Antonio Estache

Efficiency Gains from Port Reform and the Potential for Yardstick Competition: Lessons from Mexico

This paper shows how measures of relative efficiency performance could promote yardstick competition between port infrastructure operators. The illustration is based on a study of the efficiency effects of the Mexican 1993 Port Reform. It covers 1996-99 and relies on a stochastic production frontier to show that Mexicos ports achieved 2.8-3.3% average annual efficiency gains since reform. The port-specific measures point to consistent leaders and laggards which would not all be identified by common partial productivity indicators. This information could be built into an explicit incentive-based regulatory regime aiming at promoting catch-up by laggards.

Infrastructure Services in Developing Countries: Access, Quality, Costs, and Policy Reform

The authors review the evidence on the state of infrastructure in the developing world, emphasizing the investment needs and the emerging policy issues. While their assessment is seriously constrained by data gaps, they provide useful insights on the main challenges ahead, emphasizing that, in addition to the widely discussed access problems, the poorest also face major affordability and service quality issues which were not well addressed by the reforms of the 1990s. The authors make a case for a stronger commitment of the international community to generate the information needed to assess and monitor infrastructure needs and policies.

Utilities Privatization and the Poor: Lessons and evidence from Latin America

Abstract The perception that privatization hurts the poor is growing and creating a backlash against the private provision of basic infrastructure services. At the same time, governments are finding themselves fiscally strapped, searching for ways to finance the large investments needed to expand services to the poor. In Latin America, a laboratory for privatization, evidence exists which sheds light on the privatization experience. This paper analyzes the channels through which the poor might either lose or gain from privatization, examines the evidence accumulated on what has actually happened, and then discusses the policy options available to decision-makers who want to increase efficiency while at the same time dealing with the infrastructure needs of the poor that have been identified as being important for their welfare. In that context, the issue of whether welfare considerations should form part of the regulatory approach to privatized services is examined. The papers major aims are to shed light on the issue of who can and does benefit from privatization of utilities, and to guide policy-makers in the choices.

Current Debates on Infrastructure Policy

This paper provides an overview of the major current debates on infrastructure policy. It reviews the evidence on the macroeconomic significance of the sector in terms of growth and poverty alleviation. It also discusses the major institutional debates, including the relative comparative advantage of the public and the private sector in the various stages of infrastructure service delivery as well as the main options for changes in the role of government (i.e. regulation and decentralization).

Emerging Infrastructure Policy Issues in Developing Countries: A Survey of the Recent Economic Literature

The author reviews the recent economic research on emerging issues for infrastructure policies affecting poor people in developing countries. His main purpose is to identify some of the challenges the international community, and donors in particular, are likely to have to address over the next few years. He addresses six main issues: (1) the necessity of infrastructure in achieving the Millennium Development Goals; (2) the various dimensions of financing challenges for infrastructure; (3) the debate on the relative importance of urban and rural infrastructure needs; (4) the debate on the effectiveness of infrastructure decentralization; (5) what works and what does not when trying to target the needs of the poor, with an emphasis on affordability and regulation challenges; and (6) the importance of governance and corruption in the sector. The author concludes by showing how the challenges identified define a relatively well integrated agenda for both researchers and the international infrastructure community.

Infrastructure Performance and Reform in Developing and Transition Economies: Evidence from a Survey of Productivity Measures

The authors review about 80 studies on electricity and gas, water and sanitation, and rail and ports (with a footnote on telecommunications) in developing countries. The main policy lesson is that there is a difference in the relevance of ownership for efficiency between utilities and transport in developing countries. In transport, private operators have tended to perform better than public operators. For utilities, ownership often does not matter as much as sometimes argued. Most cross-country studies find no statistically significant difference in efficiency scores between public and private providers. As for the country-specific studies, some do find differences in performance over time but these differences tend to matter much less than a large number of other variables. Across sectors, private operators functioning in a competitive environment or regulated under price caps or hybrid regulatory regimes tend to catch up best practice faster than public operators. There is a very strong case to push regulators in developing and transition economies toward a more systematic reliance on yardstick competition in a sector in which residual monopoly powers tend to be common.

Telecommunication Reforms, Access Regulation, and Internet Adoption in Latin America

The authors review the stylized facts on regulatory reform in telecommunications and its effects on telecommunications development and Internet penetration in Latin America. Relying on data from the International Telecommunication Union, the Information for Development Program (InfoDev), and the World Bank for 1990-99, the authors then test econometrically the determinants of the differences in Internet penetration rates across Latin America. The results show that effective implementation of the reform agenda in telecommunications regulation could accelerate adoption of the Internet in Latin America-even though it is only part of the solution (income levels, income distribution, and access to primary infrastructure are the main determinants of growth in Internet connections and use). Regulation will work by cutting costs. Cost cutting will require that regulators in the region take a much closer look at the design of interconnection rules and at the tradeoffs that emerge from the complex issues involved. It will also require a commitment to developing analytical instruments, such as cost models, to sort out many of the problems. Appropriate cost models will generate benchmarks that are much more consistent with the local issues and with the local cost of capital than international benchmarks will ever be for countries in unstable macroeconomic situations. Cost cutting will require an equally strong commitment to imposing regulatory accounting systems that reduce the information asymmetrics that incumbents use to reduce the risks of entry. All these changes will ultimately require a stronger commitment by competition agencies, since in many countries a failure to negotiate interconnection agreements will raise competition issues just as often as it will raise regulatory questions.

LIMITS TO COMPETITION IN URBAN BUS SERVICES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES.

During the past three decades, urban public transport policy has gone through several phases. From public ownership and monopoly provision, the 1980s and 1990s were characterized by a strong liberalization of the sector. This experience showed the limits of liberalization of the sector in terms of safety, prices and accountability. The paper discusses the market failures that justify this claim and the regulatory options available in this emerging new role of government. It illustrates how they are being used in practice in some countries.

A Few Things Transport Regulators Should Know About Risk and the Cost of Capital

In reviewing contracts, establishing price limits, or arbitrating conflicts, regulatory agencies and policy advisors face significant information asymmetry in determining the appropriate allowed rate of return, or discount rate. The information gap is especially important in determining the degree of market risk - often a critical component of the cost of capital demanded by operators. The authors consider various methodological problems in the transport sector in establishing the link between regulatory regime and degree of market risk The results of quantitative studies confirm that even for the transport sector - where there is intermodal competition and where contracts are often shorter and regulatory decisions may be less pressing than for utilities - the choice of regulatory regime greatly affects the degree of market risk a company faces. This has important implication for regulatory agencies and actions. When a regulatory agency undertakes a price review, or when issues arise about concession contracts, it is important that regulators assess correctly the required rate of return and cost of capital. They must also assess correctly the level of risk, which affects the required rate of return and the cost of capital. Most regulators in developing countries have a problem: the regulated companies are unquoted or undertake many activities for a range of industries and even sectors. For them this methodology for measuring the cost of capital, calculating the measure of market risk, and estimating the impact of various regulatory regimes on market risk may be useful.

The Theory of Access Pricing: an Overview for Infrastructure Regulators

The paper provides policymakers and regulators with an overview of the more relevant theoretical issues related to the pricing of access to ensure that the political debate around practical concerns is solidly grounded. The paper discusses in detail the importance of access pricing in the context of: 1) a liberalized and vertically separated industry, 2) liberalized but vertically integrated industries, 3) unregulated access (private negotiations).