Anne Weyembergh

The Development of Eurojust: Potential and Limitations of Article 85 of the TFEU

This article first underlines the contributions and limitations of the revised Eurojust Decision of 16 December 2008 and of the Framework Decision of 30 November 2009 on prevention and settlement of conflicts of jurisdiction. It then presents a detailed analysis of the contents of Article 85, paragraph by paragraph, and of its potential. Several passages of this provision, resulting from difficult compromises, are quite ambiguous and raise numerous questions. The opened prospects remain limited because, unlike Article 86 TFEU, the centre of gravity for investigations and prosecutions would not be transferred at EU level. However, Article 85 offers concrete possibilities to transform Eurojust from a simple mediator and player at horizontal cooperation level to a player with binding operational powers at vertical integration level. Such transformation explains why the implementation of Article 85 is quite sensitive in terms of national sovereignty and given the discrepancies between national systems. The question is whether Member States are now ready to accept such development and exploit the possibilities set out in Article 85.

The external dimension of the European Area of Freedom, Security and Justice

The EU is a major player in the global economy, due not only to its weight in international trade, foreign direct investment and exchange rate mechanisms, but also to its capacity to influence global standard formation through its single market and its Economic and Monetary Union. In addition, a further more diffuse form of influence stems from the sum of its external policies, as well as from the model provided by its internal socio-economic model. This prominent position poses the question of the extent to which these vectors of influence have been adapted to the new landscape defined by globalisation. First, this chapter starts with a preliminary characterisation of the European economic and social model, and with the challenges arising from a globalised economy. Second, it details the evolution of the Lisbon Strategy (2000-10), the modernisation agenda aimed at preparing Europe for the challenges of globalisation, as well as its implications for the Unions external action. The Lisbon Strategy, adopted by the European Council in 2000, was designed to address the question of whether it is possible to update Europes development strategy so that it might rise to the new challenges resulting from globalisation, technological change and population ageing, while still preserving European values. A further core question which emerged was the need to identify under which conditions a win-win game could be fostered at the international level. In other words, the question is how to create global players engaged in a race to the top - not the bottom - with regard to the social and environmental conditions of a transition to a knowledge-intensive economy. What could the specific role of the EU be in this process of international convergence? This chapter argues that the EU can play a very relevant role in spreading a new development agenda through a variety of means: by providing a positive example in implementing a new development agenda, in line with the Lisbon Agenda, in its own member states; by intertwining this new development agenda with its enlargement and neighbourhood policies; and by connecting this new development agenda in the various components of its external action: its cooperation policy; the external projection of its internal policies; its trade policy and foreign policy regarding third countries, other macro-regions and multilateral organisations.Born in 1999, the euro has rapidly become an international currency. It has become the second international currency used in all the functions classically attributed to a currency and its role is now more important than that of the legacy currencies. However, the US dollar although in a position of decline, is still the most widely used currency. The euro is a currency without a state. This means that it is in a very specific position with respect to other currencies in a world still mostly designed for and by states. In order to evaluate the way the euro has fitted into the international monetary and financial system, it seems necessary to get a broad view of the components and workings of the main institutions and groupings in charge of monetary and financial stability. Despite the focus on the International Monetary Fund (IMF), one cannot neglect the G7, which has been defined as the screening committee of the IMF, and other entities, like the G20 (which has grown in importance since the Washington Summit of November 15, 2008), the G10 and the Basle institutions (Bank of International Settlements (BIS), Basle Committee for Banking Supervision (BCBS), Financial Stability Forum (FSF)). The European Community Treaty includes provisions concerning the participation and representation of the euro area in international financial institutions. The Lisbon Treaty confirms these provisions and establishes a stable presidency for the Eurogroup, which plays an increasing role in the external representation of the euro area along with the European Central Bank President and the Economic and Monetary Union Commissioner. Practises have developed to coordinate the positions of the member states in the international context. But pragmatism cannot allow for the euro to be effectively represented on an equal footing with the other international currencies. Taking into account the specific features of the IMF, and the ongoing reform of this institution as well as the pressures exercised on the EU, and Europe in general, by its partners, various scenarios are presented and evaluated with regard to the representation of the euro area within the Fund. The question of the inclusion of the euro area is directly connected to a move towards more legitimacy and effectiveness for the