Andrew T. H. Tan

A handbook of terrorism and insurgency in Southeast Asia

This timely and significant book seeks to explain the deep-seated complexities of terrorism and insurgency in Southeast Asia. In the aftermath of 9/11, this region has been designated by the United States to be the ‘second front’ in the war on terrorism. Yet despite the emergence of this ‘new’ global terrorism, the authors argue that armed rebellion in Southeast Asia is a phenomenon that predates Al Qaeda and the global Jihadist movement and that much can be learned from the motivations behind it.

Armed Muslim Separatist Rebellion in Southeast Asia: Persistence, Prospects, and Implications

The persistence of armed Muslim separatist rebellion in Southeast Asia is demonstrated by the ongoing rebellions in Aceh and Mindanao. A strong regional identity infused with Islam has been a binding factor in these separatist movements. Their persistence demonstrates the failure of Indonesia and the Philippines in achieving legitimacy for their post-independence political structures as well as continued internal weakness. The prospects for their quick and peaceful resolution are not good. The external dimension of Muslim separatism has heightened mistrust among states in the region and raised apprehensions over the broader issue of Islamic fundamentalism and the implications for the region should Aceh and Mindanao achieve secession.

Terrorism in Singapore: Threat and Implications

Following the seminal events of 11 September 2001, Southeast Asia, especially the Malay archipelago, has come into focus as the so-called ‘second front’ in the war against international terrorism. Subsequent events have brought home the fact that the events of 11 September had great resonance within the region. The existence of an Al Qaeda-affiliated network in Southeast Asia was dramatically highlighted by the arrest in Singapore since January 2002 of 31 members of the extremist Jemaah Islamiah (JI) group, which also operates a clandestine network of cells in Malaysia and Indonesia. The radical Islamic group planned to attack American military personnel at a local subway station, US naval vessels at Singapore’s Changi Naval Base, US commercial interests, Western and Israeli embassies, and Singaporean military facilities. It is thus clear that apart from the New York and Washington attacks on 11 September 2001, Singapore was also a prime Al Qaeda target. Had the planned attacks succeeded, they would have caused many casualties and could have had an immense political, psychological and economic impact on Singapore that would reverberate throughout the region and elsewhere. It would also have been the largest terrorist attack after 11 September 2001. Singapore is a prime Al Qaeda target as it is seen as a major US ally, since it hosts a naval logistics facility that has been crucial to US naval and military operations in the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf and Afghanistan. As a consequence, Singapore’s response to the war on international terrorism has been the most vigorous of the Southeast Asian states, and as an ally closely identified with the US, it has come to share many of its assumptions and perspectives on the issue of radical Islam. This article explains the threat of terrorism to Singapore emanating from new international terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda and its regional radical Islamic affiliates, examines its implications in terms of responses and political impacts both domestically and regionally, and also assesses the limitations to Singapore’s counter-terrorism strategy.

Punching Above Its Weight: Singapore’s Armed Forces and Its Contribution to Foreign Policy

After sustained development since its independence in 1965, Singapore’s much-touted defence capabilities have matured, as it transitions towards Third-Generation armed forces. This has given the small island-state significant conventional defence capabilities which have been widely recognized to be the most advanced in Southeast Asia. However, the question is to what purpose they are to be employed. Unlike Israel and the Middle East, Singapore’s geostrategic environment in Southeast Asia is wholly different. The development of regional norms and the general stability of political and economic relationships, despite occasional tensions between Singapore and Malaysia, and less frequently with Indonesia, have meant that the possibility of open conflict has receded. Although historical tensions between various pairs of bilateral relationships in the Malay Archipelago mean that open armed conflict cannot be totally ruled out, the region has in fact proven to be relatively stable in the past four decades. So far, no conventional war has occurred among the various putative security referents in the Southeast Asian sub-regional security complex comprising the Malay Archipelago states of Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. This has left Singapore with a potentially expensive war-fighting institution which has not fought a war and may not fight one in the foreseeable future, which could be due to the success of its primary function, namely deterrence. The substantial investment in this expensive military machine, sustained at a cost of 5–6per cent of GNP every year, has been made possible by the astonishing economic growth that has transformed Singapore into one of the world’s wealthiest countries.

