Anthony O. Edmonds

January 1960–January 1961: Disappointment and Renewal

The year 1960 opened with a glimmer of hope for a positive change in the international situation. Largely the result of the initiative of an enthusiastic Prime Minister Macmillan and an initially reluctant President Eisenhower, the Western alliance was poised to enter into meaningful negotiations with the Soviet Union for the first time in the Cold War. The success of these negotiations, of course, depended upon the willingness of Nikita Khrushchev and the Soviet leadership to entertain the prospect of acceptable solutions to the issues which divided East and West. In 1959, in talks with Macmillan in Moscow in February, at the “kitchen debate” in Moscow with Vice President Richard Nixon in July, and finally with Eisenhower at Camp David in September, Khrushchev appeared open to a dialogue with the West.

1959: Mac, Ike, and Mr. K.

On 27 January 1959, Harold Macmillan wrote Dwight Eisenhower a rather petulant letter, complaining about a decision to award a turbine contract for an American dam project to an American rather than a British firm. What is most remarkable about this letter is the almost apocalyptic language the prime minister used to voice his displeasure: “What really worries me about this turbine contract is the injury that so small a thing can do to the cause that you and I have so much at heart of Anglo-American co-operation and understanding and the liberalism and interdependence with which your name will always be associated.”1 Such was the power of the Cold War paradigm in 1959 that it could turn what should have been a routine matter into a rhetorical ploy by Macmillan to try to wheedle a contract out of his good friend.2

Introduction: The Strange Twilight that Was Neither War nor Peace

On 10 January 1957, Harold Macmillan became the prime minister of Great Britain, following the resignation of Anthony Eden on 9 January. Eden had been, in effect, forced from office by a combination of the overwhelming political pressure brought upon him and his government by the Suez crisis, then in its sixth month, as well as his own serious health problems. On the same day, 10 January, Dwight D. Eisenhower, the thirty-fourth president of the United States, wrote a congratulatory message to Macmillan. The tone of Eisenhower’s letter underscored the friendship which existed between the two men, a relationship which originally began during World War II in the North Africa campaign when Eisenhower was the Supreme Allied Commander of the combined British-American troops, and Macmillan was Britain’s Minister Resident in Algiers, the personal representative of Prime Minister Winston Churchill to Eisenhower’s staff. “Dear Harold,” Eisenhower wrote, The purpose of this note is to welcome you to your new headaches. The only real fun you will have is to see just how far you can keep on going with everybody chopping at you with every conceivable kind of weapon. Knowing you so long and well I predict that your journey will be a great one. But you must remember the old adage, “Now abideth faith, hope, and charity — and greater than these is a sense of humor.”1

1957: Repairing the Special Relationship

In 1957, Harold Macmillan and Dwight D. Eisenhower set out to repair the strained relationship between Great Britain and the United States that had resulted from the lengthy Suez crisis of 1956. The restoration of closer ties between Britain and the United States was a high-stakes exercise for both leaders, although considerably higher for Macmillan than for Eisenhower. Upon taking office in mid-January, Macmillan faced a host of serious problems. The Suez crisis had dealt a setback to the British economy; Britain needed to adjust its international commitments in line with the increasingly scarce resources which it could afford for defense; and morale within the Conservative Party was dangerously low. Perhaps most important for Macmillan and the future of his government, Britain’s relationship with the United States cried out for immediate attention.1

1958: The Policy Dimension of the Macmillan-Eisenhower Relationship

For Harold Macmillan and Dwight D. Eisenhower, the dynamics of British— American relations were considerably different in 1958 than they had been in 1957. The two leaders had spent much of 1957 in a lengthy fence-mending exercise, and their meetings at Bermuda in March, at Washington in October, and then at Paris in December had solidified their diplomatic partnership and overcome much of the tension that had existed between Britain and the United States in the aftermath of the Suez crisis.

1959: Moscow, Washington, London, Paris

In 1959, Dwight D. Eisenhower and Harold Macmillan were confronted with a new crisis, in addition to their concerns about disarmament, the Middle East, and even the situation in the Far East. On 10 November 1958, Nikita S. Khrushchev, the premier of the Soviet Union, told an audience in Moscow that the Western powers had violated their postwar agreements over the future of Germany. He called upon the United States, Great Britain, and France to end their occupation of West Berlin and said that the Soviet Union intended to negotiate a separate treaty with the German Democratic Republic (East Germany), thereby enabling the East Germans to control the access routes to Berlin. The Western powers, therefore, would be forced to negotiate a separate arrangement with East Germany, a country which they did not recognize diplomatically, in order to maintain their rights in Berlin. Khrushchev’s speech was perceived as a tactic designed to force the West out of Berlin. Shortly after his 10 November speech, Khrushchev gave a six-month ultimatum for settling the Berlin issue, holding out the prospect of armed confrontation if a settlement was not reached.1

1960: Washington and Paris

As the year 1960 signaled the beginning of a new decade, so also did it open with a glimmer of hope for a positive change in the international situation. Largely due to the initiative of Dwight D. Eisenhower and Harold Macmillan, the Western alliance was poised to enter into meaningful negotiations with the Soviet Union for the first time in the Cold War. The success of these negotiations, of course, depended upon the willingness of Nikita Khrushchev and the Soviet leadership to entertain the prospect of acceptable solutions to the issues which divided East and West. In 1959, in talks with Macmillan in Moscow in February, at the “kitchen debate” in Moscow with Vice President Richard Nixon in July, and finally, with Eisenhower at Camp David in September, Khrushchev appeared willing to open a dialogue with the West.

1958: Arms Control, Washington, Lebanon

As Dwight D. Eisenhower and Harold Macmillan viewed British-American relations at the beginning of 1958, they witnessed a considerable change by contrast with 1957. The two leaders had spent much of 1957 mending fences and establishing a renewed basis for cooperation between the United States and Great Britain. In 1958, Eisenhower and Macmillan were forced to address the policy-making dimensions of their relationship. A particularly vexing problem for both the British and the Americans was the issue of arms control and disarmament and its impact upon relations with the Soviet Union.

Eisenhower, Macmillan and Allied Unity, 1957-61

Prologue 1957: Suez, Bermuda, Washington, Paris 1958: Arms Control, Washington and Lebanon 1959: Berlin, Moscow, Washington, London, Paris 1960: Washington and Paris Epilogue Bibliography