Armin Steinbach

Renewable Energy and the Free Movement of Goods

Member States retain the right to decide who can receive renewable energy subsidies, and can exclude green electricity produced abroad from subsidy programmes. With its decision in the Alands Vindkraft case, the European Court of Justice assured the continued existence of renewable energy subsidy programmes in various European Union Member States. While the judgment was welcomed by many political stakeholders, it highlights a number of unresolved legal questions. To date, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has failed to clarify if and when discrimination against foreign goods is permitted for reasons of environmental protection. The problems that remain in the wake of the Alands Vindkraft decision argue in favour of abandoning the existing distinction between discriminatory and non-discriminatory subsidy measures. With its decision, the CJEU has granted Member States broad leeway to conduct their own assessment of the proportionality of a measure. All in all, renewable energy providers have reason to celebrate; however, the goal of creating a single European market for electricity has fallen by the wayside.

The Mutualisation of Sovereign Debt: Comparing the American Past and the European Present

This study identifies commonalities between two historical incidents of debt assumption – in the United States in 1791 and in present-day Europe. By comparing the interests and behaviour of key players in these two incidents, we find three major parallels: First, in their strategic interactions, parties both for and against debt mutualisation raise arguments based on notions of fairness and morality. Second, in both historical episodes we find harsh rhetoric levelled against private creditors, who are derided as greedy speculators. Third, bargaining is an essential element of the debt assumption process. Bargaining is directed towards limiting or expanding the scope of debt assumption. Further, bargaining typically leads to some form of conditionality imposed in order to increase the chances of the debts being repaid or to ensure benefits accrue to the parties assuming the debt.

All's well that ends well? Crisis policy after the German Constitutional Court’s ruling in Gauweiler

Crisis policy of the ECB has been controversial on the judicial stage between the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) and the German Constitutional Court (FCC). While the controversy appears to be settled at this stage following the FCCs judgment in June 2016, disagreement between the courts persists in two regards. First, on the scope and intensity of judicial review of a potential future application of the OMT programme, the FCC gives less discretionary leeway to the ECB than the CJEU and thus exerts stricter judicial review. Second, there are legal boundaries on a “haircut” relinquishing parts of the debt of euro countries owed to Member States and the ECB. This article offers a legal analysis of the remaining controversies and the policy scope of the ECB.

Der politische Beamte als verfassungsrechtliches Problem

Der politische Beamte ist ein Beamter, der jederzeit in den einstweiligen Ruhestand versetzt werden kann. Er nimmt eine Zwitterstellung im Gefüge der Ministerialbürokratie ein. Einerseits finden tragende Strukturprinzipien des Beamtenrechts – Lebenszeitprinzip, Leistungsprinzip, Unabhängigkeit und Neutralität – auf ihn nicht oder nur abgeschwächt Anwendung. Andererseits gilt er trotzdem als Beamter und genießt insbesondere beamtenrechtliche Versorgungsansprüche. Praktisch agiert er an der Nahtstelle zwischen Politik und Verwaltung. Zu seinen wesentlichen Aufgaben zählt es, die politischen Impulse der Regierung in die Verwaltung hineinzutragen und für eine reibungslose Umsetzung zu sorgen.1 I. Einleitung . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 II. Verwaltungssoziologische Einordnung des politischen Beamten. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 1. Das Transformationsmodell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2. Das Repräsentationsmodell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3. Mischsystem und Trennungssystem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 III. Verfassungsrechtliche Ratio des politischen Beamten . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 1. Zweiteilung der Exekutive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 2. Ministerverantwortlichkeit und politische Beamte . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 IV. Grenzen der Verschränkung zwischen Exekutive und Legislative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 1. Leistungsprinzip . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 2. Lebenszeitprinzip und Unabhängigkeit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 3. Stabilitätsund Sachlichkeitsfunktion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 4. Unparteilichkeit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 V. Der Ämterkreis des politischen Beamten . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 1. »Der engste Kreis unmittelbarer Berater« . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 2. Politische Beamte in Repräsentationsämtern. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 3. Politische Beamte in Ministerien . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 a) Staatssekretäre und Ministerialdirektoren (§ 54 Abs. 1 Nr. 1 BBG) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 b) Beamte des höheren Dienstes im Auswärtigen Dienst (§ 54 Abs. 1 Nr. 2 BBG) . . . . . . 27 4. Politisches Fachbeamtentum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 VI. Fazit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

EU economic governance after the crisis: revisiting the accountability shift in EU economic governance

ABSTRACT Numerous scholars have argued that economic governance in the European Union (EU) has undergone an undemocratic shift as part of the crisis, with accountability moving from parliamentary to executive powers. This paper challenges this view, arguing that the crisis has led to a shift from economic to political accountability. I define economic accountability as the market-led accountability regime enshrined in EU Treaties and contrast it to the current political accountability regime, by which creditor states and monetary institutions have supplanted markets as a forum for rewarding and disciplining market actors. This ‘substitution effect’ has been sustained by European Court of Justice (CJEU) jurisprudence, with the CJEU positing a functional equivalence between market-driven pressures and political conditionality.

