Andrew Marquard

Equitable access to sustainable development: operationalizing key criteria

Equitable access to sustainable development (EASD) is crucial for the future of the climate regime as it applies to adaptation, mitigation, and the means of implementation. An approach to allocating effort and deriving carbon budgets is presented here based on the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) principles of responsibility, capability, and sustainable development. A transparent model to operationalize EASD is applied by applying quantitative proxies for these criteria, and results for selected countries and groups are presented. A robust result is that the mitigation burden calculated by the model is significantly greater for developed than developing countries. For individual countries the results vary depending on the parameters chosen. A middle value of the mitigation burden for South Africa of 15 GtCO2e over the first half of the 21st century is reported, with the greatest effort required when a starting year of 1970 is chosen and historical land-use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) emissions are excluded when accounting for responsibility. In a regime applicable to all, it is clear that although all countries must do more, some must do more than others. Policy relevance Equitable access to sustainable development is crucial to the climate negotiations. Quantified allocations are presented for South Africa and other countries, based on the UNFCCC principles of responsibility, capability, and sustainable development. It is shown that the mitigation burden given these principles must be significantly greater for developed than developing countries. The results are relevant to, inter alia, the upcoming 2013–2015 review and the negotiations under the Durban Platform.

Who picks up the remainder? Mitigation in developed and developing countries

A fair, effective, flexible and inclusive climate regime beyond 2012 will need several political balances. Mitigation and funding will be at the heart of the agreement. The IPCCs Fourth Assessment Report indicates that absolute reductions will be needed in Annex I (AI) countries and substantial deviation from baseline in some non-Annex I (NAI) regions by 2020. Although the latter was not explicitly quantified by the IPCC, the EU subsequently proposed a range for developing countries. Sharing the burden for mitigation is essentially zero-sum: if one does less, the other has to do more. We critically examine the implicit assumption that NAI countries would pick up the remainder of the required global effort minus the AI contribution. We suggest that greater levels of ambition can be achieved by turning the formula around politically, starting from the achievable ‘deviation below baseline’ given NAIs national programmes and appropriate international support. AI countries may have to exceed the IPCC ranges or pay for the remainder. For notional levels of NAI mitigation action, Annex I has to reduce by between −52% and −69% below 1990 by 2020, only dropping to a domestic −35% with commitments to offset payments through the carbon market. Given the large mitigation gap, a political agreement on the question of ‘who pays’ is fundamental. The carbon market will provide some investment, but it mainly serves to reduce costs, particularly in developed countries, rather than adding to the overall effort. Market-linked levies and Annex I public funding will therefore be crucial to bridge the gap.

Structuring approaches to pricing carbon in energy- and trade-intensive sectors in South Africa

How might energy-intensive (EI) sectors and those that are also trade-intensive (EITI) be included in the use of economic instruments for mitigation in South Africa? Carbon tax or emissions trading are being considered among the economic instruments that could be implemented in emerging South African climate policy to achieve a 34% GHG reduction below business-as-usual by 2020. Energy-intensive and trade-intensive sectors are identified and compared. Reviewing international experience, policy options are explored for application in the SA context. The rate of a carbon tax could be linked to energy or carbon content, with lower rates being subject to an agreement with government on mitigation. If emissions trading were chosen, initial allowances should be auctioned. If permits were allocated administratively to EI or EITI sectors, this should be transitional and should allow for an appeals procedure. Recycling of revenue would be desirable under either a tax or auctioning scheme, promoting efficiency, further mitigation and diversification in EITI sectors. Policy favouring EI industry might need to be revised in favour of incentives for climatefriendly programmes.

South Africa’s multiple faces in current climate clubs

ABSTRACT Climate clubs emerged as a concept to revitalise the international climate change negotiations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and mitigate the free-riding problem. The underlying idea suggests that countries committed to reducing emissions can advance a stable coalition in the form of a club with other countries. As a result, more countries would put forth targets for more ambitious emissions reductions. This article analyses South Africa’s memberships in current climate related clubs. We contextualise South African climate club governance in its wider geopolitical and national context of low-carbon development. The purpose of the analysis is to identify if and how South Africa can possibly contribute to advancing ambition for change within climate clubs. Furthermore, it advances ideas about possible design options for climate clubs that may appeal to developing countries.