Antonio Giustozzi

War and Peace Economies of Afghanistan's Strongmen

Afghanistans war economy started taking its current shape after 1992, when the main politico-military actors had to find alternative sources of revenue, having been dropped by their international sponsors. The same actors integrated into the ‘peace economy’ following the official end to the war in 2001, in a process which resembles the formation of ‘mafia’ networks, in which the narcotics trade appears to play an important role. If the central government turns out to be too corrupt and uncommitted to address the issue, the international community might one day have to directly engage these actors in order to facilitate their evolution from ‘robber barons’ to legitimate magnates.

Centre–periphery relations in Afghanistan: Badakhshan between patrimonialism and institution-building

The article offers a review of centre–periphery relations and local politics in the Afghan province of Badakhshan from the 1980s to the post-2001 era. It maps the local powerbrokers and charts the transformations that occurred during this period, with particular reference to the impact of the central governments policies on local political alignments and relations of power. The key argument is that President Karzais and the cabinets behaviour towards Badakhshani politics was aimed at re-establishing a patrimonial system, rather than at institution-building as claimed. Unable or unwilling to successfully deal with established local players, Kabul resorted to sponsoring new players in local politics and facilitating their rise in order to weaken more independent powerbrokers. However, a local perception of weakness in Kabul, not least due to uncertainty over the durability of the Karzai administration, led local players, old and new, to behave with very short-term horizons, as ‘roving bandits’ rather than as ‘stationary’ ones.

Bureaucratic façade and political realities of disarmament and demobilisation in Afghanistan

Internationally sponsored disarmament and demobilisation in Afghanistan was characterised by a marked divergence between the bureaucratic process designed by the UN and the political reality of disarmament. The bureaucratic process had several flaws of its own, which were particularly obvious in the case of DIAG, but the main reason for the substantial failure of disarmament was the absence of political will among key Afghan partners. International players in the process choose to compromise on ratherunfavourable terms, saving the façade of demobilisation thanks to the formal disbandment of the militias incorporated under the Ministry of Defence, but in fact allowing thousands of militias to continue operating throughout the country. The article shows how the very limited impact of DDR and even more so DIAG was already obvious in the early stages of the process and was deliberately ignored. The article concludes that the compromise could at least have achieved some limited aims, such as delegitimising the militias, had not many of their leaders been allowed to compete successfully for parliamentary seats shortly afterwards.

Networks and Armies: Structuring Rebellion in Colombia and Afghanistan

Until recently, the importance of organizational factors in the understanding of the variance of the behavior of state challengers had not been recognized. New studies and theories have underscored its crucial character. This article contends that challengers can be placed in a continuum constituted by two opposed polar types, army like and network associations, and compare the Afghan Talibans and the Colombian Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—FARC)s organizational principles from this point of view. The main claim is that organizationally inspired explanations behave much better than resource inspired ones when accounting for the differences between the Taliban and the FARC.

THE AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY: UNWARRANTED HOPE?

Abstract Billions of dollars have been spent in training, mentoring and equipping a new Afghan army which is representative of Afghanistans diverse ethnic groups and operates in the nations interests. Yet, at the end of 2009, the Afghan Army is beset by a host of problems including widespread illiteracy, ethnic rivalries, drug use and poor combat effectiveness. Respected Afghan expert Antonio Giustozzi analyses what has gone wrong and suggests that a new model may be the only way forward.

The inverted cycle: Kabul and the strongmen's competition for control over Kandahar, 2001–2006

Abstract Afghan tribes and local communities have been exposed to foreign patronage since at least the 19th century, but the scale of patronage relative to Afghanistans internal economy increased dramatically after the late 1970s. Inevitably, this had a major impact on Afghanistans own internal dynamics and on the mechanisms of political legitimisation. This article focuses on the province of Kandahar, which occupies a privileged space in Afghan politics and history, having given origin to almost all of the countrys ruling elites. It deals with three groups of tribal strongmen, who tried to use tribally based patronage systems to stake a claim to local power.

Privatizing war and security in Afghanistan: Future or dead end?

An assessment of the employment of mercenaries in Afghanistan gives mixed results. U.S. armed forces appear to have been happy with the Afghan Security Forces and ad hoc militias and only replaced them because of political reasons or because they felt that they were no longer needed. By contrast, the work of private security companies seems to have satisfied few. While in the short term no practical alternative to their use existed, it is not obvious that this option saves any money to the governments involved in the medium and long-term. Moreover, private security contractors are not subject to the control of military authorities, nor to military discipline. Their record of abusive behavior is indisputable and probably played a significant role in alienating the Afghan public. Unless much changes, the potential of private security companies in peacekeeping does not appear to be a bright one.

Afghanistan’s decentralised regional foreign policy

Afghanistans lack of a state monopoly of violence reflects on its foreign policy in a number of ways. First, various non-state organizations developing their own relations with foreign countries. Second, enforcing coherent policy making within the institutions of the Afghan state itself has been sometimes problematic as officials could rely on the patronage of organizations external to the state to delay the implementation of official policies. This article discusses the cases of Afghan foreign policy towards Pakistan, India, China and Iran.

The Afghan Way of War. Culture and Pragmatism: A Critical History

The scenario after 2030 depends on the shape of the East Asian Community. If the community were to be comprised of ASEAN+6 (China, Japan and South Korea, plus India, Australia and New Zealand), it would be easier for Japan to contain China’s ambition to become the regional hegemon. If the community comprised only ASEAN+3 – without India, Australia or New Zealand – China would be the next hegemon in East Asia. The book is excellent in that it conducts a systematic analysis of the relative positions of China and Japan in their quest for supremacy in East Asia. However, there are some relevant factors it fails to consider. For example, the author does not analyse the differing capacity between China and Japan in terms of foreign diplomacy. As Hidetaka Yoshimatsu (in New Political Economy, 2010) demonstrates, the two countries’ different diplomatic approaches in the negotiation of free trade agreements with ASEAN resulted in different levels of influence in Southeast Asia. While China’s pragmatic diplomatic style with policy commitment strengthened its ability as an effective negotiator with ASEAN, and resulted in growing Chinese influence in the region, Japan’s inflexible diplomatic style – constrained by domestic political institutions such as the powerful agricultural lobby against free trade agreements – reduced Japan’s policy decisiveness and commitment and ultimately limited the growth of its influence in the region. As this case demonstrates, the difference in diplomatic capacity certainly affects China and Japan’s political influence and leadership role in East Asia. In addition, the author’s emphasis on Japan’s technological supremacy may be slightly exaggerated. He predicts it would take another twenty years for China to catch up with Japan in this regard. However, the economic dynamics of East Asia are already transforming the Japan-centred production system. For example, Chinese and Taiwanese electronics giants, Haier and Hon Hai (Foxconn), recently acquired the white goods division of Sanyo and the LCD panel division of Sharp respectively, when these large Japanese electronics companies were suffering from business difficulties. With an increasing number of such cases, Japan’s technological advantage may be reduced as a result of technology transfer and the bankruptcy of technology-rich subcontractors. China has benefitted most from regional economic integration and globalisation and (Greater) China’s economy has become more influential. It remains to be seen whether China and Japan can institutionalise co-leadership in East Asia in the next two decades, despite their problematic history. It is also uncertain whether China will be the next regional hegemon, and thereafter compete with the United States for a hegemonic position beyond East Asia. Whatever the results may be, and despite a few shortcomings, the book is an excellent read that provides readers with essential information on which they can make their own judgements on the future of China-Japan rivalry in the quest for supremacy in East Asia. 