Promoting Coherence Between PTAs and the WTO Through Systemic Integration

The proliferation of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) has resulted in a heterogeneous regime of trade rules applicable among WTO Members. The interplay between PTA and WTO rules has several implications, including risks of legal tensions and incoherence between both regimes, as well as between overlapping networks of PTAs. Consequently, adjudicative bodies both under regional PTAs and global WTO dispute settlement mechanisms are increasingly confronted with taking account of alien legal sources for the purpose of interpretation. Coherence between PTA and WTO rules thus depends on the degree to which adjudication at both levels—PTA and WTO—allows integration of alien legal sources. This article explores the role of systemic integration as a method of interpretation under public international law allowing adjudicating bodies to deal with possible tensions and promote coherence within international trade law. It traces the various approaches to systemic integration pertaining to international trade rules as employed under both WTO and PTA adjudication. While systemic integration offers a public international law tool for reducing fragmentation of substantial law, there is heterogeneity in adjudicative practice regarding the readiness to employ systemic integration for the purpose of interpretation. The article identifies possible avenues through which future dispute settlement can exploit the potential for coherence through systemic integration, as well as elements which could be taken into consideration when integrating multilateral and preferential rules. It also provides insight on how PTAs could facilitate the application of systemic integration by adjudicating bodies at both levels.

The EU Debt Crisis: Testing and Revisiting Conventional Legal Doctrine

Controversies surrounding the European sovereign debt crisis loom prominent in the public debate. From a legal perspective, the no-bailout rule and the ban on monetary financing constitute the main principles governing the legality review of financial assistance and liquidity measures. Interpretation of these rules are full of empirical claims. According to conventional legal doctrine, bond spreads only depend on the country’s debt position, largely ignoring other causal factors including liquidity. We test the hypotheses implicit in conventional legal reasoning. We find evidence that a significant part of the surge in the spreads of the peripheral Eurozone countries was disconnected from underlying fundamentals and particularly from a country’s debt position, and was associated rather strongly with market sentiments and liquidity concerns. We apply our empirical findings to the legal principles as interpreted by recent jurisprudence arguing that application of the no- bailout principle and the ban on monetary financing should be extended to capture non-debt related factors. Also, the empirical results suggest taking recourse to alternative legal grounds for reviewing the legality of anti-crisis instruments and allowing for a lender of last resort in the euro zone.

Effect-Based Analysis in the Court's Jurisprudence on the Euro Crisis

Effect-based analysis is genuinely implicit in economic reasoning. The jurisprudence developed throughout the debt crisis reveals frequent recourse to effect-based analysis for the legal assessment of the compatibility of anti-crisis instruments with EU law. The dividing line between the European Court of Justice (ECJ) (in Gauweiler and Pringle) and the German Constitutional Court (in its request for a preliminary ruling on the OMT programme) can be drawn according to whether spillover effects for the purpose of delineating monetary from fiscal policy are recognised or not. This difference inspires the diverging answers the courts give on whether the ECB acted within its mandate. This article examines the scope and nature of the Court’s effects orientation and seeks to analyse the underlying economic rationale guiding the Court’s interpretation of the relevant EU Treaty norms – this analysis led the ECJ to results that conflicted with the analysis of the German Constitutional Court. The different (economic) understandings adopted by the courts are also explored in light of the functionality of interest rates in relation to monetary and fiscal policy.

The Legality of European Central Bank's Sovereign Bond Purchases

The European Central Bank’s (ECB) bond purchase program — possibly the most effective anti-crisis tool yet — is compatible with EU law. Proceedings against the ECB’s bond purchases have been brought both before the General Court of the Court of Justice of the European Union and the German Constitutional Court (BVerfG) in distinct proceedings. While the General Court has dismissed the action for annulment based on admissibility reasons, the BVerfG has, for the first time in history, referred the case to the Court of Justice of the EU. This Article argues that the ECB bond purchase program is compatible with EU law because it is founded on monetary policy. Furthermore, the ECJ is likely to exercise judicial restraint based on precedent, and the amount of discretion afforded to the ECB in pursuing its mandate.

Price Undertakings in EU Anti-Dumping Proceedings – An Instrument of the Past?

Price undertakings are alternatives to imposing anti-dumping duties. In the past, almost half of EU anti-dumping measures were price undertakings. This has drastically changed in recent years. We identify four reasons for the decreasing relevance of price undertakings. First, prior to the accession of Eastern European Countries (EEC) to the EU, price undertakings were heavily used vis-a-vis EEC. At the same time, China became frequent subject of anti-dumping proceedings, where undertakings were rarely used due to monitoring issues. Second, unlike anti-dumping duties, price undertakings are often difficult to monitor and can be circumvented more easily. Third, there are reasons related to the suitability of price undertakings to remove dumping practice and injurious effects, particularly in the context of high price volatility. Fourth, price undertakings may have potentially anti-competitive effects, as minimum prices tend to exacerbate competition policies.