Apostolis Papakostas

Why is there no clientelism in Scandinavia? : A comparison of the Swedish and Greek sequences of development

Why is there no clientelism in Scandinavia? : A comparison of the Swedish and Greek sequences of development

The rationalization of civil society

Two ideas are almost universally accepted as reality in political sociology. One is that numbers are declining in nearly all membership associations. The usual interpretation of this phenomenon is that it occurs because of individualization. The other is that the character of collective action has changed. This idea, which stems from Touraine, Melucci and Castells, states that a new historical category of social action has emerged, one that resembles action in primary groups rather than in organizations and in some way is a victory over the iron law of oligarchy. This article questions both ideas. The author intends to show that another historical process is in play here, namely, a process of ‘inert rationalization’ in social movements, political parties and associations, which is taking place in Europe with different starting points and at different tempos. The result of this process can be summed up as ‘more organization with fewer people’. Domination, inherent in oligarchic organizations, is being transformed by the creation of a new organizational boundary between elite (or profession) and members. The point is that it is membership itself as a form for affiliation that is disappearing, not just members. The article argues that this is mainly because resource mobilization patterns have historically changed from the mobilization of resources drawn from members to the mobilization of resources drawn from other organizations. Finally, the article analyses the importance of the unstructured power fields (or open spaces) created by rationalization processes for social innovation and new social movements.

More Organization with Fewer People

In Chapter 3, we saw that the public’s very witnessing of the decision-making process in modern democracies played an important role in the establishment of trust. We also saw how social and organizational boundaries simultaneously solve trust problems within a delimited boundary and create a transparency problem for those outside. The mechanisms that elucidate the course of events within a delimited area also constituted a theme in Chapter 3. For example, the fact that the estates were forced to keep minutes that became public represents one such mechanism. The mechanisms work to shed light on the decision-making processes of a fairly shielded elite group while maintaining a line of demarcation between the group and that part of society the group believes it represents. Mass participation through formal membership is the functional equivalent of this. Despite the oligarchic tendencies so inherent to it, mass participation based on membership abolishes the boundary between elite groups and the social base. It thus transforms the question of transparency into one of internal organizational processes and controls written in rules that often stipulate routines, role differentiations, the control of power, and power abuses, similar to those prescribed in constitutions.

Structured Skepticism and the Production of Trust

There are all kinds of devices invented for the protection and preservation of countries: defensive barriers, forts, trenches, and the like … But prudent minds have, as a natural gift, one safeguard which is the common possession of all, and this applies especially to the dealings of democracies. What is this safeguard? Skepticism. This you must preserve. This you must retain. If you can keep this, you need fear no harm. The quote above is taken from the Second Philippic, a speech to the Athenian demos given by Demosthenes in 344–343 BC with the purpose of highlighting the dangers awaiting democracy in Athens if the Macedonian King Philip gained ground. Even though the words of Demosthenes are an elegant rhetorical overestimation of democracy’s ability to defend itself — and in a cynical way history has probably reminded us of this — it should be stated without reservation that skepticism is conceived of as a basic constituent for democracy’s functioning ever since democracy was founded in the cities of ancient Greece. Indeed, most of the forms of democracy and its practice are institutionalized forms of skepticism. That those in authority are elected and re-elected, that a number of democracies have formal limits as to how many times a person can be re-elected, that there are constitutional principles and controls for the division of power — these are all examples of democratic principles and practices founded on the distrust of power and its consolidation, or intended to protect against the abuse of power.

Social or Public Capital

The books cited in the first chapter as representative of the “neo-culturalist turn” in studies of trust have led to many publications in the social sciences. Numerous scholarly articles and books have been published, and it is difficult to coordinate an overview of the field’s many nuances. As an illustration, a search carried out in October 2008 on the database Worldwide Political Science Abstracts for the three terms considered key in Chapter 1, “network”, “social capital”, and “trust”, yielded the names of 787 researchers whose brief descriptions of their work on their own websites included the three terms. In the Sociological Abstracts database there have been 485 entries containing all three terms since 1990, and the trend is growing, with few entries at the beginning of the period and 61 in 2010, and these numbers are probably grossly underestimated (search carried out in March 2012). In some of the latest publications there are overviews of ongoing research and discussions of the concepts used in the field. In this summary chapter, I will refrain, as I have chosen to do in previous chapters, from giving a detailed account of definitional matters or an extensive overview of this expanding field of research.

The Organizational Bases of Corruption

Something unusual has happened in Sweden in recent years. In a country where the general public trusts state authorities, the mass media publishes daily reports that something is rotten in the “state of Sweden”. Corruption scandals erupt one after another, and the stories in newspaper op-ed and financial pages on such matters are often intriguing. A random selection of recent “affairs” reveals public officials and their wives attending expensive conventions paid for by subcontractors, heads of state-run companies taking bribes from suppliers, a cabinet minister responsible for business matters accepting a job in a large conglomerate and then arranging an informal meeting with the prime minister. The newspaper articles typically play up the sensational elements in the cases, often those dealing with criminal aspects. Other articles, however, are more interested in issues of private morality. Ethics committees seem to be springing up right and left.

Boundary Technologies and the Segmentation of Trust

Many people have fixed morning routines. They shower, eat breakfast, read the newspaper, and brush their teeth; they may also listen to the radio. In general, people are creatures of habit, and by and large every person has his/her own routines. Some people carry out these routines meticulously and in a specific order; others cannot be bothered.

What States Do People Trust and How Do They Emerge

As demonstrated in Chapter 3, a well-functioning bureaucratic organization of state activities is an important precondition for the production of trust. But to claim that the vast majority of states in the world work in a bureaucratic way is far from true; indeed, the opposite holds true. Universal rules, if they exist, are implemented in a rather particularistic fashion with limited and occasionally no transparency, and are frequently combined with different forms and degrees of corruption. I will explore corruption further in its more common manifestation in the following chapter. In this chapter, I consider in greater detail the social preconditions necessary for the development of bureaucracy as a form for organizing state activities and the development of the specific form of political corruption generally termed clientelism. In this endeavor, I will examine the case countries of Sweden and Greece. Sweden has an international reputation as a country where its citizens trust the state; in Greece the opposite seems to be the case. I will now turn my attention to what kind of states people trust and how they emerge.