Andrew Garwood-Gowers

China and the “Responsibility to Protect”: The Implications of the Libyan Intervention

The emerging principle of a “responsibility to protect” (R2P) presents a direct challenge to China’s traditional emphasis on the twin principles of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other states and non-use of military force. This paper considers the evolution of China’s relationship with R2P over the past ten years. In particular, it examines how China engaged with R2P during the recent Libyan crisis, and considers what impact this conflict may have first, on Chinese attitudes to R2P, and second, on the future development and implementation of the doctrine itself. This paper argues that China’s decision to allow the passage of Security Council resolution 1973, authorising force in Libya, was shaped by an unusual set of political and factual circumstances, and should not be viewed as evidence of a dramatic shift in Chinese attitudes towards R2P. More broadly, controversy over the scope of NATO’s military action in Libya has raised questions about R2P’s legitimacy, which have contributed to a lack of timely international action in Syria. In the short term at least, this post-Libya backlash against R2P is likely to constrain the Security Council’s ability to respond decisively to other civilian protection situations.

China's “Responsible Protection” Concept: Reinterpreting the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and Military Intervention for Humanitarian Purposes

This article assesses the extent to which the recently formulated Chinese concept of “Responsible Protection” (RP) offers a valuable contribution to the normative debate over R2P’s third pillar following the controversy over military intervention in Libya. While RP draws heavily on previous proposals such as the original 2001 ICISS report and Brazil’s “Responsibility while Protecting” (RwP), by amalgamating and re-packaging these earlier ideas in a more restrictive form the initiative represents a new and distinctive interpretation of R2P. However, some aspects of RP are framed too narrowly to provide workable guidelines for determining the permissibility of military intervention for civilian protection purposes, and should therefore be clarified and refined. Nevertheless, the Chinese proposal remains significant because it offers important insights into Beijing’s current stance on R2P. More broadly, China’s RP and Brazil’s RwP initiatives illustrate the growing willingness of rising, non-Western powers to assert their own normative preferences on sovereignty, intervention and global governance.