Anil K. Kashyap

Corporate Structure, Liquidity, and Investment: Evidence from Japanese Industrial Groups

This paper presents evidence suggesting that information and incentive problems in the capital market affect investment. We come to this conclusion by examining two sets of Japanese firms. The first set has close financial ties to large Japanese banks that serve as their primary source of external finance and are likely to be well informed about the firm. The second set of firms has weaker links to a main bank and presumably faces greater problems raising capital. Investment is more sensitive to liquidity for the second set of firms than for the first set. The analysis also highlights the role of financial intermediaries in the investment process.

The Role of Banks in Reducing the Costs of Financial Distress in Japan

This paper explores the idea that financial distress is costly because free-rider problems and information asymmetries make it difficult for firms to renegotiate with their creditors in times of distress. We present evidence consistent with this view by showing Japanese firms with financial structures in which free-rider and information problems are likely to be small perform better than other firms in industrial groups-those with close financial relationships to their banks, suppliers, and customers-invest more and sell more after the onset of distress than non-qroup firms. Moreover, firms that are not group members, but nevertheless have strong ties to a main bank also invest and sell more than firms without strong bank ties.

The Impact of Monetary Policy on Bank Balance Sheets

This paper uses disaggregated data on bank balance sheets to provide a test of the lending view of monetary policy transmission. We argue that if the lending view is correct, one should expect the loan and security portfolios of large and small banks to respond differentially to a contraction in monetary policy. We first develop this point with a theoretical model; we then test to see if the models predictions are borne out in the data.

Zombie Lending and Depressed Restructuring in Japan

In this paper, we propose a bank-based explanation for the decade-long Japanese slowdown following the asset price collapse in the early 1990s. We start with the well-known observation that most large Japanese banks were only able to comply with capital standards because regulators were lax in their inspections. To facilitate this forbearance the banks often engaged in sham loan restructurings that kept credit flowing to otherwise insolvent borrowers (that we call zombies). Thus, the normal competitive outcome whereby the zombies would shed workers and lose market share was thwarted. Our model highlights the restructuring implications of the zombie problem. The counterpart of the congestion created by the zombies is a reduction of the profits for healthy firms, which discourages their entry and investment. In this context, even solvent banks do not find good lending opportunities. We confirm our storys key predictions that zombie-dominated industries exhibit more depressed job creation and destruction, and lower productivity. We present firm-level regressions showing that the increase in zombies depressed the investment and employment growth of non-zombies and widened the productivity gap between zombies and non-zombies.

The Transformation of the U.S. Banking Industry: What a Long, Strange Trip It's Been

This paper summarizes and quantifies past changes in the U.S. commercial banking industry and forecasts what the future may hold. It emphasizes regulatory changes and technical and financial innovations as the central driving forces behind transformation of the industry. Changes in the regulatory environment include the deregulation of deposit accounts, several major changes in capital requirements, reductions in reserve requirements, expansion of bank powers, and liberalization of geographic restrictions on intrastate and interstate banking. Important technical innovations that have affected the banking industry include the advances in information processing and telecommunications technologies that facilitate the low-cost, rapid transfer of information and funds that fuel modern financial markets. Innovations in applied finance include those that have allowed the securitization of many traditional bank assets and have expanded the scope and volume of financial derivative activity. Many of these regulatory, technical and financial changes have altered the way in which banks compete with each other, and have brought about substantial external competition to U.S. banking organizations from foreign banks and from nonbank financial intermediaries. To document and assess the effects of these forces, the authors examine the evolution over time of the balance sheets, off-balance sheet activities, and income statements of all insured U.S. commercial banks from 1979 through 1994. The authors believe the most novel aspect of their analysis derives from the estimation of the patterns of bank lending to borrowers of different sizes over time. A key question they examine is how the well-known reduction in bank commercial and industrial lending of the early 1990s affected different sizes of borrowers. They estimate a 34.8 percent real contraction in loans to borrowers with bank credit of less than

The Japanese Banking Crisis: Where Did It Come From and How Will it End?

1 million during the first half of the 1990s, a substantial decline in lending to large borrowers, with lending to medium sized borrowers at nearly the same level before the 1990s. In looking at the future, the authors suggest that several thousand banking organizations are likely to disappear under nationwide banking, but that the remaining banks will still number in the thousands. They also predict further contraction in the extension of bank credit to small businesses, although not as large as reductions in the first half of the 1990s. They suggest that because of organizational diseconomies, it may be difficult for the larger organizations to invest profitably in relationship-based small business loans. The loss of share for small loans due to the consolidation of banking assets predicted by the model should be considered as an upper bound, because other banks or nonbank competitors will likely step in and reissue some of these loans. Nonetheless, many of the eliminated loans likely will not be reissued because they are negative NPV investments. The authors predict that these changes will occur within the first five years after the implementation of nationwide banking.

