Annalisa Prencipe

Proprietary costs and determinants of voluntary segment disclosure: evidence from Italian listed companies

This paper aims to identify new determinants of the extent of voluntary segment disclosure by using the theoretical framework of the proprietary costs theory, which states that companies limit voluntary disclosure because of proprietary costs, such as preparation and competitive costs. On the basis of the existing literature on this theory and on segment reporting, three hypotheses are theoretically derived, each correlating the level of segment disclosure to a new determinant, specifically the correspondence between the segments and legally identifiable sub-groups of companies, the growth rate and the listing status age. The paper also provides further evidence to test the impact of some ‘traditional’ determinants, introduced in the study as control variables. The hypotheses formulated are empirically verified. The analysis is carried out with reference to Italy, because of its limited legal and professional provisions on the topic. For the empirical test, a sample of sixty-four Italian listed companies is selected and a multiple regression model is used. Results show that, except for the growth rate, the two other new determinants are significantly related to the extent of segment disclosure. These findings confirm that proprietary costs are particularly relevant and limit the incentive for companies to provide segment information to the market.

The relationship between voluntary disclosure and independent directors in the presence of a dominant shareholder

Abstract Differently from prior studies that examine the role of stand-alone control systems within the relationship between owners and managers, our study investigates the correlation between two control mechanisms – voluntary disclosure and independent directors – in companies characterized by the presence of a dominant shareholder that is supposed to mitigate the classical agency problem. Based on agency theory, we hypothesize that the two mechanisms tend to coexist, since the presence of either one reduces the costs of introducing the other. Two further effects – the reputation and the domino effect – contribute to determine a positive relationship between the two mechanisms. We carried out the empirical analysis on 175 non-financial Italian listed companies, all controlled by a dominant shareholder. Voluntary disclosure is measured through three alternative disclosure indexes. Independent directors are identified not only according to a formal/legal definition, but also through stricter criteria. The empirical test is based on a multivariate analysis controlling for size, residual ownership diffusion, leverage, profitability and labour pressure. Results support our hypothesis and are robust to alternative criteria to identify dominant shareholders. Our study contributes to a better understanding of the relationship between different control mechanisms in particular agency settings.

Earnings Management in Family Firms: Evidence from R&D Cost Capitalization in Italy

Recent accounting-related scandals have underscored the prevalence of earnings management in financial markets. This article provides empirical evidence on the motivations for earnings management in publicly listed family companies, highlighting the differences from public nonfamily firms. Basing our predictions on an analysis of the salient characteristics of family firms in both an agency and a stewardship framework, we hypothesize that family firms are less sensitive to income-smoothing motivations than are nonfamily firms, while they are similarly motivated to manage earnings for debt-covenant and leverage-related reasons. We test our hypotheses by looking at a specific accrual, R&D cost capitalization, where statistical tests confirm our hypothesized relationships.

Corporate Governance and Earnings Management in Family-Controlled Companies

The corporate governance literature advances the idea that certain aspects of a board of directors’ structure improve the monitoring of managerial decisions. Among these decisions are a manager’s policies about managing earnings. Prior studies have shown that earnings management in widely held public companies is less prevalent when there is a high level of board independence. However, there is less evidence regarding the effectiveness of board independence on earnings management in family-controlled companies. This issue is particularly interesting as such companies are susceptible to various types of agency concerns. It is the purpose of this study to shed light on the earnings management issue in family-controlled companies characterized by potentially lower board independence and a higher risk of collusion. In this study, board independence is estimated by two parameters: (1) proportion of independent directors on the board; and (2) lack of chief executive officer (CEO)–board chairman duality function. Our empirical results provide evidence that the impact of board independence on earnings management is indeed weaker in family-controlled companies. The same result also holds for the lack of CEO– board chairman duality function. Such effects become stronger in cases in which the CEO is a member of the controlling family.

Accounting Research in Family Firms: Theoretical and Empirical Challenges

Abstract Family firms play a significant role in the global economy. Consistently, over the last two decades academia has turned its attention to the family dimension as a determinant of business phenomena, and this interest has increased over time. While family business research has reached an age of ‘adolescence’ as a field of study, accounting research to date seems to have been rather slow to pick up on the distinctive characteristics of family firms, and their implications for accounting and reporting practices. In an attempt to accelerate and support research in the field, in this article we highlight theoretical and empirical challenges that accounting scholars need to consider when addressing issues related to accounting and reporting in family firms. These challenges include the selection and potential mixing of appropriate theoretical frameworks, and complications in defining operationally what family firms are. We also provide a ‘state of the art’ of studies in financial accounting, management accounting and auditing, identifying which issues in relation to family firms have been addressed in the research, and which theories, research methods and types of data have been used in these studies. We conclude by providing directions for future research that can advance our understanding of accounting and reporting in family firms.

