Anne Böckler

Giving a helping hand: effects of joint attention on mental rotation of body parts

Research on joint attention has addressed both the effects of gaze following and the ability to share representations. It is largely unknown, however, whether sharing attention also affects the perceptual processing of jointly attended objects. This study tested whether attending to stimuli with another person from opposite perspectives induces a tendency to adopt an allocentric rather than an egocentric reference frame. Pairs of participants performed a handedness task while individually or jointly attending to rotated hand stimuli from opposite sides. Results revealed a significant flattening of the performance rotation curve when participants attended jointly (experiment 1). The effect of joint attention was robust to manipulations of social interaction (cooperation versus competition, experiment 2), but was modulated by the extent to which an allocentric reference frame was primed (experiment 3). Thus, attending to objects together from opposite perspectives makes people adopt an allocentric rather than the default egocentric reference frame.

Catching Eyes Effects of Social and Nonsocial Cues on Attention Capture

Direct eye contact and motion onset are two powerful cues that capture attention. In the present study, we combined direct gaze with the sudden onset of motion to determine whether these cues have independent or shared influences. Participants identified targets presented randomly on one of four faces. Initially, two faces depicted direct gaze, and two faces depicted averted gaze. Simultaneously with or 900 ms before target presentation, one face with averted gaze switched to direct gaze, and one face with direct gaze switched to averted gaze. When gaze transitions and target presentation were simultaneous, the greatest response-time facilitation occurred at the location of the sudden onset of direct gaze. When target presentation was delayed, direct-gaze cues maintained a facilitatory influence, whereas motion cues induced an inhibitory influence. These findings reveal that gaze cues and motion cues at the same location influence information processing via independent and concurrently acting social and nonsocial attention channels.

Accessory Stimuli Affect the Emergence of Conflict, Not Conflict Control

Accessory signals that precede stimuli in interference tasks lead to faster overall responses while conflict increases. Two opposing accounts exist for the latter finding: one is based on dual-route frameworks of response preparation and proposes amplification of both direct response activation and indirect response selection processes; the other refers to attentional networks and suggests inhibition of executive attention, thereby hampering conflict control. The present study replicated previous behavioral findings in a Simon task and extended them by electrophysiological evidence. Accessory tones facilitated stimulus classification and attentional allocation in the Simon task as reflected by an increased N1 amplitude and an overall decrease of the N2 amplitude, respectively. The conflict-related N2 amplitude, which is larger in conflict trials compared with nonconflict trials, was not modulated by accessory tones. Moreover, accessory tones did not affect sequence-dependent conflict adaptation. In terms of a dual-route framework present results suggest amplification of both response preparation routes by accessory stimuli. An executive attention approach proposing accessory stimuli to hamper control of conflict is not supported.

Invisible Man Exclusion From Shared Attention Affects Gaze Behavior and Self-Reports

Social exclusion results in lowered satisfaction of basic needs and shapes behavior in subsequent social situations. We investigated participants’ immediate behavioral response during exclusion from an interaction that consisted of establishing eye contact. A newly developed eye-tracker-based “looking game” was employed; participants exchanged looks with two virtual partners in an exchange where the player who had just been looked at chose whom to look at next. While some participants received as many looks as the virtual players (included), others were ignored after two initial looks (excluded). Excluded participants reported lower basic need satisfaction, lower evaluation of the interaction, and devaluated their interaction partners more than included participants, demonstrating that people are sensitive to epistemic ostracism. In line with William’s need-threat model, eye-tracking results revealed that excluded participants did not withdraw from the unfavorable interaction, but increased the number of looks to the player who could potentially reintegrate them.

Accessory stimuli affect the emergence of conflict, not conflict control: A Simon-task ERP study.

Accessory signals that precede stimuli in interference tasks lead to faster overall responses while conflict increases. Two opposing accounts exist for the latter finding: one is based on dual-route frameworks of response preparation and proposes amplification of both direct response activation and indirect response selection processes; the other refers to attentional networks and suggests inhibition of executive attention, thereby hampering conflict control. The present study replicated previous behavioral findings in a Simon task and extended them by electrophysiological evidence. Accessory tones facilitated stimulus classification and attentional allocation in the Simon task as reflected by an increased N1 amplitude and an overall decrease of the N2 amplitude, respectively. The conflict-related N2 amplitude, which is larger in conflict trials compared with nonconflict trials, was not modulated by accessory tones. Moreover, accessory tones did not affect sequence-dependent conflict adaptation. In terms of a dual-route framework present results suggest amplification of both response preparation routes by accessory stimuli. An executive attention approach proposing accessory stimuli to hamper control of conflict is not supported.

Structural plasticity of the social brain: Differential change after socio-affective and cognitive mental training

Training to understand the feelings and thoughts of others induces structural changes in two divergent social brain networks. Although neuroscientific research has revealed experience-dependent brain changes across the life span in sensory, motor, and cognitive domains, plasticity relating to social capacities remains largely unknown. To investigate whether the targeted mental training of different cognitive and social skills can induce specific changes in brain morphology, we collected longitudinal magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) data throughout a 9-month mental training intervention from a large sample of adults between 20 and 55 years of age. By means of various daily mental exercises and weekly instructed group sessions, training protocols specifically addressed three functional domains: (i) mindfulness-based attention and interoception, (ii) socio-affective skills (compassion, dealing with difficult emotions, and prosocial motivation), and (iii) socio-cognitive skills (cognitive perspective-taking on self and others and metacognition). MRI-based cortical thickness analyses, contrasting the different training modules against each other, indicated spatially diverging changes in cortical morphology. Training of present-moment focused attention mostly led to increases in cortical thickness in prefrontal regions, socio-affective training induced plasticity in frontoinsular regions, and socio-cognitive training included change in inferior frontal and lateral temporal cortices. Module-specific structural brain changes correlated with training-induced behavioral improvements in the same individuals in domain-specific measures of attention, compassion, and cognitive perspective-taking, respectively, and overlapped with task-relevant functional networks. Our longitudinal findings indicate structural plasticity in well-known socio-affective and socio-cognitive brain networks in healthy adults based on targeted short daily mental practices. These findings could promote the development of evidence-based mental training interventions in clinical, educational, and corporate settings aimed at cultivating social intelligence, prosocial motivation, and cooperation.