Southeast Asia as the ‘second front’ in the war against terrorism: evaluating the threat and responses

Following the seminal events of 11 September 2001, and especially since 12 October 2002, southeast Asia has come into focus as the so-called ‘second front’ in the war against international terrorism. However, the threat of terrorism to southeast Asia emanating from radical Islam predated these events. An emerging security concern in recent years has been the rise of extreme Islamic groups. In addition, there exist Islamic separatist/guerilla groups within the region which envision separate Islamic states, and which have been actively engaged in long-running insurgencies against the central governments in the region. In evaluating the nature of the threat emanating from militant Islamic terrorism, there is a need for better typologies to explain the complexity of home-grown Muslim militant groups, and the emergence of transnational linkages both among them and with international Islamic terrorism. These complexities, coupled with the presence of fundamental grievances which long predated 11 September 2001, point to the necessity for a more broad-based strategy that takes into account the presence of fundamental grievances. But the varied nature of these grievances, and the difficulties that have been encountered in meeting the challenges posed by militant Islam, mean that the war against terrorism will be long drawn-out. Containment, not victory, will be the most realistic outcome.

Terrorism, Insurgency and Religious Fundamentalism in Southeast Asia

Taylor and Francis Ltd FDEF_A_325430.sgm 10.1080/14702430802252636 Defence Studies 470-2436 (pr nt)/1743-9 98 (online) Original Article 2 08 & F ancis 830 00September 2 08 AndrewTan atan11@ xcite.com; andrew.tan@unsw.edu.au Since the seminal events of 11 September 2001, Southeast Asia has become designated as the ‘second front’ in the Global War on Terrorism. This should come as no surprise, as Southeast Asia has the world’s largest Muslim population. Moreover, the crisis of governance that accompanied the fall of the Suharto regime in Indonesia in 1998 and the emergence of political Islam in that country seemed to open up the possibility of the Malay Archipelago becoming a sanctuary for Al-Qaeda terrorists fleeing from US-led military action in Afghanistan that took place in late 2001. This article will attempt to examine the veracity of the so-called New Terrorism paradigm expounded by a new generation of terrorist analysts, who maintain that a new, more deadly form of apocalyptic religious terrorism has emerged in the 1990s and that it has manifested itself in Southeast Asia. In this respect, this article will examine five questions: What is the socalled ‘new’ terrorism, as opposed to the ‘old’ terrorism, that has emerged in recent years? Why is Southeast Asia important in the global war on terrorism? How is the new terrorism manifested in the region? Has it replaced the old ethno-nationalist Muslim insurgencies that we have seen in Southeast Asia? What implications do these developments have for countering terrorism in the region?

