Arie Verhagen

The grammar of causatives and the conceptual structure of events.

Analytic causative constructions can best be described as extensions of simpler kinds of expressions, rather than as reductions from more complex underlying structures. In particular, causatives of intransitive predicates (e.g. I made Mary cryj are viewed as modelled on simple two-participant clauses (like I ate the cake,), and causatives of transitive predicates (e.g. He had the servant taste the foodj are seen as modelled on simple threeparticipant clauses (like I gave Mary a flower, or She broke it with a hammer—i.e. mainly ditransitive and instrumental clause types). One especially important advantage of this approach is that it offers an explanatory semantic account of the Variation of case markings found in causative constructions (such as the rather general alternation of dative, or other non-oblique, with instrumental), itpredicts that such Variation is related systematically to the semantics ofcase markings in simple clauses, which is in fact the case. It is argued that accounts ofcase marking of causees formulated strictly in terms of a formal hierarchy ofcases cannot be adequate, given the semantic factors affecting the choice of case. The marking of the causee is a consequence of conceived differences in its role in the causal event, which relate to such aspects of event structure as (in)directness of causation and (relatedly) degree of agency and affectedness of participants. Such factors are elements ofcertain general conceptual models of causation. This approach not only has wider empirical coverage than syntactic, hierarchy-based accounts, but is simple, unified, has greater explanatory power both for cross-linguistic Variation andfor intricate intralinguistic distributional facts; finally, it accords with a cognitively-based view oflanguage, in which the knowledge underlying grammar is not qualitatively different from other aspects of human understanding and reasoning.

Interaction and causation: Causative constructions in modern standard Dutch.

Abstract The Dutch verbs doen (‘do’) and laten (‘let’) categorize an event as involving either direct or indirect causation, respectively. The latter means that another force than the agents is seen as more immediately involved in bringing about the effect, and is therefore especially suited to indicate interactions between humans: i.e. mind-to-mind causation. The difference between these verbs reflects the folk world view in which the mental world is seen as separate from the physical, each having distinct causal properties. We show how this explains the sharp difference, observable in usage, in the preferences of both verbs for animate and inanimate participants. Another cultural cognitive model playing a role in the use of doen vs. laten is the ‘folk model of the mind’, which governs our understanding of mental processes such as perception and belief. Against the background of this model, speakers exploit the choice between the two verbs for particular effects, e.g. to attribute particular causal powers to certain referents, such as God or government authorities, or, combining verb choice with case marking, to subtly indicate different degrees of autonomy and affectedness of causees. The study demonstrates the intimate relation between cognitive models, pragmatic contextual factors, and lexical semantics.

A cultural evolutionary model of patterns in semantic change

Abstract Language change has been described as an unintended effect of language in use (Keller, On language change: The invisible hand in language, Routledge, 1994). In this view, change results from the way individuals use their language; the challenge is thus to explain change and its properties in terms of factors operating on the individual level, and population dynamics. An intriguing example of such a phenomenon is the finding that language change shows some highly regular tendencies. This has recently received considerable attention in the literature (Bybee et al., Why small children cannot change language on their own: Suggestions from the English past tense, John Benjamins, 1994; Heine and Kuteva, World lexicon of grammaticalization, Cambridge University Press, 2002; Traugott and Dasher, Regularity in semantic change, Cambridge University Press, 2002; Hopper and Traugott, Grammaticalization, CambridgeUniversity Press, 2003). In unrelated languages, similar words often change in similar ways, along similar “trajectories” of development. This phenomenon is called “unidirectionality”, and it is an important part of processes of grammaticalization, items changing from a lexical meaning to a grammatical function. It has been claimed that around 90–99% of all processes of grammaticalization are unidirectional (Haspelmath, Linguistics 37: 1043–1068, 1999). This article explores several mechanisms that may lead to language change, and examines whether they may be responsible for unidirectionality. We use a cultural evolutionary computational model with which the effects of individual behavior on the group level can be measured. By using this approach, regularities in semantic change can be explained in terms of very basic mechanisms and aspects of language use such as the frequency with which particular linguistic items are used. One example is that frequency differences by themselves are a strong enough force for causing unidirectionality. We argue that adopting a cultural evolutionary approach may be useful in the study of language change.

Viewpoint and the Fabric of Meaning: Form and Use of Viewpoint Tools across Languages and Modalities

This volume explores the cross-linguistic diversity, and possibly inconsistency, of the span of linguistic means that signal reported speech and thought. The integration of broad linguistic (viewpoint in conversation and narrative) and cognitive (theory of mind and understanding the inner life and thought of others) strategies for handling mixed points of view will be considered.

