Ariadna Ripoll Servent

Do supranational EU institutions make a difference? EU asylum law before and after 'communitarization'.

ABSTRACT This article examines whether the empowerment of the European Unions (EU) supranational institutions has had an impact on the development of EU asylum. By systematically investigating EU asylum law before and after ‘communitarization’, it argues that its ‘policy core’ has maintained a high degree of continuity. An advocacy coalition under the leadership of the interior ministers managed to co-opt pivotal actors in the newly empowered European Commission and European Parliament. By contenting themselves with changes of secondary order, these EU institutions accepted and institutionalized the restrictive and weakly integrated core of EU asylum set by the Council in the first negotiation round. Their role and decisions were driven not only by the negotiation dynamics and political expediency, but also by new inter- and intra-institutional norms fostering consensual practices.

Playing the Co-Decision Game? Rules’ Changes and Institutional Adaptation at the LIBE Committee

Abstract The introduction of co-decision has transformed the European Parliament (EP), changing the patterns of behaviour inside the institution, especially its committees. The entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon extends the use of co-decision; thus, more EP committees will have to adapt to the new patterns of behaviour set out by the new decision-making rules. In order to understand how this process of adaptation occurs and what the consequences are, the present study examines the change in decision-making rules that occurred in the committee for civil liberties and justice and home affairs (LIBE) after 2005 as a precedent for future changes. Interviews and analyses of legislative texts indicate that adaptation to co-decision may occur very quickly but that its extent can be limited by forms of dual behaviour, when the coexistence of two decision-making rules oppose two different worldviews, introducing uncertainty inside committees and among external actors.The introduction of co-decision has transformed the European Parliament (EP), changing the patterns of behaviour inside the institution, especially its committees. The entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon extends the use of co-decision; thus, more EP committees will have to adapt to the new patterns of behaviour set out by the new decision-making rules. In order to understand how this process of adaptation occurs and what the consequences are, the present study examines the change in decision-making rules that occurred in the committee for civil liberties and justice and home affairs (LIBE) after 2005 as a precedent for future changes. Interviews and analyses of legislative texts indicate that adaptation to co-decision may occur very quickly but that its extent can be limited by forms of dual behaviour, when the coexistence of two decision-making rules oppose two different worldviews, introducing uncertainty inside committees and among external actors.

The role of the European Parliament in international negotiations after Lisbon

ABSTRACT After the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the European Parliament (EP) can give or withdraw its consent to most international agreements. This new scenario calls for theoretical models that help us to better understand the roles and strategies of European Union (EU) institutions in international negotiations. Departing from ‘two-level-games’ and principal–agent models, this article examines three interrelated elements (levels of negotiations; decision-making stages; and strategies) to explain the first international negotiations under the consent procedure (SWIFT Agreement). This case shows how the EP made use of day-to-day decision-making to informally expand its formal veto powers. The EP is now capable of controlling the EU negotiator during both the agenda-setting and the negotiation stages. Its informal involvement is set to transform its relationship with the Council and their collective capacity to influence and control the Commission.

Point of no return? The European Parliament after Lisbon and Stockholm

Abstract The entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon has raised new expectations in the area of freedom, security and justice (AFSJ). The extension of co-decision increases the capacity of the European Parliament (EP) to have an influence on decision-making. This article engages with securitisation theories in order to analyse the evolution of the AFSJ as well as the role of its main actors in the securitisation process. It evaluates the past role of the EP as well as the recent changes introduced by the extension of co-decision in order to establish whether it will become a new securitising actor or will have the potential for de-securitisation of the agenda. The macro-institutional changes in the Treaty of Lisbon indicate that the EP will have opportunities to de-securitise, although the emphasis on EU citizens’ rights introduced in the Stockholm programme offers it a chance to appeal to domestic audiences at the expense of more diffuse issues such as immigration and asylum.

