Andrew Fenton

Ethical Challenges and Interpretive Difficulties with Non-Clinical Applications of Pediatric fMRI

In this article, we critically examine some of the ethical challenges and interpretive difficulties with possible future non-clinical applications of pediatric fMRI with a particular focus on applications in the classroom and the courtroom – two domains in which children come directly in contact with the state. We begin with a general overview of anticipated clinical and non-clinical applications of pediatric fMRI. This is followed by a detailed analysis of a range of ethical challenges and interpretive difficulties that trouble the use of fMRI and are likely to be especially acute with non-clinical uses of the technology. We conclude that knowledge of these challenges and difficulties should influence policy decisions regarding the non-clinical uses of fMRI. Our aim is to encourage the development of future policies prescribing the responsible use of this neuroimaging technology as it develops both within and outside the clinical setting.

The Extreme Male Brain Theory of Autism and the Potential Adverse Effects for Boys and Girls with Autism

Autism, typically described as a spectrum neurodevelopmental disorder characterized by impairments in verbal ability and social reciprocity as well as obsessive or repetitious behaviours, is currently thought to markedly affect more males than females. Not surprisingly, this encourages a gendered understanding of the Autism Spectrum. Simon Baron-Cohen, a prominent authority in the field of autism research, characterizes the male brain type as biased toward systemizing. In contrast, the female brain type is understood to be biased toward empathizing. Since persons with autism are characterized as hyper-systemizers and hypo-empathizers, Baron-Cohen suggests that, whether they are male or female, most possess an “extreme male brain profile.” We argue that Baron-Cohen is misled by an unpersuasive gendering of certain capacities or aptitudes in the human population. Moreover, we suggest that this may inadvertently favour boys in diagnosing children with Autism Spectrum Disorders. If this is correct, it could also have rather serious consequences for treatment and services for girls (and women) on the Autism Spectrum.

Chimera Research and Stem Cell Therapies for Human Neurodegenerative Disorders

In April 2005, the U.S. National Academy of Sciences (NAS) published its Guidelines for Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research . These voluntary guidelines are among the most permissive in the world—in a country that prohibits federal funding of research to derive human embryonic stem (hES) cells (cells that can self-renew or differentiate into most cells in the human body). One of the few research prohibitions in the NAS guidelines concerns the creation of certain kinds of human–nonhuman chimeras. A chimera is an organism with a mixture of cells from two different organisms , from the same or different species. Figure 1 provides a useful overview of different types of chimeras. This work was supported, in part, by a Stem Cell Network grant to Francoise Baylis and Jason Scott Robert and a CIHR grant to Francoise Baylis. We sincerely thank Alan Fine, Rich Campbell, Cynthia Cohen, and Tim Krahn for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. Thanks are also owed to Tim Krahn for his research assistance. An earlier version of this paper was presented to the Department of Bioethics and the Novel Tech Ethics research team ( www.noveltechethics.ca ). We thank the participants at each of these meetings for their helpful comments.

BUDDHISM AND NEUROETHICS: THE ETHICS OF PHARMACEUTICAL COGNITIVE ENHANCEMENT

This paper integrates some Buddhist moral values, attitudes and self-cultivation techniques into a discussion of the ethics of cognitive enhancement technologies - in particular, pharmaceutical enhancements. Many Buddhists utilize meditation techniques that are both integral to their practice and are believed to enhance the cognitive and affective states of experienced practitioners. Additionally, Mahāyāna Buddhisms teaching on skillful means permits a liberal use of methods or techniques in Buddhist practice that yield insight into our selfnature or aid in alleviating or eliminating duhkha (i.e. dissatisfaction). These features of many, if not most, Buddhist traditions will inform much of the Buddhist assessment of pharmaceutical enhancements offered in this paper. Some Buddhist concerns about the effects and context of the use of pharmaceutical enhancements will be canvassed in the discussion. Also, the author will consider Buddhist views of the possible harms that may befall human and nonhuman research subjects, interference with a recipients karma, the artificiality of pharmaceutical enhancements, and the possible motivations or intentions of healthy individuals pursuing pharmacological enhancement. Perhaps surprisingly, none of these concerns will adequately ground a reflective Buddhist opposition to the further development and continued use of pharmaceutical enhancements, either in principle or in practice. The author argues that Buddhists, from at least certain traditions - particularly Mahāyāna Buddhist traditions - should advocate the development or use of pharmaceutical enhancements if a consequence of their use is further insight into our self-nature or the reduction or alleviation of duhkha.

