Arjan H. Schakel

Measuring Regional Authority

Abstract This article sets out a conceptual basis for measuring regional authority and engages basic measurement issues. Regional authority is disaggregated into two domains (self-rule and shared rule) and these are operationalised in eight dimensions. The article concludes by examining the robustness of this measure across alternative measurement assumptions.

Patterns of Regional Authority

Abstract This paper introduces a new dataset on regional authority in 42 democracies for 1950–2006 and formulates five hypotheses. First, an S-curve effect describing a logistic association between the population of a country and its regional authority. Secondly, a heteroskedasticity effect, in which the variance in regional authority among larger countries is greater than that among smaller countries. Thirdly, an identity effect, in which the allocation of authority to a jurisdiction is influenced by the relative strength of a populations identity to the community encompassed by the jurisdiction. Fourthly, a democracy effect, which leads democracies to have higher levels of regional authority than dictatorships. Fifthly, an integration effect, which removes a potential economic cost on regionalization by providing a transnational frame for economic exchange.

Operationalizing Regional Authority: A Coding Scheme for 42 Countries, 1950–2006

Abstract This article sets out a coding scheme for eight dimensions of regional authority across 42 developed countries for the period 1950–2006. The article explicates coding rules, discusses ambiguities of interpretation, and explains how particular regions are coded.

Validation of the Regional Authority Index

Abstract This article validates the Regional Authority Index (RAI) with seven widely used decentralization indices in the literature. A principal axis analysis reveals a common structure. The major source of disagreement between the RAI and the other indices stems from the fact that the RAI does not include local governance, whereas most other indices do. Two other sources of disagreement concern the treatment of federal versus non-federal countries, and countries which have recently regionalized and/or have asymmetrical regions, whereby the more fine-grained RAI captures greater variation. The second part of the article discusses content validity of fiscal indicators.

Congruence Between Regional and National Elections

The number of regional elections and what is at stake at these elections have increased considerably over the past decades. Yet the interpretation of regional election results lags behind, in particular explanations for when and how regional election results deviate from national election results. This article conceptualizes congruence of the vote in three different ways that make it possible to assess the contribution of three competing theoretical approaches in explaining variation in dissimilarity between vote shares across space and time. These approaches are second-order election theory, regional authority and territorial cleavages. The hypotheses are tested against a data set containing the results of more than 4,000 regional and national elections held in 360 regions in 18 countries. It appears that the depth of territorial cleavages explains variation across space, but to understand change over time one needs to consider institutional authority and second-order election effects.

Country and regional scores

Tables 1A and B set out the coding schemes for self-rule and shared rule, which together constitute regional authority. Table 2 aggregates scores for all regional units to the country level for 42 countries. Eight dimensions of regional authority are coded on an annual basis for years in which a country was independent and (semi-)democratic from 1950 to 2006. The algorithm for combining regional scores is described in Hooghe et al. (‘Operationalizing Regional Authority . . .’, this issue, pp. 123–142). Table 3 provides disaggregated scores—scores for all regional levels below the national level having an average population greater than 150 000, scores for asymmetrical arrangements and scores for special autonomous regions. The population of countries/years is the same as for Table 2.

Profiles of regional reform in 42 countries (1950-2006)

Albania was one of the most centralized communist countries in Europe until the regime fell in 1992, and the first free local elections were held. The country had a three-tier local government structure topped by 36 district councils (rrhethe). Rrhethe survived the transition to democracy in March 1992 but, with an average population of around 100 000, they are too small to be considered a regional tier. Under pressure from the Albanian association of municipalities backed by the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe (CLRAE), the government enacted a reform in 2000 which created twelve regions (qarku), reduced rrhethe to deconcentrated subdivisions and strengthened local government. The average population of a qark is about 250 000. Qarku were granted little authority over policy. They are concerned with regional planning, co-ordinating actions of regional interest and delivering public services delegated by the central government or by the constituent municipalities and communes.

Between autonomy and secession Decentralization and regionalist party ideological radicalism

The literature on regionalist parties has traditionally focused on the origins of their electoral strength while their ideology remains an under-explored aspect of territorial party politics. This is surprising because for the question of whether decentralization ‘accommodates’ or ‘empowers’ regionalist pressure one needs to consider both. In this paper we single out the factors that increase the probability of adopting a radical (secessionist) as opposed to a moderate (autonomist) ideological stance, with a particular focus on the effect of decentralization. We make use of a large and original dataset, covering 11 countries, 49 regions, and 78 parties for the 1940s–2000s. Beyond the level of decentralization and decentralization reforms, we analyze the impact of two sets of factors: the first concerns regional identity and includes regional language, regional history and geographical remoteness; while the second concerns institutional/political variables which include voting systems, competition from statewide parties and from other regionalist parties, and office responsibility. We find that all variables matter for regionalist party ideology but with different effects across regional and national electoral arenas. We also find that level of decentralization and regional reform is significantly associated with radicalism, which suggests that policy success and accommodative strategies by statewide parties may lead to a polarization on the centre-periphery dimension.

From class to region: how regionalist parties link (and subsume) left-right into centre-periphery politics

The primary dimension of political contestation for regionalist parties is the centre-periphery dimension but they are pressured to adopt positions on the left-right dimension by competition with state-wide parties. We argue that the relative economic position of a region is a key variable for explaining how regionalist parties adopt left-right positions and link them to the centre-periphery dimension. Based on a quantitative analysis of 74 regionalist parties – distributed in 49 regions and 11 countries – over four decades, we find strong evidence that regionalist parties acting in relatively rich regions tend to adopt a rightist ideology, while regionalist parties acting in relatively poor regions tend to adopt a leftist ideology. A qualitative illustration of two paradigmatic cases, the Lega Nord (LN) and the Scottish National Party (SNP), appears to support our interpretation that left-right orientations are subsumed into centre-periphery politics through the adoption of two ideal types of regionalist discourse: one labelled as ‘bourgeois regionalism’ (Harvie, 1994) and one labelled as ‘internal colonialism’ (Hechter, 1975).

Regional and National Elections in Western Europe. Territoriality of the Vote in Thirteen Countries

In the post-war era one of the most significant transformations in the democratic process throughout Western Europe has been the widespread introduction of regional elections. Symptomatic of this decentralization has been the shift of various legislative powers to regional governing bodies. As a result, electorates throughout Western Europe now have more opportunities to express their preferences and air their grievances across electoral arenas while the dynamics of electoral competition have become increasingly multifarious and complex. Voters can now use regional elections to articulate their discontent with the policies of the national government or can elect based on the political offer in the regional electoral arena. This book brings together leading experts on elections who analyze differences between regional and national electoral outcomes in thirteen West European countries between 1945 and 2011. It extends existing insights by providing new empirical evidence and by presenting alternative accounts for differences between the regional and national vote across Western Europe.