Anna Maria Mayda

Do Interest Groups Affect US Immigration Policy

While anecdotal evidence suggests that interest groups play a key role in shaping immigration policy, there is no systematic empirical analysis of this issue. In this paper, we construct an industry-level dataset for the United States, by combining information on the number of temporary work visas with data on lobbying activity associated with immigration. We find robust evidence that both pro- and anti-immigration interest groups play a statistically significant and economically relevant role in shaping migration across sectors. Barriers to migration are lower in sectors in which business interestgroups incur larger lobby expenditures and higher in sectors where labor unions are more important.

Individual Attitudes Towards Skilled Migration: An Empirical Analysis Across Countries

It is commonly argued that skilled immigration benefits the destination country through several channels. Yet, only a small group of countries reports to have policies in place aimed at increasing the intake of skilled immigrants. Why? In this paper we analyze the factors that affect a direct measure of individual attitudes towards skilled migration, focusing on two main channels: the labor market and the welfare state. We find that more educated natives are less likely to favor skilled immigration - consistent with the labor-market channel - while richer people are more likely to do so - in accordance with the welfare state channel under the tax adjustment model. Our findings thus suggest that the labor market competition threat perceived by skilled natives in the host countries might be driving the observed cautious policies.

Do Countries Free Ride on MFN

The Most-Favored Nation (MFN) clause has long been suspected of creating a free rider problem in multilateral trade negotiations. To address this issue, we model multilateral negotiations as a mechanism design problem with voluntary participation. We show that an optimal mechanism induces only the largest exporters to participate in negotiations over any product, thus providing a rationalization for the Principal supplier rule. We also show that, through this channel, equilibrium tariffs vary according to the Herfindahl-Hirschman index of export shares: higher concentration in a sector reduces free riding and thus causes a lower tariff. Estimation of our model using sector-level tariff data for the U.S. provides strong support for this relationship.

Risk, Government and Globalization: International Survey Evidence

This paper uses international survey data to document two stylized facts. First, risk aversion is associated with anti-trade attitudes. Second, this effect is smaller in countries with greater levels of government expenditure. The paper thus provides evidence for the microeconomic underpinnings of the argument associated with Ruggie (1982), Rodrik (1998) and others that government spending can bolster support for globalization by reducing the risk associated with it in the minds of voters.

What Drives Individual Attitudes Towards Immigration in South Africa

This paper empirically investigates the determinants of individual attitudes towards immigration in South Africa using the 1996, 2001 and 2007 rounds of the World Value Survey. The main question we want to answer is whether South African public opinion on migration is affected by the potential labor market competition of migrants towards natives. We investigate this issue by estimating the impact of survey respondents’ individual skill on their pro-migration attitudes. Our estimates show that the impact of individual skill – measured both with educational attainment and an occupation based measure – is positive and significant in both 1996 and 2001. Given that in both years immigrants to South Africa are on average more skilled than natives, we conclude that the labor-market channel does not play a role in preference formation over immigration. What might explain the positive impact of individual skill are non-economic determinants.

Do South-South Trade Agreements Increase Trade? Commodity-Level Evidence from Comesa

South-South trade agreements are proliferating: developing countries signed 70 new agreements between 1990 and 2003. Yet the impact of these agreements is largely unknown. In this paper, we focus on the static effects of South-South preferential trade agreements that take place through changes in trade patterns. We estimate the impact of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) on Ugandas imports between 1994 and 2003. We use detailed import and tariff data at the 6-digit Harmonized System level for over 1,000 commodities. Based on a difference-indifference estimation strategy, we find evidence--in contrast to aggregate statistics--that COMESAs preferential tariff liberalization has not considerably increased Ugandas trade with member countries, on average across sectors. The effect, however, is heterogeneous across sectors. Finally, we find no evidence of trade-diversion effects.

Do Terms-of-Trade Effects Matter for Trade Agreements? Evidence from WTO Countries

In the literature on the economics of international trade institutions, a key question is whether or not terms-of-trade effects drive international trade agreements. Recent empirical work addressing terms-of-trade effects has been restricted to non-WTO countries or accession countries, which differ markedly from existing WTO members and account for only a tiny fraction of world trade. This paper investigates whether MFN tariffs set by existing WTO members in the Uruguay round are consistent with the terms-of-trade hypothesis. We present a model of multilateral trade negotia-tions featuring free riding on MFN that leads the resulting tariff schedule to display terms-of-trade effects. Specifically, the model predicts that the level of the importer’s tariff resulting from negotia-tions should be negatively related to the product of exporter concentration, as measured by a Her-findahl-Hirschman index (sum of squared export shares), and the importer’s market power, as measured by the inverse elasticity of export supply, on a product-by-product basis. We test this hy-pothesis using data on tariffs, trade and production across more than 30 WTO countries and find strong support. We estimate that the internalization of terms of trade effects through WTO negotia-tions has lowered the average tariff of these countries by about 20% compared to its non-cooperative level.

Do Interest Groups Affect U.S. Immigration Policy

While anecdotal evidence suggests that interest groups play a key role in shaping immigration policy, there is no systematic empirical analysis of this issue. In this paper, we construct an industry-level dataset for the United States, by combining information on the number of temporary work visas with data on lobbying activity associated with immigration. We find robust evidence that both pro- and anti-immigration interest groups play a statistically significant and economically relevant role in shaping migration across sectors. Barriers to migration are lower in sectors in which business interest groups incur larger lobby expenditures and higher in sectors where labor unions are more important.

Do South-South trade agreements increase trade? Commodity-level evidence from COMESA

South-South trade agreements are proliferating: developing countries signed 70 new agreements between 1990 and 2003. Yet the impact of these agreements is largely unknown. In this paper, we focus on the static effects of South-South preferential trade agreements that take place through changes in trade patterns. We estimate the impact of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) on Ugandas imports between 1994 and 2003. We use detailed import and tariff data at the 6-digit Harmonized System level for over 1,000 commodities. Based on a difference-indifference estimation strategy, we find evidence--in contrast to aggregate statistics--that COMESAs preferential tariff liberalization has not considerably increased Ugandas trade with member countries, on average across sectors. The effect, however, is heterogeneous across sectors. Finally, we find no evidence of trade-diversion effects.

Protection for Free? The Political Economy of U.S. Tariff Suspensions

This paper studies the political influence of individual firms on Congressional decisions to suspend tariffs on U.S. imports of intermediate goods. We develop a model in which firms influence the government by transmitting information about the value of protection, via costless messages (cheap-talk) and costly messages (lobbying). We estimate our model using firm-level data on tariff suspension bills and lobbying expenditures from 1999-2006, and find that indeed verbal opposition by import-competing firms, with no lobbying, significantly reduces the probability of a suspension being granted. In addition, lobbying expenditures by proponent and opponent firms sway this probability in opposite directions.