Andrew Lugg

Pierre Duhem's conception of natural classification

Duhems discussion of physical theories as natural classifications is neither antithetical nor incidental to the main thrust of his philosophy of science. Contrary to what is often supposed, Duhem does not argue that theories are better thought of as economically organizing empirical laws than as providing information concerning the nature of the world. What he is primarily concerned with is the character and justification of the scientific method, not the logical status of theoretical entities. The crucial point to notice is that he took the principle of the autonomy of physics to be of paramount importance and he developed the conception of natural classification in opposition to accounts of physical theories that contravened it.

W.V. Quine on Analyticity: “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” in Context

ABSTRACT: It is not W.V. Quine’s aim in “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” to prove against all-comers that the analytic/synthetic distinction is untenable or to provide a novel conception of our knowledge. He aims to undermine the empiricist’s appeal to the distinction and show what empiricism unencumbered by dogma comes to. Focusing on §§1-3 and §6, I argue that his treatment of analyticity is framed by important philosophical assumptions and the conception of knowledge he defends is one to which he had long been committed. “Two Dogmas” is less easily dismissed when read in the context of Quine’s early lectures on Carnap.

Disagreement in science

SummaryThe argument of this paper is (1) that, contrary to what is often thought, there are cases of disagreement among scientists concerning the relative acceptability of theories which do not turn on nonrational or extra-scientific considerations, (2) that agreement cannot be secured without adversely affecting the scientific enterprise as we know it, and (3) that disagreement can be accommodated within a theory of scientific rationality and progress based on the idea that the relative acceptability of scientific theories is a function of their relative problem-solving effectiveness.The diversity of our opinions does not proceed from some men being more rational than others but solely from the fact that our thoughts pass through diverse channels and the same objects are not considered by all.’ Descartes, Discourse on Method.

Wittgenstein’s True Thoughts

Abstract The central remarks of the Tractatus are without substantial content or consequence, remarks at the boundaries of sense that dissolve into truth. While they say nothing, they encapsulate logical features of language and the world. Unasserted, they express thoughts, the truth of which Wittgenstein takes to be unassailable and definitive, while asserted, they are out-and-out nonsense. What is manifest in linguistic practice is no more sayable - and no less significant - than what is manifest in logical truths, mathematical equations and the principles of mechanics.

History, Discovery and Induction: Whewell on Kepler on the Orbit of Mars

William Whewell’s stature among philosophers has slipped considerably since the late 1960s and early 1970s, when he was widely portrayed as providing an alternative to positivist philosophy of science. Partly as a result of shifting philosophical fashion and partly because the short-comings and idiosyncracies of the historicist approach have become clearer, philosophical interest in Whewell now tends to focus on his discussion of particular issues such as the role of consilience in theory choice rather than on his more general conception of scientific inquiry. Yet in redressing the balance we are in danger of losing sight of the gains that Whewell undoubtedly made. There remains much to be said for his contention that philosophy of science should be rooted in a close examination of actual scientific practice. And many of his specific insights concerning scientific discovery have still to be fully assimilated by philosophers of science.

Feyerabend's Rationalism

I like to say there is no scientific method as such, but rather only the free and utmost use of intelligence. P.W. Bridgman

Putnam on reductionism

It is Putnam’s view that reductionism (i.e., “the doctrine that the laws of such ‘higher level’ sciences as psychology and sociology are reducible to the laws of lower-level sciences biology, chemistry, ultimately to the laws of elementary particle physics”*) is wrong. In this note, I take issue with some of Putnam’s arguments. Putnam begins with the ‘logical point’ that “from the fact that the behavior of a system can be deduced from its description as a system of elementary particles it does not follow that it can be explained from that description” (131). That a square peg, a fraction less than 1” across, goes through a 1” square hole but not through a 1” round hole can be deduced and explained by appealing to elementary geometry, the rigidity of the peg, and so on. But, even if deducible, it can’t be explained by appeal to elementary particle physics, there being a pragmatic constraint on explanation: The relevant features of a situation must be brought out by an explanation and not buried in a mass of irrelevant information (132). So explanation is intransitive and reduction fails (provided, of course, reduction without explanation is an impossibility). This argument is not as clear as Putnam seems to think. One might cling to the idea that deducibility guarantees explanation and deny that explanation must be revealing. Then, only revealing explanation would fail of transitivity, not explanation itself. (In this respect, note that Putnam himself has occasion to talk of revealing explanation (133).) A more telling complaint is that reduction need not make for explanation (in Putnam’s sense) since derivability, not explainability, guarantees reducibility. (But see below.) Putnam has a second important line of argument, however, which if correct, undercuts the criticisms just mentioned. As he puts it, the laws of higher-level science (e.g., economics, even biology) are autonomous vis&vis the laws of physics, in the sense that there is no deduction of the former from the latter to be had. The former can only be deduced from the latter in conjunction with “ ‘auxiliary hypotheses’ which are occidental from the point of view of the lower-level discipline” (134, Putnam’s italics). Whereas, says Putnam, “given the structure of the peg and board, one can deduce the rigidity... given the microstructure of the brain and the nervous system, one cannot deduce that capitalist

Impossible Colours: Wittgenstein and the Naturalist’s Challenge

With the rise of naturalistic philosophy, conceptual analysis has faded into the background, and Ludwig Wittgenstein’s account of reddish green and transparent white as grammatically excluded has been written off or ignored. While his view of such impossible colours is, as he himself saw, open to question, so too is the naturalist’s alternative.

Incompatible Colours and the Development of Wittgenstein’s Philosophy

Ludwig Wittgenstein’s treatment of the problem of why nothing can be two colours all-over at the same time is not, as widely claimed, the Achilles heel of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1922). Nor was his rejection of his early explanation of the impossibility the starting point for the philosophy of Philosophical Investigations (1953). From the beginning, as the remarks in Notebooks 1914–1916 make clear, Wittgenstein took qualities and quantities to be mathematically representable, was of the view that points can have just one colour because of the structure of colour, and regarded mathematical impossibilities as logical impossibilities. Moreover, Wittgenstein revised his account of the impossibility of two colours occurring together subsequent to revising his conception of an elementary proposition , not the other way around. His new thinking was a consequence, not the cause, of what is regularly deemed crucial to the development of his philosophy.

‘The priority of paradigms’ revisited

ZusammenfassungIn diesem Beitrag liefere ich eine Interpretation und Verteidigung der These Thomas Kuhns von der Priorität von Paradigmen. Ich behaupte, daß Kuhns Argument für diese These wichtiger, als gewöhnlich angenommen wird, ist, und zwar sowohl für die Klärung seiner Ideen als auch für die Wissenschaftstheorie im allgemeinen. Anerkennt man seine Kritik an der üblichen Auffassung, daß Regeln den Paradigmen vorausgehen, so erscheint vieles von dem, was er über andere Gegenstände sagt, in einem neuen Licht, und viele Schwierigkeiten, die Philosophen (einschließlich Kuhns) bei ihren Versuchen zur Erklärung des Wissenschaftswandels angetroffen haben, erweisen sich als unbegründet.