Ann Ward

Oedipus and Socrates on the Quest for Self-Knowledge

This article explores how Sophocles’ Oedipus the King and Plato’s Apology of Socrates address the question of whether reason can ground the good human life. Sophocles’ tragedy and Plato’s dialogue both tell of the search for rational self-knowledge. Both Oedipus and Socrates are recognized for human wisdom and are presented as skeptical toward the gods. Yet, whereas Oedipus’ life ends in tragedy, Socrates’ life does not. Sophocles thus suggests that the rational search for truth must be limited by a pious respect for the gods. Plato, on the other hand, preserves Socrates’ belief that the ‘unexamined life is not worth living for a human being’. Four lines of inquiry into the causes of this divergence are then explored: 1) Socrates’ order of knowledge from particular to universal, 2) Oedipus’ proneness to anger, 3) Socrates’ private life in contrast to Oedipus’ public life and, 4) the differing status of the family.

Generosity and Inequality in Aristotle’s Ethics

This article explores the virtues of generosity and magnificence in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Generosity involves private individuals giving moderately; magnificence is spending by individuals on a grand scale for public purposes. Inequality, it is argued, grounds and motivates these virtues. For Aristotle, generosity and magnificence are products of inherited wealth, and the generous and the magnificent person seek the noble in their actions rather than the benefit of their recipients. The generous and the magnificent intend to place themselves in a superior position to those who receive their gifts.Moreover, magnificence flows from a great inequality of wealth and requires that the provision of public goods be in private hands. Aristotle, this article suggests, means to critique rather than embrace these virtues by pointing to the inequality and privacy at their foundation. The way in which Aristotle’s theory of justice supplements his analysis of generosity and magnificence is also brought to light.

Political Emotions: Aristotle and the Symphony of Reason and Emotion

Political Emotions: Aristotle and the Symphony of Reason and Emotion , Marlene K. Sokolon, DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2006, pp. 217. Marlene K. Sokolon has provided an intellectually stimulating and highly original work on Aristotles understanding of the emotions, mainly as presented in his treatise the Art of Rhetoric . The central thesis of Sokolons book manifests itself in her analysis of the emotion of anger. According to Sokolon, for Aristotle anger is the paradigmatic human emotion, defined as the desire for revenge for a dishonourable and undeserving public insult against oneself or those one loves. Of this desire for revenge, Sokolon argues that “for Aristotle, unique human anger is not ‘at’ something, but more properly ‘with’ what some other person did or intends to do. Anger and the other political emotions are certain kinds of judgments or perceptions about sociopolitical circumstances. Anger judges specific kinds of events with an acknowledged political, or what we now call ‘cultural,’ meaning” (p. 55). Thus, Sokolon argues that for Aristotle the emotional experience of anger occurs in social and political contexts where there are evaluations of worth in situations involving relations of power. But if anger is the paradigmatic human emotion, this means that anger is not simply representative of various political emotions, but illustrates that human emotion as such is an essentially political phenomenon. Sokolons thesis, therefore, is that for Aristotle, “man is by nature a political animal” not simply because he possesses reason, the apparent claim of the Politics , but also because he experiences emotions.

Self-reflection, Egyptian Beliefs, Scythians and “Greek Ideas”: Reconsidering Greeks and Barbarians in Herodotus1

This article addresses the debate between Afrocentrists like Martin Bernal and classical scholars such as Mary Lefkowitz and Robert Palter concerning the origins of ancient Greek civilization. Focusing on the first half of Herodotus’ Histories, I argue that, although Greek cultural developments can be attributed to the Greeks themselves, Herodotus indicates that the conditions that made these developments possible were due to the prior Greek absorption of important aspects of Egyptian religion. Herodotus shows that the Greeks learned from the Egyptians to individualize their gods and to appreciate the humanity of women. This Egyptian influence, Herodotus suggests, is what allowed the Greeks, in contrast to the Scythians, to become an object to themselves within the context of stable city life. I conclude that this habit of self-reflection is the source of the uniquely Greek contribution to the art, philosophy, science and politics of the West.