Anne Goujon

Population, Households, and CO2 Emissions

The model linking environmental impact to population, affluence, and technology, or I = PAT, is reformulated in terms of households (i.e., I = HAT) as opposed to persons. Such an approach may be preferable in the case of environmental impacts that arise from activities, such as residential heating and automobile transport, for which there exist significant household-level economies of scale. Because of changes in average household size, the I = HAT model gives rise to a very different decomposition of the sources of historical growth of environmental impacts than does I = PAT. Taking growth of global energy consumption as an example, the authors find that I = PAT attributes 18 percent of the annual increase (in absolute terms) over the period 1970-90 to demographic increase in more developed regions, whereas I = HAT attributes 41 percent because the number of households grew faster than the number of persons. The I = PAT and I = HAT models also give rise to substantially different projections of CO_2 emissions in the year 2100. The authors conclude that decomposition and projection exercises are sensitive to the unit of demographic account chosen. Until more is known about the nature of the many activities that give rise to environmental impacts, it would be unwise to draw far-reaching conclusions from one choice of model without a substantive justification of that choice.

Estimating least-developed countries' vulnerability to climate-related extreme events over the next 50 years.

When will least developed countries be most vulnerable to climate change, given the influence of projected socio-economic development? The question is important, not least because current levels of international assistance to support adaptation lag more than an order of magnitude below what analysts estimate to be needed, and scaling up support could take many years. In this paper, we examine this question using an empirically derived model of human losses to climate-related extreme events, as an indicator of vulnerability and the need for adaptation assistance. We develop a set of 50-year scenarios for these losses in one country, Mozambique, using high-resolution climate projections, and then extend the results to a sample of 23 least-developed countries. Our approach takes into account both potential changes in countries’ exposure to climatic extreme events, and socio-economic development trends that influence countries’ own adaptive capacities. Our results suggest that the effects of socio-economic development trends may begin to offset rising climate exposure in the second quarter of the century, and that it is in the period between now and then that vulnerability will rise most quickly. This implies an urgency to the need for international assistance to finance adaptation.

Demographic dimensions in forecasting: Adding education to age and sex

Any breakdown of the total population (i.e., the number of living individuals staying within a well-defined area) for analytical purposes follows a certain implicit or explicit logic. In demography it has become standard practice to sort the total population along the dimensions of age and sex. Although this practice is usually taken for granted and not explicitly justified, it may be useful to recall the good reasons that have lead to this practice. This appraisal of age and sex helps to evaluate the importance one should assign to explicit consideration of such other possible dimensions as marital status, ethnicity, labor force participation, region of origin, and educational status. Three criteria should govern the determination to explicitly consider a particular dimension (breakdown) in demographic analysis in general and in population projections in particular: Criterion 1. To the users the dimension is interesting in its own right and therefore desirable as an explicit output parameter. Criterion 2. The dimension is a relevant source of demographic heterogeneity with an impact on the dynamics of the whole system and therefore on the resulting population size. Criterion 3. It is feasible (in terms of data and methodology) to consider the dimension explicitly. Age meets these criteria....

Diffusion of education in six world regions, 1960-90

Education has been found to be related to fertility and hence population growth; to the status of women; and to labor force skills. Therefore, education is a central issue for development, and it is important to understand the dynamics of education diffusion throughout populations during developmetn. This note analyzes trends in school enrollment and adult education achievement for six world regions, 1960-90. There has been an enormous global increase in both measures of education. Gaps between male and female enrollment remain, and the gap is larger at lower levels of education. As enrollment rates increase and the average level of adult education rises, the gender gap narrows considerably.

Future human capital: Population projections by level of education

The 20th century was the century of explosive population growth, resulting in unprecedented impacts; in contrast, the 21st century is likely to see the end of world population growth and become the century of population aging. We are currently at the crossroads of these demographic regimes. This book presents fresh evidence about our demographic future and provides a new framework for understanding the underlying unity in this diversity. It is an invaluable resource for those concerned with the implications of population change in the 21st century.