The Communitarization of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: Why Institutional Change does not Translate into Policy Change

This article proposes an explanation as to why institutional change – understood as more competences for the European Unions supranational institutions – has rarely led to policy change in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ). It draws attention to the constraints that newly empowered actors have faced in the wake of introducing the co-decision procedure. If the key principles of a given AFSJ sub-policy – its ‘policy core’ – were defined before institutional change occurred, the Council (as the dominant actor of the early intergovernmental co-operation) has found it easier to prevail in the altered structural environment and to co-opt or sideline actors with competing rationales. The article compares the importance of the new decision-making procedure with two alternative pathways potentially leading to policy change, namely, the power of litigation and the impact of unexpected external events.

The European Parliament and the Returns Directive: The End of Radical Contestation; The Start of Consensual Constraints

In 2008, the European Parliament (EP) and the Council approved a new directive that sought to regulate and harmonise the standards of deportation. The Returns Directive raised criticisms from various fronts but it also confirmed the EP as a new actor in the field. Thanks to its new co-legislative powers, the EP became an active promoter of EU-wide policies seeking to remove irregular immigrants from the territory. Interestingly, before turning into a co-legislator the EP had led a sustained opposition to the security-biased policies formulated by the Council. Given the substantial shift in the position of the EP, the Returns Directive is a good example to examine the changes in the political dynamics after the introduction of new decision-making rules and their impact on the construction of a new EU framework for deportation practices.

A New Form of Delegation in EU Asylum: Agencies as Proxies of Strong Regulators: A new form of delegation in EU asylum

The malfunctioning of the Common European Asylum System can be traced back to the principle of responsibility established by the Dublin regime. To attenuate its problems, the EU has delegated regulatory competences to Frontex and the European Asylum Support Office (EASO), which have been given a ‘right to intervene’ in those Member States that put the system at risk. This article expands Majones typologies of agents and trustees to explain why and how power has been delegated and the resulting consequences. It includes cases of failed delegation and argues that, although Frontex and EASO should operate as trustees – to prevent co‐operation from breaking down – they have not been provided with enough autonomy, which exposes them to capture by particular interests. The reforms show that EU agencies are likely to be used as proxies by a group of strong Member States to monitor and intervene in weaker Member States.

Protecting or Processing

The European Union is well-known for its high levels of data protection and concern about the effects of data sharing on individuals’ privacy. The 1995 Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC) established clear norms that have guided the development of data protection laws at the national level. However, these principles have often been tested by advances in the field of law enforcement, where personal data has increasingly been processed for the purpose of fighting crime. This tension has become more problematic with the advent of the Treaty of Lisbon, which has ‘constitutionalised’ data protection as a fundamental right in Article 16 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. This chapter explores to what extent the tension between data protection and data processing has been solved in the process of recasting the former provisions for the protection of personal data. The ‘package approach’ to the reform process has managed to improve the coherence of data protection in the private and the public sectors, but the tensions between privacy and security remain—especially in the law enforcement domain.

Eroding Germany’s Commitment to Data Protection: Policy Entrepreneurs and Coalition Politics in EU Passenger Name Records

A history of totalitarian governments and state surveillance appear to have made Germans sensitive towards the uses of personal data. Because of such concerns, Germany often acted as an obstacle to security measures requiring personal data at the EU level. However, there has been a recent sea-change in Germany over EU Passenger Name Records (EU-PNR), a measure that requires the personal data of airline passengers for security purposes. Many in Berlin have moved from lukewarm at the time of the first EU-PNR proposal in 2007 to advocating it in 2014. The article draws on Kingdons Multiple Streams Framework (MSF) to examine this change in position, comparing two government coalitions – the CDU/CSU–FDP (2009–13) with the CDU/CSU–SPD (2013–) – to show how actors within the CDU/CSU have acted as policy entrepreneurs to ensure agreement on EU-PNR. It is argued that the composition of governmental coalitions can act as a central condition that facilitates or hinders the success of policy entrepreneurs. While the position of the FDP blocked any progress on EU-PNR in the former coalition, policy entrepreneurs used the willingness of the SPD to show voters their support for tougher security measures, thereby ensuring Germany’s support for EU-PNR.