Andrew M. Bailey

You Needn't be Simple

Abstract Here is an interesting question: what are we? David Barnett has claimed that reflection on consciousness suggests an answer: we are simple. Barnett argues that the mereological simplicity of conscious beings—Simplicity—best explains the Datum: that no pair of persons can itself be conscious. In this paper, I offer two alternative explanations of the Datum. If either is correct, Barnetts argument fails. First, there are not any such things as pairs of persons. Second, consciousness is maximal; no conscious thing is a proper part of another conscious thing. I conclude by showing how both moves comport with materialist theories of what we are and then apply them to another anti-materialist argument.

On the concept of a spirit

Substance dualism is on the move. Though the view remains unfashionable, a growing and diverse group of philosophers endorse it on impressive empirical, religious, and purely metaphysical grounds. In this note, I develop and evaluate one conceptual argument for substance dualism. According to that argument, we may derive a conclusion about our nature from the mere fact that we have the concept of a spirit. The argument is intriguing and fruitful; but I shall contend that it is, nonetheless, unsound.

Composition and the cases

Abstract Some strange cases have gripped philosophers of mind. They have been deployed against materialism about human persons, functionalism about mentality, the possibility of artificial intelligence, and more. In this paper, I cry “foul”. It’s not hard to think that there’s something wrong with the cases. But what? My proposal: their proponents ignore questions about composition (questions about when some things make up another). And ignoring composition is a mistake. Indeed, materialists about human persons, functionalists about mentality, and believers in the possibility of artificial intelligence can plausibly deploy moderate theories of composition in defense of their views. And as it turns out, these strange cases are an interesting source of evidence for moderate theories of composition.

Persons, Animals, Ourselves, by Paul F. Snowdon

contains no general rules for determining who is entitled to how much of what. Sher might respond that, once society’s sufficientarian obligations are fulfilled, any pattern of distributive shares that emerges above the relevant thresholds will be compatible with the demands of justice. But that response misses the point. We are given no basis for working out whether Morey is entitled to more than Les—an issue that determines whether Morey’s career goals count as rational and Les’s do not. Despite the problems I have raised, Equality for Inegalitarians has significant merits. It is written in Sher’s characteristically lucid and engaging style, replete with bold moves and quirky examples, and for those reasons it makes for a fun read. Philosophers interested in the nature and value of autonomy might be disappointed to find surprisingly little engagement with the literature on those topics; autonomy and effective living are closely related. But, overall, the book’s thought-provoking treatment of big-picture issues makes it well worth reading for those who are interested in distributive justice.