Anthony Gill

State Welfare Spending and Religiosity: A Cross-National Analysis

What accounts for cross-national variation in religiosity as measured by church attendance and non-religious rates? Examining answers from both secularization theory and the religious economy perspective, we assert that cross-national variation in religious participation is a function of government welfare spending and provide a theory that links macro-sociological outcomes with individual rationality. Churches historically have provided social welfare. As governments gradually assume many of these welfare functions, individuals with elastic preferences for spiritual goods will reduce their level of participation since the desired welfare goods can be obtained from secular sources. Cross-national data on welfare spending and religious participation show a strong negative relationship between these two variables after controlling for other aspects of modernization.

Rethinking Protestantism in Latin America

Introduction: Rethinking Protestantism in Latin America -- David Stoll 1. Struggling Against the Devil: Pentecostalism and Social Movements in Urban Brazil -- John Burdick 2. The Crentes of Campo Alegre and the Religious Construction of Brazilian Politics -- Rowan Ireland 3. Brother Votes for Brother: The New Politics of Protestantism in Brazil -- Paul Freston 4. Protestantism in El Salvador: Conventional Wisdom versus the Survey Evidence -- Kenneth M. Coleman, Edwin Eloy Aguilar, Jose Miguel Sandoval, and Timothy J. Steigenga 5. The Reformation of Machismo: Asceticism and Masculinity among Colombian Evangelicals -- Elizabeth Brusco 6. Shifting Affiliations: Mayan Widows and Evangelicos in Guatemala -- Linda Green 7. Religious Mobility and the Many Words of God in La Paz, Bolivia -- Lesley Gill Conclusion: Is This Latin Americas Reformation? -- Virginia Garrard-Burnett Bibliography About the Contributors Index

Will a Million Muslims March? Muslim Interest Organizations and Political Integration in Europe

Presently, Islam in Europe has a weak and divided political voice. This article draws on collective action theory and the religious economies model to analyze Muslim interest organizations in democratic polities. The authors develop general theoretical propositions and apply them to a case study of mosque – state relations in the federal state (land) of Berlin. The study shows that institutional features of the German polity and diaspora Islam make collective action difficult and provide opportunities for factions (“spoilers”) to under-mine broad-based collective action if they perceive centralizing organizations as compromising doctrinal and organizational autonomy. In addition, conflicts between organizations representing conservative Muslim interests and secularly oriented ones further complicate collective action. The result is narrow interest articulation by smaller, less diverse groups. Based on our study, the authors consider the general applicability of our propositions and their implications for European polities.

The institutional limitations of Catholic progressivism: an economic approach

From the vantage point of the 1970s and early 1980s, the Latin American Catholic Church appeared to be on a trajectory of increasing progressivism, typically manifesting itself as a “preferential option for the poor”. Recently, however, the Catholic hierarchy has experienced a “conservative retrenchment”. Why has this change occurred? Argues that the need to maintain a high profile in democratic societies experiencing rapid growth in evangelical Protestantism has led Church officials to return to an elite‐based, conservative political strategy. Suggests that lacking the resources to compete adequately with the rapid expansion of evangelical Protestantism, bishops have turned to lobbying the political and economic elite to help them maintain their social presence and prevent further parishioner defections from the faith. Ironically, at that time when the Church most needs state assistance to compete effectively, politicians are least likely to lend support.

Religiöse Dynamik und Demokratie in Lateinamerika

Fur mehrere Jahrzehnte, von den 1960ern bis zu den 1980ern, war Lateinamerika fur Politologen und Soziologen von besonderem Interesse. Wahrend dieser Zeitspanne schwankten viele Lander dieser Region zwischen Autoritarismus und Demokratie, was einen betrachtlichen Anstieg von Literatur zum Thema Regimewandel zur Folge hatte. Ab den fruhen 1990er Jahren verlagerte sich der wissenschaftliche Schwerpunkt auf das Studium der Regimekonsolidierung, wobei Bedingungen untersucht wurden, unter denen Demokratie aufrecht erhalten und gefestigt werden kann. Aber die politische Landschaft war nicht das einzige, was sich wahrend der zweiten Halfte des 20. Jahrhunderts veranderte. Ein religioser Wandel ging durch die Region. Innerhalb der beherrschenden Religion Lateinamerikas — dem Katholizismus — bildete sich eine lose zusammenhangende Bewegung radikaler Geistlicher heraus, die den politischen und sozialen Status quo unter dem Banner der „Befreiungstheologie“ in Frage stellten. Mehrere nationale Bischofskonferenzen, die lange fur ihre Rucksichtnahme auf die politischen Fuhrer bekannt waren, begannen ebenfalls, die Wirtschaftspolitik und die Menschenrechtsverletzungen der Diktaturen der Region anzuprangern. Aber noch uberraschender als dieser radikale Wandel innerhalb der katholischen Kirche war fur Wissenschaftler die Entstehung und die rasante Entwicklung einer neuen religiosen Bewegung - des evangelikalen Protestantismus.

An Economic and Pedagogical Defense of Gratuities

A few upscale restaurants in the United States recently have ended the practice of tipping their wait staff, preferring a fixed labor cost method of compensation. This attempt to change this long-standing cultural practice presents a fascinating opportunity to explore a variety of economic concepts including principal-agent problems, gains-from-trade, price discrimination, and cultural institutions designed to build trust. I argue that tipping remains an economically efficient means of providing quality service wherein restaurant owners, wait staff, and customers all benefit in what can be a win-win-win situation. The norm of tipping also provides an excellent example to teach basic economic principles and foster classroom discussion.

Christian Democracy without Romance: The Perils of Religious Politics from a Public Choice Perspective

ABSTRACT Christian Democracy is often championed as a romantic means of bringing ethical considerations for the common good into the daily life of politics. Public choice theory, on the other hand, reveals that the search for the common good is quixotic amidst divergent policy preferences within a nation. While there may be a handful of values that are accepted by nearly all citizens (e.g., prohibitions on murder), more mundane policy choices will likely promote differences of opinion. Given the often arbitrary nature of voting procedures, the ability of one faction to manipulate the vote choice, and the self-interested behavior of politicians to be re-elected, political parties will inevitably alienate some portion of the citizenry. Attaching Christianity to short-term political outcomes serves to undermine its long-term goal of promoting Gods mission. Nonetheless, the Catholic concept of subsidiarity is congruent with many of the findings of public choice theory and offers a way for Christians to engage in public life without tainting themselves in the political partisan arena of political partisanship.

The Political Economy of Religious Property Rights

Abstract Religious liberty is generally thought to apply to rights of conscience. However, acting upon one’s beliefs also involves numerous other civil liberties including the right to assemble, as well as the right to own and use real estate. I assert that the successful operation and growth of religious movements requires well-specified and protected private property rights. However, in recent decades, one of the major threats to religious freedom has been an attack on the property rights of religious denominations, particularly smaller and less organized ones. In addition to common Not in my backyard complaints, I assert two additional reasons for this phenomenon: (1) the tax-exempt status of religious groups dis-incentivizes politicians from giving out building permits to congregations; and (2) the growth of private and homeschooling incentivizes politicians concerned with protecting public school funding from granting land use permits that could facilitate alternative educational facilities.