Ann B. Gillette

Voting on Tax Policy Design

The authors build on the work of Engelmann and Strobel and of Ackert, Martinez-Vazquez, and Rider to examine the potential role of social preferences in tax policy design. They randomly assign each participant in a session to a group with five members. The payoffs to participants are determined by majority vote of the participants in a given group. The authors randomly assign each participant a pretax income that remains the same throughout the experiment to control for the potential confounding effect of risk-pooling equilibria. On the basis of statistical analysis of the data generated by these experiments, they find support for the hypothesis that the minimax preferences of Rawls or the inequality aversion model of Fehr and Schmidt help explain individual choices over alternative tax structures.

Risk Tolerance, Self-Interest, and Social Preferences

We use an experimental method to investigate whether systematic relationships exist across distinct aspects of individual preferences: risk aversion in monetary outcomes, altruism in a twoperson context, and social preferences in a larger group context. Individual preferences across these three contexts are measured, and there is no possibility for risk sharing, wealth effects, or updating expectations of the population choices. We find that social preferences are related to demographic variables, including years of education, gender, and age. Perhaps most importantly, self allocation in a two-person dictator game is related to social preferences in a group context. Participants who are more generous in a dictator game are more likely to vote against their selfinterest in a group decision-making task which we interpret to be expressions of social preferences.

If at first you don't succeed: an experimental investigation of the impact of repetition options on corporate takeovers

This paper models, and experimentally simulates, the free-rider problem in a takeover when the raider has the option to “resolicit,” that is, to make a new offer after an offer has been rejected. In theory, the option to resolicit, by lowering offer credibility, increases the dissipative losses associated with free riding. In practice, the outcomes of our experiment, while quite closely tracking theory in the effective absence of an option to resolicit, differed dramatically from theory when a significant probability of resolicitation was introduced: The option to resolicit reduced the costs of free riding fairly substantially. Both the raider offers and the shareholder tendering responses generally exceeded equilibrium predictions.

The Modern Racing Landscape and The Racetrack Wagering Market: Components of Demand, Subsidies, and Efficiency

Horse racing is an important industry throughout much of the world, and gambling has been increasingly relied on to provide financial support for beleaguered state governments. Technology has changed the way track patrons bet, with the vast and increasing majority of total bets being made away from live racing. The menu of wagering options continues to grow with a wide variety of exotic bets, futures wagering markets, program betting, and on-line betting venues becoming more prevalent. We know a fair amount about the determinants of wagering volume, but our knowledge of the demand for wagering on these different types of bets within and across venues remains in its infancy. We review the available research on the components of wagering demand, the effect of government subsidies on wagering volume, and the efficiency of the betting market. We also describe several new issues that continue to affect the racing landscape.