Anita Mukherjee

Medicaid and Long-Term Care: Do Eligibility Rules Impact Asset Holdings?

Medicaid provides a critical source of insurance against the rising costs of long-term care, and as a result, individuals may strategically offload assets (typically to children) to meet the means-tested eligibility requirement. Yet, evidence on such behaviors is limited. In this paper, we use variation in the propensity to conduct improper transfers induced by the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 to quantify the extent of strategic transfers. The Act discouraged asset offloading by introducing significant penalties for such actions. We estimate difference-in-differences models based on the hypothesis that individuals with high levels of self-reported nursing home risk (high risk) will alter transfers based on the Act’s changes, while other individuals remain unaffected. We find that over a two-year horizon, high risk individuals reduced transfers to children on the extensive margin by 10 percent and that the average total amount of transfers decreased by

Impacts of Private Prison Contracting on Inmate Time Served and Recidivism

1,700. We also conduct a triple-differences analysis to examine various forms of heterogeneity. We find that the reduction in transfers we document comes from high risk individuals who are less financially literate, suggesting that more financially sophisticated households either have other mechanisms to shield assets or are not sensitive to Medicaid eligibility.

Do Private Prisons Distort Justice? Evidence on Time Served and Recidivism

I contribute new evidence on the impacts of private prison contracting by exploiting staggered prison capacity shocks in Mississippi between 1996 and 2004. I find that private prison inmates serve up to 90 additional days, which equals 7 percent of the average time served. The mechanism for this delayed release appears linked to the widespread use of conduct violations in private prisons. Despite the additional days served, I find no evidence that private prison inmates recidivate less. I nest both results in a theoretical model based on the typical private prison contract that pays a diem for each occupied bed.

Assessing the Demand for Micropensions Among India's Poor

I contribute new evidence on the impacts of private prison contracting by exploiting staggered prison capacity shocks in Mississippi between 1996 and 2004. I find that private prison inmates serve up to 90 additional days, which equals 7 percent of the average time served. The mechanism for this delayed release appears linked to the widespread use of conduct violations in private prisons. Despite the additional days served, I find no evidence that private prison inmates recidivate less. I nest both results in a theoretical model based on the typical private prison contract that pays a diem for each occupied bed.