Past and Future of Human Capital in Southeast Asia: From 1970 to 2030

This paper examines the levels of educational attainment in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam from 1970 to 2030 by reconstructing and projecting levels of educational attainment. While the study of the past shows that the determination to invest in education has been strong in those six countries, efforts to increase levels of education were implemented at different rates and levels of intensity. The projections show the legacy of those past efforts. In Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand, there will be tangible increases in the proportion of the working-age population with a tertiary education. The Philippines will have a dichotomous society, where large proportions of the population will have either tertiary or only primary education. In Indonesia, the bulk of the working-age population will shift from primary in 2000 to secondary by 2030. The projection horizon and the trend type of scenarios do not allow Vietnam to catch up with the other countries in this study.This paper examines levels of educational attainment in Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam for the period 1970-2030 through the reconstruction and projection of levels of educational attainment. While the study of the past shows that the determination to invest in education has been strong in the six countries, the investments were implemented at different pace and intensity, the projections show the legacy of past investments. In Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand, there will be tangible increases in the proportion of the working age population with a tertiary education. The Philippines will have a dichotomous society where large proportions will either have a tertiary education or only a primary education. In Indonesia, the bulk of the working age population will shift from primary in 2000 to secondary by 2030. The projection horizon and the trend type of scenario do not allow Vietnam to catch up with the other countries.

Human Capital, Values, and Attitudes of Persons Seeking Refuge in Austria in 2015

Since its inception in 2010, the Arab Spring has evolved into a situation of violent conflict in many countries, leading to high levels of migration from the affected region. Given the social impact of the large number of individuals applying for asylum across Europe in 2015, it is important to study who these persons are in terms of their skills, motivations, and intentions. DiPAS (Displaced Persons in Austria Survey) aims to uncover the socio-demographic characteristics of the persons seeking refuge who arrived in Austria in 2015, mainly originating from Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan. Particular focus is on human capital, attitudes and values. This survey, the first of its kind in Austria and possibly in Europe, was carried out among adult displaced persons, mostly residing in Vienna, yielding 514 completed interviews. Information gathered on spouses and children allows for the analysis of 972 persons living in Austria, and of further 419 partners and children abroad. Results indicate that the surveyed population comprised mainly young families with children, particularly those coming from Syria and Iraq. Their educational level is high compared with the average level in their country of origin. A vast majority of respondents are Muslims, rating their religiosity at medium levels. Judging from stated attitudes towards gender equity, interviewed men seem to have more liberal attitudes than their compatriots. The majority of respondents do not intend to return to their home countries, mostly because of the perception of permanent threat. DiPAS provides data for political decision-making and the on-going societal dialogue. Its findings can help to inform assessments about the integration potential of the displaced population into the host society. In addition, the applied methodological technique and experiences during the fieldwork provide valuable insights on sampling asylum seekers and refugees in the current European context.

The End of Secularisation through Demography? Projections of Spanish Religiosity

Abstract This article presents the first projection, to our knowledge, of the intensity of religiosity in a population, which has a strong bearing on the critical question of the religious future of Europe. Spain has, in recent decades, simultaneously experienced rapid religious decline and marked demographic change through high immigration and declining fertility. To investigate future trends, we carry out population projections by religion and religiosity to the year 2050. We find that both fertility and immigration increase the share of the highly religious, as the more religious tend to have more children and immigrants tend to be more religious than non-immigrants. The non-religious population grows because people switch from religion to no-religion and because they are younger. Our findings suggest that in the longer term (2050), there may be growth in the no-religion population, a decline in the share of highly religious Christians, and moderate development of low religious Christians. The Muslim population would substantially increase, unless there is an end to migration and fertility differentials.

A cross‐sectional mixed study of the opportunity to improve maternal postpartum care in reproductive, maternal, newborn, and child health services in the Kaya health district of Burkina Faso

To propose a rationale to improve maternal postpartum care in reproductive, maternal, newborn, and child health (RMNCH) services.

American political affiliation, 2003–43: A cohort component projection

The recent rise in identification with American political parties has focused interest on the long-term dynamics of party support. Liberal commentators cite immigration and youth as forces that will produce a natural advantage for the Democrats in the future, while conservative writers highlight the importance of high fertility amongst Republicans in securing growth. These opinions are not based on demographic analysis. We addressed this omission by undertaking the first ever cohort component projection (up to 2043) of populations by American party allegiance, based on survey and census data. On current trends, we predict that American partisanship will change much less than the nations ethnic composition because the parties are similar in age structure. Nevertheless, our projections suggest that the Democrats will gain 2–3 per cent more support than the Republicans by 2043, mainly through immigration, although the higher fertility of Republicans may eventually offset that advantage.