Anna-Sofia Maurin

Trope theory and the Bradley regress

Trope theory is the view that the world is a world of abstract particular qualities. But if all there is are tropes, how do we account for the truth of propositions ostensibly made true by some concrete particular? A common answer is that concrete particulars are nothing but tropes in compresence. This answer seems vulnerable to an argument (first presented by F. H. Bradley) according to which any attempt to account for the nature of relations will end up either in contradiction, nonsense, or will lead to a vicious infinite regress. I investigate Bradley’s argument and claim that it fails to prove what it sets out to. It fails, I argue, because it does not take all the different ways in which relation and relata may depend on one another into account. If relations are entities that are distinct from yet essentially dependent upon their relata, the Bradleyan problem is solved. We are then free to say that tropes in compresence are what make true propositions ostensibly made true by concrete particulars.

The Problem of Thing-Construction

The second fundamental constructive task in the development of a theory of tropes is that of constructing what may be called ‘concrete particulars’ (or, ‘things’) from a basic stock of tropers.231

The Problem of Universalisation

Now that the theoretical framework inside which the present work is set has been spelled out we are in a position to formulate and attempt to solve two very fundamental problems for trope theory. Tropes, it is assumed, must be able at least to fulfil their basic function as truth-makers. But the existence of singular tropes does not seem sufficient to provide for the truth of every kind of atomic proposition. Tropes are particular, but in some cases the truth-makers required to account for truth appear to be universal. Tropes are abstract, but in some cases the truth-makers required to account for truth appear to be concrete.