Anit Mukherjee

Fighting Separately: Jointness and Civil-Military Relations in India

ABSTRACT How do countries transition from single service to joint operations? This article engages with the discussion on military innovation to argue that civil–military relations are the most important driver for jointness. In doing so it examines jointness in the Indian military. Relying on archival research and primary interviews this article sheds new light on the operations of the Indian Peacekeeping Forces (IPKF) in Sri Lanka from 1987–1990, the 1999 Kargil War and the Post-Kargil defence reforms. The main argument is that the Indian military’s transition to jointness has been ‘incomplete’ primarily because of its prevailing model of civil-military relations. This model prevents civilians from interfering in the operational issues of the military, including on matters pertaining to jointness. It therefore recommends more forceful civilian intervention to overcome the prevailing single service approach.

Facing Future Challenges

In July 2011, India appointed the Naresh Chandra Committee to re-visit the issue of defence reform. Addressing such fundamental problems as poor institutional knowledge, confused civil-military relations and a lack of inter-service and interagency co-ordination will help India to realise its ambitions on the world stage. However, the committee may find it difficult to define reforms that are acceptable to all of the principal actors: the military, politicians and civilian bureaucracy.

Educating the Professional Military: Civil–Military Relations and Professional Military Education in India

This article analyzes the ways in which civil–military relations shape professional military education (PME). Its main argument is that military education benefits from a civil–military partnership. In doing so, the article examines the role of civil–military relations in shaping PME in India. While describing the evolution of military education in India, it analyzes its weaknesses and argues that this is primarily due to its model of civil–military relations, with a limited role for civilians. Theoretically, this argument challenges Samuel Huntington’s notion of “objective control”—which envisaged a strict separation between the civil and military domains. Conceptually, this article argues for a greater dialogue on military education among civilians, both policy makers and academics, and military officers and not to leave it to the military’s domain—as is currently the practice in most countries.

Secrecy, Civil-Military Relations, and India's Nuclear Weapons Program

Gaurav Kampani provides a compelling account of the evolution of India’s nuclear weapons program from 1989 to 1999 and rightly highlights how the need for secrecy “stymied India’s operational advances.”1 “Secrecy concerns,” he argues, “prevented decisionmakers and policy planners from decomposing problem sets and parceling them out simultaneously for resolution to multiple bureaucratic actors, including the military” (p. 82). In his eagerness to argue this point, however, Kampani is too quick to dismiss other explanations for India’s slow pace of operationalization. In this letter, I argue that a more complete account of “New Delhi’s long nuclear journey” should incorporate civil-military relations as another inouential factor.

K. Subrahmanyam and Indian Strategic Thought

In the end an intellectual’s life is judged not only by those who mourn his passing, but also by those who challenged his ideas. K. Subrahmanyam, the undisputed doyen of India’s strategic community, had his share of both, and his death at the age of 82 on 2 February 2011 leaves behind an immeasurable void. In his professional career, K. Subrahmanyam faced much criticism for his views, at various times, from within the military and among civil servants, the academic community and foreign observers. The criticism – a badge of honour of sorts – was primarily because he had the courage to challenge conventional wisdom and speak truth to power in a passionate desire to influence policy. Over time, however, most of his detractors came to grudgingly respect him and his ideas. This comes across clearly in the large number of personal tributes and recollections written by his colleagues and followers in India and abroad.1 Arguably no other public intellectual in India has had such a domineering influence in his chosen field of policy. Though ironically it was his largest ambition – to change India’s attitude towards national security – he only partially succeeded and obsessed about it in the twilight of his life. Indian policy makers will do well to pay attention, even if belatedly, to his arguments and to honour him appropriately. However, first it might be instructive to briefly examine his influence on Indian strategic thinking and recognize some of the principles by which he lived. K. Subrahmanyam used to recall sadly his first engagement with national security at the highest levels when he was working as a junior official in the Ministry of Defence during the Indo-China War in 1962. Since then he worked with almost every prime minister on most aspects of India’s national security. Immediately after the 1962 War, he worked under Defence Minister YB Chavan on the much needed restructuring and rearmament of the military. Recognizing his potential, YB Chavan was instrumental in appointing K. Subrahmanyam as the second Director of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) – which was initially inspired by the American RAND Corporation. This position, which he held for a second time in the 1980s, allowed him to nurture and encourage strategic thinking in India. He wrote prodigiously on a variety of subjects, including defence planning, higher defence organization, technological changes in warfare and foreign policy among others. An important part of his role was to mentor and encourage military officers, bureaucrats, diplomats and journalists to think outside of their individual silos and connect politics and foreign, defence and economic policies, and thus enter the realm of strategy. He was also fearless in taking on what with hindsight we know to be ossified thinking, whether in the political