Singapore's Defence: Capabilities, Trends, and Implications

Singapores economic importance and military capability rank it among Southeast Asias middle powers despite its small land area and population. Trends indicate that Singapore is determined to maintain an advanced military capability utilizing the latest military and information technologies which were proven in the Gulf War. However, this could lead to enhanced regional suspicions and have negative implications for the very security that the build-up was supposed to achieve. What this means is that Singapores defence policy and foreign policy have to go hand-in-hand. Full use of its substantial military capability to support political and security objectives will only be achieved in the context of an integrated defence and foreign policy framework. Both Singapore and Malaysia also require political will to work together to achieve overriding common objectives, given the fact that the defence of both countries is indivisible. Introduction Singapores defence policy is an important subject for study because Singapores economic importance and military capability rank it among Southeast Asias middle powers despite its small land area and population. In most assessments of position in the international hierarchy, five elements of capability are usually considered: economic power, military power, motivational power, achievement, and potential. Based on at least some of these elements, Israel in the Middle East and South Korea in Northeast Asia would fall into the category of middle powers. [1] In the context of Southeast Asia, Singapore, with its economic strength and stability (demonstrated during the Asian economic crisis of 1997-98), technology, and size and sophistication of its armed forces could be considered a middle power. According to Martin Wight, the great powers would bid for the support of such middle powers in peacetime. In war, middle powers might also be able to deter a direct attack because of their ability to inflict costs out o f proportion to what a great power could hope to gain by attacking it. [2] Unique among the ASEAN states, Singapore has ignored the economic crisis affecting the region since 1997 by continuing its military build-up, a relentless process that began in 1965 following Singapores independence. The development of the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) could have been halted by the economic recession in 1984-85, or by the more relaxed international environment since the end of the Cold War in 1990. However, Singapores relentless pursuit of military security highlights its own sense of strategic uncertainty. Singapore fears sudden political developments in the region, particularly in the neighbouring states of Malaysia and Indonesia, which might require its armed forces to be used either as a deterrent, or as a means of national defence. This suggests that Singapores leadership perceives that under certain circumstances, conflict could in fact occur, and the nations military capabilities must be credible at all times. The fact that it takes a very long time to build up such capabilities ha s meant that Singapores military development has been continuous and sustained. This development also reflects other factors, such as political will, aided by the longevity of the same regime in power since independence; Singapores sustained economic development (except during the short recession of 1984-85), which has given it the ability to devote resources to defence; and the lack of real progress in the development of a regional security community. Singapores sustained military build-up also reflects its perception of basic insecurity as a city-state in a volatile region. This would have been borne out by the current political instability in Indonesia, which, together with the violent expression of anti-Chinese sentiments in the May 1998 riots, could not have been comfortable for Singapores leaders. After all, Singapore, with its economically successful Chinese majority, represents for neighbouring states a tempting means of diverting attention from domestic economic ills and a ready-made racial scape goat for populist leaders seeking support in the context of a breakdown of social, political and economic order. …

Security strategies in the Asia-Pacific: the United States' "second front" in Southeast Asia

Terrorism and Security in the Malay Archipelago Terrorism Insurgencies Maritime Security Great Power Rivalries The Regional Arms Build-up

The arms race in Asia : trends, causes and implications

1. The Asian Arms Race Phenomenon 2. Conceptualising the Arms Race in Asia 3. Trends in the Asian Arms Race 4. Causes of the Asian Arms Race 5. Implications of the Arms Race in Asia 6. Conclusions

The Emergence of Naval Power in the Straits of Malacca

The generally upward trend in arms spending and procurement in Asia since the end of Cold War, despite the evident promise of a post-Cold War peace dividend, indicates other local dynamics at work and also prompted regional analysts to speak of an arms build-up in the region. According to Desmond Ball in 1993, the phenomenon could be explained in terms of defence modernization and the new requirements for defence self-reliance in the region.In 2009, Ball however warned that the size and sophistication of the continuing regional arms build-up meant that there now existed the danger of a real arms race. While the arms build-up has been significant in the booming economies of East Asia, such as China, Taiwan, South Korea and Japan, the states in Southeast Asia have been more selective in their modernization plans. The key factors which explain their arms build-up and modernization have been: the growing importance of maritime security,the maintenance of internal security capabilities, the availability of resources due to economic growth, the easy availability of arms after the end of the Cold War, inter-state tensions within the region, and corruption. One key feature has been the development of naval capabilities as a consequence of the growing importance of maritime security. In particular, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand have paid special attention to enhancing their naval power. These four states are particularly relevant to regional and international maritime security, as they are the littoral states responsible for the security of the Straits of Malacca, the world’s most important and strategic waterway, through which one quarter of the world’s trade, half the world’s oil and two-thirds of its natural gas trade passes.