Antonio López Pina

The Growth of Democratic Legitimacy in Spain

The political transition in Spain provides a rare opportunity to monitor popular attitudes toward alternative regimes. Through the analysis of national surveys conducted in 1978, 1979–80, and 1984, we first establish that the Spanish public distinguishes not only between successive governments—the Franquist and the center-right and socialist governments of the post-Franco period—but also between Francoism and democracy as political systems. Second, we show that during the post-Franco era the criteria of legitimacy have begun to shift from formal political to social democratic values. These analytical results are achieved by comparing standard with less orthodox measures of political legitimacy and performance, and by revising conventional theories of system support. Third, we estimate the determinants of support for and opposition to the two regimes. The Franquist system remains more polarizing than does the democratic system; the constituencies of the democratic regime are considerably broader and more heterogeneous. However, while the new democratic state is comparatively inclusive and autonomous, low rates of political participation and changes in traditional socialist ideology have made the institutional bases of legitimacy ambiguous.

The Spanish Public in Political Transition

Once again, Spain is in political transition. The death of Franco in 1975 provided the opportunity for rationalizing an awkward political system. The objective of the politicians who gathered to draft a new constitution was twofold: to organize a state that was to be both modern and legitimate in a society that is still in many ways ‘pre-civic’ but, at the same time, increasingly tied to the industrial and post-industrial West.

Economic Policy and Public Opinion in Spain

The socialist party has come to power in Spain just as socialist orthodoxy has fallen out of fashion, at a time of widespread unemployment, and in the wake of memories of prosperity during the last years of Francoism. Drawing on data from a national sample, we examine the preferences of Spaniards with regard to economic policy and the effects of these preferences on support for the government. Economic opinions are relatively uncrystallized, although it is possible to discern a progressive-conservative split. An equally important feature of public opinion is the high level of expectations surrounding government responsibility for economic affairs. These characteristics reflect the disjuncture between economic ideology and actual practice during past decades as well as an older legacy of statist values. Despite the inchoate nature of attitudes on certain economic issues, and because of the high level of expectations regarding economic policy, perceptions of collective economic conditions-that is, sociotropic considerationstend to have a greater impact than traditional cleavages, such as religion, on support for the government.

The Nature of Political Support and Legitimacy in Spain

Drawing on data from four national surveys conducted in Spain since 1978, this article evaluates a theory of political legitimacy that incorporates three elements. The first takes into account the fact that, in instances of regime change, ordinary citizens can meaningfully compare democratic and antidemocratic political systems. The second element considers the content of interregime comparison, in particular, standards of economic growth and social equity. Third, the phenomenon of trust in private and public domains is brought into play for the purpose of specifying a distinctively democratic type of political legitimacy. Finally, the strengths and limitations of the model are discussed, with special reference to its utility in situations where regime transitions are not involved, and where the focus is on mass as well as elite politics.

Social Identity and Mass Politics in Spain

Social identities based on class, religion, and region underpin political cleavages in Spain. This article examines the salience of divisions based on these identities and estimates changes in the conflict-potential of the cleavages over time. The political consequences as well as the origins of the dimensions of conflict are analyzed. While some of the social identities remain fairly strong—religion, for example, more evidently than class—the direct effects of the cleavages on both within-and extra-system politics at the mass level appear to have weakened. Data are drawn from the third in a series of national surveys conducted in 1978, 1980, and 1984.