Arjaan Wit

The effect of social categorization on cooperation in three types of social dilemmas.

Abstract The present study investigated whether cooperation in various social dilemmas could be promoted by categorizing subjects at a group level rather than at a personal level. Three types of games were employed, i.e. the Prisoners Dilemma Game (PDG), the Chicken Dilemma Game (CDG) and the Trust Dilemma Game (TDG). Categorization level (Group vs. Personal) and Type of Game (PDG vs. CDG vs. TDG) constituted the 2 × 3 factorial design. As predicted from Social Identity Theory, Group Categorization elicited more cooperation than Personal Categorization. Additional data sustained a social identification interpretation. Second, it was investigated whether the rank order in cooperation among the three games, which were presented to the subjects in a lifelike format, would replicate the rank order observed in an abstract gaming study, and it did: in the PDG fewer cooperative choices were made than in the CDG, whereas in the CDG fewer cooperative choices were made than in the TDG.

Preferences for leadership in social dilemmas: Public good dilemmas versus common resource dilemmas

It has been argued that a structural solution to social dilemmas is to install a leader, but here we consider the possibility that group members will oppose giving up their decisional freedom. Previous studies have shown that feedback indicating collective failure results in a stronger preference for the leadership option. We argue that preferences for the leadership option depend not only on the feedback group members receive, but also on the type of dilemma they are facing. The results of our experiment, in which we manipulated dilemma type as well as feedback, corroborate our reasoning. The distribution of initial property in public good and common resource dilemmas helps to explain these findings.

Justifying Decisions in Social Dilemmas: Justification Pressures and Tacit Coordination Under Environmental Uncertainty

This article investigates how justification pressures influence harvesting decisions in common resource dilemmas. The authors argue that when a division rule prescribes a specific harvest level, such as under environmental certainty, people adhere more strongly to this division rule when they have to justify their decisions to fellow group members. When a division rule does not prescribe a specific harvest level, such as under environmental uncertainty, people restrict their harvests when they have to justify their decisions to fellow group members. The results of two experimental studies corroborate this line of reasoning. The findings are discussed in terms of tacit coordination. The authors specify conditions under which justification pressures may or may not facilitate efficient coordination.

SUBORDINATES ENDORSEMENT OF AN ALLOCATING LEADER IN A COMMONS DILEMMA - AN EQUITY THEORETICAL APPROACH

The experiment consisted of two phases. In the free-access phase, subjects in groups of three, harvested from a common, replenishable resource pool. Bogus feedback indicated that the pool was prematurely exhausted. Thereafter, in the proper experimental leader phase, an “elected” bogus leader made resource allocations. The leaders allocation behavior was varied by means of a 3 (Leader-Subordinates Comparison: Leader Over payment, Leader Equal payment, Leader Under payment) ×3 (Intersubordinate Comparison: Subject Over payment, Subject Equal payment, Subject Under payment) factorial design. As predicted, leader endorsement was weakest when the leader overpaid him/herself (Leader-Subordinates Comparison main effect) and when the subject was underpaid in comparison with the fellow subordinate (Intersubordinate Comparison main effect). The interaction effect was ascribed to three circumstances: (1) When the harvests were equally allocated, leader endorsement was strongest; (2) Leader Under payment desensitized the subject to intersubordinate comparison; (3) Subject Over payment desensitized the subject to leader-subordinates comparison.

`How Many of Us Are There?': Group Size Uncertainty and Social Value Orientations in Common Resource Dilemmas

In two studies, we investigate the effects of group size (un)certainty and social value orientations in common resource dilemmas. By focusing on this largely unexplored type of environmental uncertainty, we show that, in contrast to the often replicated finding that resource size uncertainty leads to over-harvesting in common resource dilemmas, group size uncertainty is not necessarily detrimental to the collective interest. Furthermore, we argue and show that whereas under group size certainty people base their individual harvests on the equal division rule, under group size uncertainty they base their harvests on their own social value orientations: whereas under group size certainty both proselfs and pro-socials harvest about an equal share of the common resource, under uncertainty prosocials show self-restraint in order to further their groups outcomes.

Anger and Retribution After Collective Overuse: The Role of Blaming and Environmental Uncertainty in Social Dilemmas

This article investigates how group members respond to one another when collective overuse occurs. The authors argue that interpersonal reactions after overuse in a common-resource dilemma are largely determined by the environmental characteristics of the social dilemma. More specifically, under environmental certainty they expect people to show more anger to group members than under uncertainty (Study 1). Additionally, they expect stronger retributive reactions to high harvesters than to moderate harvesters, and they expect this difference to be larger under certainty than under uncertainty (Study 2 and 3). Moreover, they predict that these effects are mediated by blaming. The results of three experiments corroborate these predictions.