Andrew Le Sueur

The Rise and Ruin of Unreasonableness

It is true to say that, if a decision on a competen t matter is so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it, th en e courts can interfere. That, I think, is quite right; but to prove a case of that kind would require something overwhelming ... It is not what the court considers unreasonable, a different thing altogether. If it is what the court considers unrea sonable, the court may very well have different views to that of a local authority on mat ters of high public policy of this kind. Some courts might think that no children ought to b e admitted on Sundays at all, some courts might think the reverse, and all over the co untry I have no doubt on a thing of that sort honest and sincere people hold different views. The effect of the legislation is not to set up the court as an arbiter of the correc tness of one view over another. It is the local authority that are set in that position a nd, provided they act, as they have acted, within the four corners of their jurisdictio n, this court, in my opinion, cannot interfere.

Designing Redress: Who Does it, How and Why?

Abstract Designing redress systems for grievances against public bodies ought to be viewed as a discrete and constitutionally significant activity. However, because design is carried out by a wide variety of bodies, in different contexts, and for different reasons, it has been insufficiently recognized. This article attempts to map out redress design across a whole administrative justice landscape (that of England). Recognition of design as a distinct activity may create opportunities for better joined-up thinking about how remedies relate to each other and help ensure that redress design is informed by basic principles of constitutional propriety and administrative justice.