Fund. The future of a universal institution for monetary and financial stability is at stake.In what direction is European integration headed? This chapter defends the Kantian conception of a cosmopolitan union1 structured around three levels of law: internal, international and transnational. This conception entails a new sense of political identity, based on a reflexive view of national traditions and of history itself. This new European spirit is most notable in the EUs foreign relations, and particularly in the ideology that dominates the EUs neighborhood policy. Comparison of the respective strategic cultures of the USA and the EU further illustrates the evolving European identity.Since the end of the cold war, interregional dynamics have become a fixture both of the global multilayered multilateral system, as well as of the EUs efforts to strengthen said international system. Such interregional arrangements are deeply rooted in the new regional associations which emerged at the end of the 1980s. Since the collapse of the bipolar world order, various regional dynamics have flourished across the globe. This new wave of regionalism included a broad variety of forms and scopes of regional cooperation, nonetheless it allowed a growing number of regional entities - among first and foremost the EU - to develop multifaceted region-to-region relations. These complex multi-issued interregional arrangements have grown exponentially as they have come to meet functional and structural needs of their constituent members. Among the various roles such interregional initiatives can assume, one can distinguish between: power-balancing efforts, agenda-setting and cost-cutting concerns, protection against unwanted external pressures, institutionalizing political dialogue and consultation, and reflexive region strengthening. All of these functions can be called upon in varying degrees according to the specific context and history of any given arrangement. A detailed study of two of the EUs core region-to-region relationships - the EU-Latin America and the EU-East Asia interregional arrangements - clearly illustrates the systemic foundations, the historical path-dependencies and the contextual factors, both the exogenous and endogenous, which have come to shape these different yet comparable interregional dynamics.The EU has a broad and complex network of external relations, developed both within the context of the European Community (trade relations, development cooperation, etc.) as well as within the framework of the common foreign and security policy. This chapter first details how the Maastricht Treaty laid out the famous three pillars which originally made up the EU. The Lisbon Treaty would ultimately remove this three-tiered structure, thereby affirming the EUs singular and unified legal personality, both domestically and internationally. The EU enjoys important competences in different fields of its external relations. As shown next in this chapter, these competences can be distinguished as being either explicitly or implicitly conferred, as well as exclusive or shared with regard to the member states. The Unions competences include inter alia the conclusion of international agreements. To a large extent, the Lisbon Treaty has, along the lines subsequently described, unified the procedures behind the conclusion of such international agreements, while also awarding an ever-increasing role to the European Parliament. The EU also participates to varying degrees in many international organisations. As outlined, such participation is mostly a joint venture with the member states. This implies a necessarily close cooperation between the Union and the member states when acting within these international institutions. In conclusion, the chapter highlights the clear intent on strengthening the coherence between the different fields of the EUs external action, as well as between its internal and external policies. Coherence remains a difficult goal, even though the Lisbon Treaty improves the overall situation through important institutional reforms.1. Introduction: The EU as a model, a global actor and an unprecedented power M. Telo Part 1: The impact of the European Union on global governance 2. The influence of European Union democracy P. Magnette and K. Nicolaidis 3. The international projection of the Euro and the international monetary system Jean-Victor.Louis 4. EU competition policy in a global world Mathias Dewatripont and Patrick Legros 5. The European socio-economic model and its implications on the global economy M.J.Rodrigues Part 2: EU external policies 6. The EUs external relations and their legal framework M.Dony 7. The EU Common Commercial Policy and global/regional regulation P.Conconi 8. The European common development cooperation Nico Schijver 9. The role of the European Union in global environmental and climate governance S. Oberthur 10.The external dimension of the European Area for Freedom, Security and Justice A. Weyembergh and Ph De Bruycker 11. The CFSP and ESDP E. Remacle and B.Delcourt Part 3: Europe as a global actor: horizontal issues 12. The Neighbourhood policies of the EU R. Seidelmann 13. The EU, interregionalism and the global governance F.Ponjaert and S.Santander 14. Europe in the world: imperial legacies P.Lagrou 15. European integration and the cosmopolitan way J.M. FerryThis chapters main objective is to discuss some of the principles and ideas which are commonly evoked, in both academic and political circles, regarding the EU as an international actor and its specific participation in global governance. A substantial part of it is devoted more specifically to the European security and defence policy and to the strengthening of the EUs ability to intervene in crisis-stricken areas. Accordingly, both the unleashed potential born of the EUs ambitions on the international stage, as well as the difficulties that the EU has to face in the current state of the world system, are to be detailed.