Japan's Financial Crisis and Economic Stagnation

We argue that the deregulation leading up to the Big Bang has played a major role in the current banking problems. This deregulation allowed large corporations to quickly switch from depending on banks to relying on capital market financing. We present evidence showing that large Japanese borrowers, particularly manufacturing firms, have already become almost as independent of banks as comparable U.S. firms. The deregulation was much less favorable for savers and consequently they mostly continued turning their money over to the banks. However, banks were also constrained. They were not given authorization to move out of traditional activities into new lines of business. These developments together meant that the banks retained assets and had to search for new borrowers. Their new lending primarily flowed to small businesses and became much more tied to property than in the past. These loans have not fared well during the 1990s. We discuss the size of the current bad loans problem and conclude that it is quite large (on the order of 7% of GDP). Looking ahead, we argue that the Big Bang will correct the aforementioned regulatory imbalances. This will mean that banks will have to fight to retain deposits. More importantly, we expect even more firms to migrate to capital market financing. Using the U.S. borrowing patterns as a guide, we present estimates showing that this impending shift implies a massive contraction in the size of the Japanese banking sector.

Market Tantrums and Monetary Policy

We survey the macroeconomic stagnation and financial problems in Japan. The financial sector assessment includes separate analyses of the commercial banks, the life insurance companies and the governments fiscal investment and loan program (FILP). We estimate that the Japanese taxpayer will have to pay at least another 100 trillion yen (20% of GDP) to cover financial system losses. We explain how the current dysfunctional Japanese banking system misallocates funds by keeping many insolvent firms in business. These inefficient firms crowd out potentially profitable ones and worsen macroeconomic stagnation. A sustained macroeconomic recovery requires serious restructuring aimed at stopping this cycle.

Financial Regulation in General Equilibrium

Assessments of the risks to financial stability often focus on the degree of leverage in the system. In this report, however, we question whether subdued leverage of financial intermediaries is sufficient grounds to rule out stability concerns. In particular, we highlight unlevered investors as the locus of potential financial instability and consider the monetary policy implications. Our focus is on market “tantrums” (such as that seen during the summer of 2013) in which risk premiums inherent in market interest rates fluctuate widely. Large jumps in risk premiums may arise if non-bank market participants are motivated, in part, by their relative performance ranking. Redemptions by ultimate investors strengthen such a channel. We sketch an example and examine three empirical implications. First, as a product of the performance race, flows into an investment opportunity drive up asset prices so that there is momentum in returns. Second, the model predicts that return chasing can reverse sharply. And third, changes in the stance of monetary policy can trigger heavy fund inflows and outflows.Using inflows and outflows for different types of open-end mutual funds, we find some support for the proposition that market tantrums can arise without any leverage or actions taken by leveraged intermediaries. We also uncover connections between the destabilizing flows and shocks to monetary policy. We draw five principal conclusions from our analysis. First, in contrast with the common presumption, the absence of leverage may not be sufficient to ensure that monetary policy can disregard concerns for financial stability. Second, the usual macroprudential toolkit does not address instability driven by non-leveraged investors. Third, forward guidance encourages risk taking that can lead to risk reversals. In fact, our example suggests that when investors infer that monetary policy will tighten, the instability seen in summer of 2013 is likely to reappear. Fourth, financial instability need not be associated with the insolvency of financial institutions. Fifth, the tradeoffs for monetary policy are more difficult than is sometimes portrayed. The tradeoff is not the contemporaneous one between more versus less policy stimulus today, but is better understood as an intertemporal tradeoff between more stimulus today at the expense of a more challenging and disruptive policy exit in the future.Of course, our analysis neither invalidates nor validates the policy course the Federal Reserve has actually taken. Any such conclusion depends on an assessment of the balance of risks given the particular circumstances, which lies beyond the scope of our paper. Instead, our paper is intended as a contribution to developing the analytical framework for making policy judgments. But our analysis does suggest that unconventional monetary policies (including QE and forward guidance) can build future hazards by encouraging certain types of risk-taking that are not easily reversed in a controlled manner.

Evidence on q and investment for Japanese firms

This paper explores how different types of financial regulation could combat many of the phenomena that were observed in the financial crisis of 2007 to 2009. The primary contribution is the introduction of a model that includes both a banking system and a “shadow banking system” that each help households finance their expenditures. Households sometimes choose to default on their loans, and when they do this triggers forced selling by the shadow banks. Because the forced selling comes when net worth of potential buyers is low, the ensuing price dynamics can be described as a fire sale. The proposed framework can assess five different policy options that officials have advocated for combating defaults, credit crunches and fire sales, namely: limits on loan to value ratios, capital requirements for banks, liquidity coverage ratios for banks, dynamic loan loss provisioning for banks, and margin requirements on repurchase agreements used by shadow banks. The paper aims to develop some general intuition about the interactions between the tools and to determine whether they act as complements and substitutes.