Andrey Shastitko

Bargaining Power and Market Power: Comparison and Policy Implications

Modern economic literature fails to provide a clear demarcation line between the concepts of market power, bargaining power and countervailing buyer power. Partly this can be explained by methodological limitations of the existing approaches to analyzing these categories. But the issue cannot be limited to merely a theoretical debate, as the choice of interpretation influences the ways in which antitrust policy is implemented. The issue in question is of special importance in cases of bilateral monopoly. The article aims at providing an approach to differentiate between market power and bargaining power based on results of theoretical differentiating and experimental empirical studies. Such an approach allows us to define bargaining power in a wide and narrow sense, revealing the role of institutional factors and chosen strategies. Bargaining power in its narrow sense excludes the aspects related to market power and represents the institutional characteristics of exchange as well as firms individual strategies of dealing with counterparts on the market. To analyze the different ways in which market power and bargaining power can correspond we study cases of symmetrical and asymmetrical bargaining power without market power, as well as with market power on both sides. We demonstrate that the effects of market power - in terms of both coordination and distribution - can be similar to the effects of asymmetrical bargaining power, which serves as one of the reasons for confusing between the two. The existing trends in Russian antitrust policy demonstrate the need for a balanced approach to assessing actions that disrupt competition and actions explained by asymmetrical bargaining power in the narrow sense.

Effects of the Third Party Errors

Type-I and type-II errors effects do matter both from the rules enforcement perspective and vertically upward to rules enactment. The paper support conventional idea about detrimental influence on deterrence of both types of errors. At the same time special role of type-I errors is demonstrated based on strategic interaction between economic exchange participants supported by third-party enforcement with opportunities to discriminate players. The paper highlights the issue that errors in enforcement is not whole story: the simple classification of cases is suggested from the perspective of type-I and type-II errors in rules enforcement and rules enactment.

Economic Theory of the Competition Advocacy)

Russian Abstract: В работе рассматриваются теоретические экономические подходы к понятию адвокатирования конкуренции. Деятельность по адвокатированию конкуренции, которая не может быть полностью противопоставлена деятельности антимонопольного органа по инфорсменту, анализируется через призму неформальных институтов, механизмов адаптации правил к изменяющимся обстоятельствам их применения, инструментов убеждения, механизмов для становления таких убеждений (разделяемых ценностей).English Abstract: The paper discusses the theoretical economic approaches to the concept of competition advocacy. Activities on competition advocacy, which can not be completely opposed to the activities of the competition authority for enforcement is analyzed through the prism of informal institutions, mechanisms of adaptation to the changing circumstances of the rules of their application, tools of persuasion, the mechanisms for the establishment of such beliefs (shared values).

Structural Alternatives for Russia’s Socioeconomic Development

This article describes, compares, and assesses inertia, rentier, mobilization, and modernization strategies to guide Russias socioeconomic development.

Dominance on the Market for Legal Reference Systems: An Economic Analysis

The Russian economic literature has few examples of market studies concerning antitrust regulation (in contrast to innumerable marketing studies). At the same time, changes in antitrust laws, especially sharply increased penalties for violating them, make the application of antitrust law to individual markets important. This article analyzes the Russian market for computerized legal reference systems (CLRS) for the purpose of antitrust regulation and, in particular, to determine the possibility of dominance in this market. Our focus is on revealing the distinctive features of competition in this market. Our results, based on analysis of the federal antitrust agency’s procedure, demonstrate that economic theory—and especially the economic theory of copying digital products—is important for studies of specific markets and for classifying the market structure and a company’s position therein.

Economic Aspects of Offering Immunity for Violating Antimonopoly Law

60 English translation