, the human rights challenges in Myanmar caused me to suspend my intellectual objections to accepting an offer to provide CSR training there in 2012. Beginning with a conceptual analysis of the relationship between theory and practice within traditions of radical political philosophy, I proceed to evaluate my own apparent intellectual contradiction by reference to the notion of the lesser evil. By analysing a specific empirical instance I aim to outline a perspective upon human rights which seeks to reconcile apparent conflict between conceptual analysis and practical human rights action. In so doing, I aim to generate further discussion on the nature of the complex relationship between human rights theory as embodying a predominantly critical perspective upon existing economic realities and the unavoidably practical dimension of human rights as the ongoing attempt to transform those realities, which necessitates engaging with them.

How Autonomous Is Medical Decision Making

Determining truly autonomous decision making is complex, especially when people have deeply held values and beliefs that might limit their real choices. Virtual Mentor is a monthly bioethics journal published by the American Medical Association.

Paradoxical bedfellows: Nihilism and human rights

This article identifies and considers the existence of a manifest, though often overlooked, paradox contained within the doctrine of human rights. The principal justifications for human rights are based upon the identification of variously conceived human characteristics, or attributes of human agency. Nevertheless, human rights have all too often been required to protect some human beings from being seriously harmed by other human beings. The justification for human rights envisages a single, universal community of human beings, whereas the actual application of human rights typically testifies to the existence of two, very distinct communities: victims and perpetrators. The single greatest impetus for the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was the desire to prevent the re-occurrence of genocide. The modern human rights regime emerged out of mountains of human corpses. One would like to claim that the impetus for human rights became less urgent after the horrors of the Holocaust. Unfortunately, genocide has persisted and gross violations of human rights remain a feature of the geo-political landscape. Our need for protective human rights remains as urgent today as it did fifty years ago. This article accounts for this paradox and answers the question: Why is it that the ultimate justification and application of the doctrine of human rights is frustrated by members of the very species upon which the doctrine is based?