The Structure of Human Prosociality Differentiating Altruistically Motivated, Norm Motivated, Strategically Motivated, and Self-Reported Prosocial Behavior

Prosocial behavior is crucial for functioning societies. However, its reliable scientific assessment and the understanding of its underlying structure are still a challenge. We integrated 14 paradigms from diverse disciplines to identify reliable and method-independent subcomponents of human prosociality; 329 participants performed game theoretical paradigms and hypothetical distribution tasks commonly used in behavioral economics and completed interactive computer tasks and self-reports typically employed in psychology. Four subcomponents of prosociality were identified by exploratory factor analysis and verified by confirmatory factor analysis in an independent sample: altruistically motivated prosocial behavior, norm motivated prosocial behavior, strategically motivated prosocial behavior, and self-reported prosocial behavior. Altruistically motivated behavior was related to gender, to enhanced cognitive skills, and to reduced negative affect. Our study provides a crucial step toward an overarching framework on prosocial behavior that will benefit future research on predictors, neural underpinnings, and plasticity of human cooperation and prosociality.

Socio-Cognitive Phenotypes Differentially Modulate Large-Scale Structural Covariance Networks

Abstract Functional neuroimaging studies have suggested the existence of 2 largely distinct social cognition networks, one for theory of mind (taking others’ cognitive perspective) and another for empathy (sharing others’ affective states). To address whether these networks can also be dissociated at the level of brain structure, we combined behavioral phenotyping across multiple socio‐cognitive tasks with 3‐Tesla MRI cortical thickness and structural covariance analysis in 270 healthy adults, recruited across 2 sites. Regional thickness mapping only provided partial support for divergent substrates, highlighting that individual differences in empathy relate to left insular‐opercular thickness while no correlation between thickness and mentalizing scores was found. Conversely, structural covariance analysis showed clearly divergent network modulations by socio‐cognitive and ‐affective phenotypes. Specifically, individual differences in theory of mind related to structural integration between temporo‐parietal and dorsomedial prefrontal regions while empathy modulated the strength of dorsal anterior insula networks. Findings were robust across both recruitment sites, suggesting generalizability. At the level of structural network embedding, our study provides a double dissociation between empathy and mentalizing. Moreover, our findings suggest that structural substrates of higher‐order social cognition are reflected rather in interregional networks than in the the local anatomical markup of specific regions per se.

Effects of Observing Eye Contact on Gaze Following in High-Functioning Autism.

Observing eye contact between others enhances the tendency to subsequently follow their gaze and has been suggested to function as a social signal that adds meaning to an upcoming action or event. The present study investigated effects of observed eye contact in high-functioning autism (HFA). Two faces on a screen either looked at or away from each other before providing congruent or incongruent gaze cues to one of two target locations. In contrast to control participants, HFA participants did not depict enhanced gaze following after observing eye contact. Individuals with autism, hence, do not seem to process observed mutual gaze as a social signal indicating the relevance of upcoming (gaze) behaviour. This may be based on the reduced tendency of individuals with HFA to engage in social gaze behavior themselves, and might underlie some of the characteristic deficiencies in social communicative behaviour in autism.

Substrates of metacognition on perception and metacognition on higher-order cognition relate to different subsystems of the mentalizing network.

Humans have the ability to reflect upon their perception, thoughts, and actions, known as metacognition (MC). The brain basis of MC is incompletely understood, and it is debated whether MC on different processes is subserved by common or divergent networks. We combined behavioral phenotyping with multi‐modal neuroimaging to investigate whether structural substrates of individual differences in MC on higher‐order cognition (MC‐C) are dissociable from those underlying MC on perceptual accuracy (MC‐P). Motivated by conceptual work suggesting a link between MC and cognitive perspective taking, we furthermore tested for overlaps between MC substrates and mentalizing networks. In a large sample of healthy adults, individual differences in MC‐C and MC‐P did not correlate. MRI‐based cortical thickness mapping revealed a structural basis of this independence, by showing that individual differences in MC‐P related to right prefrontal cortical thickness, while MC‐C scores correlated with measures in lateral prefrontal, temporo‐parietal, and posterior midline regions. Surface‐based superficial white matter diffusivity analysis revealed substrates resembling those seen for cortical thickness, confirming the divergence of both MC faculties using an independent imaging marker. Despite their specificity, substrates of MC‐C and MC‐P fell clearly within networks known to participate in mentalizing, confirmed by task‐based fMRI in the same subjects, previous meta‐analytical findings, and ad‐hoc Neurosynth‐based meta‐analyses. Our integrative multi‐method approach indicates domain‐specific substrates of MC; despite their divergence, these nevertheless likely rely on component processes mediated by circuits also involved in mentalizing. Hum Brain Mapp 37:3388–3399, 2016.