What Are the Unique Design Features of Language? Formal Tools for Comparative Claims

What are the “design features” of human language that need to be explained? Starting from R. Jackendoff’s scenario for the evolution of language, we argue that it is the transitions between stages that pose the crucial challenges for accounts of the evolution of language. We review a number of formalisms for conceptualizations, sound, and the mapping between them, and describe and evaluate the differences between each of Jackendoff’s stages in terms of these formalisms. We conclude from this discussion that the transitions to combinatorial phonology, compositional semantics and hierarchical phrase structure can be formally characterized. Modeling these transitions is a major challenge for language evolution research.

When narrative takes over: The representation of embedded mindstates in Shakespeare’s Othello:

In recent times, researchers across a variety of disciplines in the humanities and social sciences have been interested in the human ability to process embedded mindstates, also known as ‘multiple-order intentionality’ (MOI): A believes that B thinks that C intends (etc.). This task is considered increasingly cognitively demanding with every order of embedding added. However, we argue that the way in which the information relevant to the task is represented in language (in particular, using a narrative) greatly influences how well people are able to deal with MOI cognitively. This effect can be illustrated by paraphrasing situations presented by a play such as Shakespeare’s Othello: by the end of Act II the audience has to understand that Iago intends that Cassio believes that Desdemona intends that Othello believes that Cassio did not intend to disturb the peace. Formulated this way, using sentence embedding to express the intentional relationships, this is highly opaque. At the same time, we know that Othello has been understood and appreciated by innumerable different audiences for ages. What is it that the play’s text does to make the audience understand all these embedded mindstates without undue cognitive strain? In this article we discuss six ‘expository strategies’ relevant to the representation of MOI and illustrate their working with examples from Shakespeare’s Othello.

A Usage-Based Model of Early Grammatical Development

The representations and processes yielding the limited length and telegraphic style of language production early on in acquisition have received little attention in acquisitional modeling. In this paper, we present a model, starting with minimal linguistic representations, that incrementally builds up an inventory of increasingly long and abstract grammatical representations (form+meaning pairings), in line with the usage-based conception of language acquisition. We explore its performance on a comprehension and a generation task, showing that, over time, the model better understands the processed utterances, generates longer utterances, and better expresses the situation these utterances intend to refer to.

Intersubjectivity and explanation in linguistics: A reply to Hinzen and van Lambalgen

Abstract 1. Introduction Let me start by saying that I very much appreciate both the effort that Hinzen and Van Lambalgen (hereafter, H&L) have put into commenting on Constructions of Intersubjectivity (hereafter, CoI), and their comments as such. It is important for all cognitive disciplines studying language that representatives from different schools of thought try to address each others work, in terms of both results and foundations. We may not reach agreement as a result of a discussion, but it will still be helpful in clarifying matters for ourselves and for other interested scholars, and thus for the future development of our common field of study. This is true even if the divide is deep—which is the case here in a number of respects, as H&L indicate themselves.

Solving the problem of double negation is not impossible : electrophysiological evidence for the cohesive function of sentential negation

ABSTRACT In natural languages, two negating elements that cancel each other out (as in not impossible) are logically equivalent to the non-negated word form (in this case, possible). It has been proposed that the function of sentential double negation is to create coherence between sentences containing opposing information. Thus, not impossible is functionally different from possible. The present ERP study tested this hypothesis in Dutch. Native speakers read sentences in which evoked negative expectations are cancelled by a second sentence including either a double negation or the corresponding non-negated word form. Results showed that non-negated word forms, such as possible, elicited a larger N400 effect than double negations, such as not impossible. We suggest that canceling out a negative expectation by a double negation compared to the non-negated word form, makes it easier for the reader to integrate the two sentences semantically and connect them to the present discourse.

Pragmatic markedness and syntax.

Abstract A distinction is made between two types of pragmatics: the pragmatics of concrete sentence contents on the one hand, and the pragmatics of construction types on the other. The latter type is severely underdeveloped, also in work within the generative framework; despite the theoretical recognition that grammars have only a limited domain of explanation, there is in practice a strong preference for explanations in terms of grammatical structure. It is proposed to consider the question of the relation between grammar and pragmatics as an entirely empirical one. In this spirit, the distribution of adverbial phrases in Dutch is considered, with respect to several interpretive factors that are related to word order. An explanation of the phenomena involved is offered in terms of pragmatic markedness conventions, and some general properties of such conventions are established. Finally, some conclusions are drawn with respect to the relations between conversational maxims and the markedness conventions, in terms of the difference between functional and theoretical explanations. The results confirm the general idea of human cognitive competence as consisting of several relatively autonomous and relatively simple subsystems.