Consequences of Brexit for European Union criminal law

The United Kingdom has almost always been a fierce defender of its insularity and its national sovereignty. It has been a fervent advocate of the intergovernmental method and has put up stiff resistance to more integration in the field of police cooperation and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. Since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon and the communitarization of the sector, it has benefited from an exceptional status in the European criminal justice area and from an unusual pick and choose capacity, leading to risks of deep imbalances in the sector. Consequently, the departure of the United Kingdom from the EU could, at first sight, generate a certain amount of relief. However, a deeper analysis about the future of criminal cooperation within the EU without the United Kingdom leads to temper such positive feeling, particularly because of the United Kingdom’s high level of expertise in the field and because of the sensitive questions Brexit raises. One of these is to know what mechanisms will replace the existing ones. Depending on the answer, Brexit might be hard or soft, which will be crucial in terms of maintaining (or not) the effectiveness of the fight against crime and preservation of the superior interest of criminal justice. Another issue is to determine who will negotiate: the EU, the Members States or both? The obvious risk here is that of diluting European criminal law and the danger of some parts of this law being sucked out of the EU’s institutional framework.

Competition or Cooperation?: State of Play and Future Perspectives on the Relations between Europol, Eurojust and the European Judicial Network

This article analyses the cooperation between EU agencies and bodies active in the fight against serious cross-border crime. It focuses on the cooperation between Europol and Eurojust on the one hand, and between Eurojust and the European Judicial Network on the other hand. Considering the existence of grey areas in which their respective mandates overlap, the complementarity of their actions and their smooth cooperation are essential to ensure coherence within the EU area of criminal justice. In both situations, the analysis of the current state of their cooperation allows the identification of good practices as well as points of concern. The current negotiations for regulations on Europol and Eurojust offer the opportunity to reflect on future perspectives and to suggest possible improvements.

The European Public Prosecutor’s Office: certain constitutional issues

The EPPO proposal proclaims a new generation of EU judicial body with, on the one hand, vertical/supranational integration aspects and, on the other hand, horizontal/intergovernmental elements. This chapter analyses the balance achieved between both types of features in the Commission’s proposal for a Regulation.

Punitive Administrative Sanctions and Procedural Safeguards: A Blurred Picture That Needs to Be Addressed:

In order to ensure effectiveness of European Union law, the legislator progressively introduced punitive sanctions in various fields of administrative law. If the definition of punitive administrative sanction is already complex, its erratic use in the European Union legal order further contributes to the blurriness of the boundaries distinguishing administrative sanctions from criminal sanctions. Consequently, the current approximation of the applicable standards in the European legal order is insufficient as the standards imposed by the European Court of Human Right, the Court of Justice of the European Union and national courts differ, notably on the extent to which punitive administrative sanctions should comply with guarantees applicable to criminal law procedures. Overcoming the hurdles of approximation requires the legislators intervention in order to set a coherent standard.