Responsibility and speculation: on possible applications of pediatric fMRI.

First and foremost, we thank the commentators for their responses. Many are fundamentally in agreement with us, and their contributions nicely complement our views. Others offer us a chance to clarify our position by challenging it. In the space allotted, it is difficult to give each commentary its due. Instead, we discuss the more salient objections that recur in one form or another in a number of commentaries and then briefly consider those commentaries that usefully expand on our views. One recurring criticism of our discussion of potential pediatric fMRI applications in the classroom or courtroom (Fenton et al. 2009) is that these applications are too speculative (see Celone and Stern (2009), Connors and Singh (2009), and Rosen (2009)). While several commentators recognize the importance of ensuring that ethical discussions are not merely reactive, they worry that our foci are so far removed from current applications that they are positively implausible. Connors and Singh (2009) go so far as to argue that we should constrain our moral gaze to present applications. We respectfully disagree with these commentators. Too much is at stake to stay ethical reflection on future applications of pediatric fMRI until they show themselves to be imminent. Celone and Stern (2009) and Rosen (2009) suggest that there are no serious prospects of extending fMRI to the nonclinical applications we identify. Perhaps, but who can know the future? In any case, it is important to note that the applications we discuss are the subject of peer-reviewed articles, popular media reports, as well as professional conversations with and among neuroscientists. Indeed, contra Ball (2009), Celone and Stern (2009) and Connors and Singh (2009), it is not mere lay hype that has led to prominent discussions of neuroimaging technology, including fMRI, in classroom or courtroom settings. Some neuroscientists fuel these discussions. Arguably, the burgeoning literature on using fMRI technology to image neural correlates of political attitudes, political emotions, moral emotions, and moral decision making (Amodio et al. 2007; Platt 2002; Qiu 2006;

Interrogating the Boundary of Human-Level and T Moral Status

As our development of neuroenhancement technologies continues apace, John Basl’s (2010) paper is a welcome addition to the discussion of appropriate state policy concerning the use of nonhuman animals in cognitive enhancement research. In this commentary we challenge the author to better interrogate and explicate the boundary of what he christens “human-level moral status” and “T moral status” (41). It is Basl’s contention that, within liberal states, policy is to be determined in part by the principle of neutrality of justification (PNJ). A policy accords with the PNJ “with respect to justification just in case that policy is consistent with all reasonable conceptions of the good embedded in liberal society” (41). In Basl’s view, the PNJ does not seek to offer substantive reasons for or against any particular policy; rather, it provides the necessary conditions for determining which ends are appropriate objects of state policy or which reasons are legitimately used by a state to justify its policies. Legitimate ends are those that can be sanctioned by the plu-

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Re-Conceiving Nonhuman Animal Knowledge Through Contemporary Primate Cognitive Studies

In this chapter I examine two claims that support the thesis that chimpanzees are substantive epistemic subjects. First, I defend the claim that chimpanzees are evidence gatherers (broadly construed to include the capacity to gather and use evidence). In the course of showing that this claim is probably true I will also show that, in being evidence gatherers, chimpanzees engage in a recognizable epistemic activity. Second, I defend the claim that chimpanzees achieve a degree of epistemic success while engaging in epistemic activity. Though this approach to chimpanzees can be extended to other nonhuman animals, I will restrict my discussion in this chapter to these nonhuman great apes.