Income Smoothing in Family‐Controlled Companies: Evidence from Italy

Manuscript Type: Empirical.Research Question/Issue: This paper focuses on the relationship between one of the main corporate governance dimensions – ownership structure – and income smoothing. The paper investigates whether family‐controlled companies differ from non‐family‐controlled companies with respect to income smoothing. Due to different incentives of management and owner investment horizons, we hypothesize that income smoothing is less likely among family‐controlled companies than among non‐family‐controlled companies. Additionally, we hypothesize that among family‐controlled firms income smoothing is less likely when CEO and Board Chairman are members of the controlling family. Various definitions of “family control” are applied. A sample of Italian listed companies is used for the empirical analysis.Research Findings/Insights: We find evidence that income smoothing is less likely among family‐controlled companies than non‐family‐controlled companies. Moreover, among family‐controlled companies, income smoothing is less likely for firms whose CEO and Board Chairman are members of the controlling family.Theoretical/Academic Implications: This paper fills a gap in the literature, suggesting that not only the level of ownership concentration or insider ownership but also the nature of the dominant shareholder (family versus non‐family) should be considered when addressing the motivations for income smoothing. Furthermore, our findings indicate that agency theory and stewardship theory are complementary in explaining the role played by family control in income smoothing decisions. While in non‐family‐controlled companies the traditional owner‐manager agency problems tend to prevail and motivate income smoothing, in family‐controlled companies such agency issues become less relevant and a stewardship attitude emerges, rendering income smoothing less likely.Practitioner/Policy Implications: This study is of interest to financial statement users, including analysts and investors, as it shows that different company types (e.g., family versus non‐family) have a different attitude towards income smoothing. In particular, these results aid users in interpreting the companys reported profitability and its potential variability. The conclusions also are of interest to auditors when evaluating the reliability of the reported income of companies characterized by various ownership structures.

Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation and Audit Quality

Abstract In a setting where mandatory audit firm rotation has been effective for more than 20 years (i.e. Italy), we analyse changes in audit quality during the auditor engagement period. In our research setting, auditors are appointed for a three-year period and their term can be renewed twice up to a maximum of nine years. Since the auditor has incentives to be re-appointed at the end of the first and the second three-year periods, we expect audit quality to be lower in the first two three-year periods compared to the third (i.e. the last) term. Assuming that a better audit quality is associated with a higher level of accounting conservatism, and using abnormal working capital accruals as a proxy for the latter, we find that the auditor becomes more conservative in the last three-year period, i.e. the one preceding the mandatory rotation. These results are confirmed using Basus [1997. The conservatism principle and the asymmetric timeliness of earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 24(1), 3–37] timely loss recognition model. In an additional analysis, we use earnings response coefficients as a proxy for investor perception of audit quality, and we observe results consistent with an increase in audit quality perception in the last engagement period.

The Impact of Corporate Governance and Earnings Management on Stock Market Liquidity in a Highly Concentrated Ownership Capital Market

We provide insights to the effects of corporate governance mechanisms and earnings management on market liquidity (measured by bid–ask spreads [B_As] and trading volume) in a setting characterized by highly concentrated noninstitutional ownership. First, we document that high noninstitutional ownership increases B_As and depresses trading volumes. Next, we show that volume of trade tends to be higher and B_A tends to be lower for firms with better corporate governance mechanisms (e.g., board independence and CEO–chairman separation) when there is high concentration of noninstitutional ownership. In contrast to prior findings, when controlling for corporate governance quality, B_As are unaffected by earnings management, while trading volume increases when earnings management is higher, presumably due to an increase in investor disagreement. Our results are robust to changes in the market trading system across the sample period.

The Effects of Conservative Reporting on Investor Disagreement

We examine whether the level of a firms conditional conservatism affects investor disagreement around earnings announcement dates. Investor disagreement is relevant for its repercussions on stock market efficiency. However, the literature related to the effect of firms’ reporting policies on disagreement is scant. Prior research suggests that conservatism, by requiring higher verifiability of profits, constrains earnings overstatements and encourages more complete revelations of losses, thus improving the information environment. In this paper, we further hypothesize that these effects of conservatism enhance news credibility and decrease information asymmetry, particularly for bad news announcements. This results in a lower disagreement and improved interpretation of earnings news. We consistently find that conservatism measures are negatively associated with proxies of announcement-time investor disagreement and that this effect is stronger when the firm is reporting bad news. Additional analyses indicate that the impact of conservatism is stronger when market surprise to the announcement is greater, while it is weaker in the presence of frequent and precise voluntary disclosure that preempts the earnings announcement. Finally, we show that a higher percentage of institutional investors’ ownership and a higher level of commitment to conservatism reinforce the impact of the latter.

Past evolution and recent trends in accounting research

Research in accounting is relatively young compared to other disciplines. Originally, normative research based on a priori reasoning and aimed at improving accounting practice was predominant among accounting scholars. After the 60’s, accounting academics started using an empirical positive approach, aimed to better understand accounting phenomena through empirical tests of hypotheses. As from then, research in accounting has gone through several changes in terms of approaches, research methods and topics. This paper aims at highlighting the main stages of the past evolution and recent trends in accounting research. After describing the main drivers of the shift from normative to positive approach, the dominant traits that have characterized accounting research for the last two decades are briefly analyzed. Particular emphasis is put on methods and topics. In the last section, the main limitations of current accounting research are highlighted, and some directions for future research are outlined.