History of the Cooperation

The cooperation in criminal matters between the Member States of the EU presents a particularly dynamic and evolutive nature. The main stages of this evolution are presented in this chapter, as well as their main successes and weaknesses.

Relations Between the EPPO and Eurojust—Still a Privileged Partnership?

Once it is established, the EPPO will not operate as an isolated actor, but it will integrate itself in the already existing network of EU agencies and bodies. In this context, its relations with Eurojust are of fundamental importance. Both actors are active in the field of judicial cooperation in criminal matters, and the Treaty itself (Article 86 TFEU) provides for a special link between them. Provisions organising their relationship can be found in the EPPO’s and Eurojust’s proposals for regulations, which are still under negotiation. The present chapter analyses the modalities of their cooperation, as they are currently envisaged, with the aim to assess whether the two actors are privileged partners. This analysis is divided in three steps: it examines firstly their institutional relationship; secondly their management and administrative links and finally their operational cooperation. The analysis reveals that it is at the moment difficult to consider Eurojust as the EPPO’s privileged partner. A better clarification of their bilateral relations should be included in the draft proposals, and Eurojust’s expertise should be better taken into consideration. A further clarification of the distribution of competences between the EPPO, Eurojust and OLAF is also advisable, especially to avoid unnecessary tensions between the different actors.

The future cooperation between OLAF and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office:

Establishing the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) will represent an important step for cross-border cooperation in criminal matters within the European Union, and more particularly for the protection of the Union’s financial interests. The EPPO’s work will complement the work carried out by the European Anti-Fraud Office. This article, based on a briefing paper commissioned by the European Parliament’s Policy Department for Budgetary Affairs, at the request of the Committee on Budgetary Control, analyses future cooperation between these two bodies, OLAF and the EPPO. Three main dimensions of their cooperation are analysed as well as the elements of complexity that may influence it. The article highlights elements essential for their close cooperation and complementarity, especially with regard to a potential revision of OLAF’s legal framework.

Report on Belgium

Warning: On 16 January 2015, following a police intervention in Verviers and in the aftermath of the Charlie Hebdo attacks in Paris, the Belgian government announced a series of measures against radicalization and terrorism. They are said to include the extension of terrorist offences, the extension of the use of special investigation techniques, the enlargement of the possibility to withdraw Belgian nationality and to withdraw temporarily the identity cards and passports, the implementation of the freezing of assets at the national level, the possibility to call on the army for specific surveillance missions and the strengthening of the analysis capacities of Belgian intelligence services. INTRODUCTION A. Belgian Experience with Terrorism Until recently, the terrorist threat with which Belgium was confronted was far more limited than in other Member States (MS) of the European Union (EU), such as Italy, Spain, France, Germany and the United Kingdom. However, this does not mean that it was totally nonexistent. Like many other Western European states, during the first half of the 1980s, Belgium faced extreme left-wing domestic terrorism, especially the activities of the so-called cellules communistes combattantes (CCC). Although this group committed numerous terrorist attacks that resulted in the death of two firefighters and injury to three others, their seriousness was more limited than those performed by the German Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF) or the Italian Brigate Rosse. During the late 1980s and 1990s, no significant terrorist threat was recorded. But the situation changed about ten years ago. According to intelligence and investigative authorities, the international terrorist threat, especially that related to radical Islamist terrorism, has become a major concern in Belgium. The country serves as an operating base for terrorist Jihadist groups, cells or networks; recruitment and training of terrorists have been organised from Belgium, and Belgium does not escape from the phenomenon of radicalization and homegrown terrorism. In this regard, the existence of more or less organised and structured recruitment network(s) to go to fight in Syria are worrying. Lone wolves and self-radicalisation are also included among Belgian terrorist threats. Action has been taken to face the radicalisation threat, for instance, with the adoption in 2005 of a ‘national counter-radicalism plan’ and a more recent federal programme of prevention of violent radicalisation.