Arnab K. Basu

Turning a Blind Eye: Costly Enforcement, Credible Commitment and Minimum Wage Laws

In many countries, non-compliance with minimum wage legislation is widespread, and authorities may be seen as having turned a blind eye to a legislation that they have themselves passed. But if enforcement is imperfect, how effective can a minimum wage be? And if non-compliance is widespread, why not revise the minimum wage? This paper examines a minimum wage policy in a model with imperfect competition, imperfect enforcement and imperfect commitment, and argues that it is the combination of all three that produces results which are consistent with a wide range of stylized facts that would otherwise be difficult to explain within a single framework. We demonstrate that turning a blind eye can indeed be an equilibrium phenomenon with rational expectations subject to an ex post credibility constraint. Since credible enforcement requires in effect a credible promise to execute ex post a costly transfer of income from employers to workers, a government with an objective function giving full weight to efficiency but none to distribution is shown, paradoxically, to be unable to credibly elicit efficiency improvements via a minimum wage reform.

Eco‐Labeling and Stages of Development

The paper examines the effectiveness of eco-labeling in providing a market-based solution to the under-consumption of eco-friendly products in developing and developed countries. The authors show that whether labeling is an effective device in solving the problem of asymmetric information between sellers and buyers, or whether false labeling severs the link between willingness to pay and environmental conscious production choices, depends crucially on how monitoring intensities respond endogenously to economic growth, openness to trade, and technology transfers. In particular, by accounting for endogenous policy responses to economic growth, it is shown that an inverted-U relationship exists between consumer spending on eco-unfriendly products and national income. In addition, while international trade unambiguously benefits the environment in the presence of eco-labeling with perfect enforcement, trade openness may nevertheless delay the turning point of the growth and environment relationship, when the cost of enforcement falls disproportionately on developing countries, and when environmental policies are employed to reap terms-of-trade gains.

Transnational Trafficking, Law Enforcement and Victim Protection: A Middleman Trafficker's Perspective

We explore two hitherto poorly understood characteristics of the human-trafficking market—the cross-border ease of mobility of traffickers and the elasticity of buyers’ demand. In a model of two-way bargaining, the exact configuration of these characteristics is shown to determine whether domestic and foreign crackdowns on illicit employment mutually reinforce or counteract one another in efforts to stem the tide of trafficking. Estimation results from a gravity model of trafficking present evidence consistent with the mutual-reinforcement view, indicating considerable ease of mobility and inelastic demand.

Exploitation of Child Labor and the Dynamics of Debt Bondage

This paper is concerned with the institution of debt bondage and child labor employment in the context of an agrarian economy with overlapping generations. The model explores the principal-agent interaction between landlords and tenants, and identifies a set of reasons why households put children to work in response to the need to service outstanding debts, only to realize that child labor work is “ exploited”, and households are made strictly worse off in general equilibrium. Debt bondage in one generation is further shown to leave spillover effects, and contribute to the cycle of debt, bonded child labor and poverty across generations. In this context, the effectiveness of trade sanctions as a policy response to bonded child labor is evaluated. Contrary to expectations, a trade ban can set off a sequence of increasing indebtedness among agrarian households that offset the intended (static) disincentives to employ child labor.

On export rivalry and the greening of agriculture–the role of eco-labels

Why do some countries establish their own national eco-labeling programs and others do not? In this paper, we provide theoretical arguments and empirical evidence suggesting that the answer to this question can shed new light on three questions that have taken center-stage in the trade and environment debate: (i) does trade exacerbate the exploitation of the environment; (ii) are countries competing in export markets engaged in a race to the bottom in environmental performance; and (iii) do market-based environmental instruments benefit the rich and hurt the poor?

New Frontiers in Environmental and Social Labeling

Outline and Emerging Issues.- The Design of an Eco-Marketing and Labeling Program for Vehicles in Maine.- Performance-based Labeling.- Do Social Labeling NGOs Have Any Influence on Child Labor?.- Economic Analysis of Eco-Labeling: The Case of Labeled Organic Rice in Thailand.- Eco-labeling and Strategic Rivalry in Export Markets.- Science, Opportunity, Traceability, Persistence, and Political Will: Necessary Elements of Opening the U.S. Market to Avocados from Mexico.- The Labels in Agriculture, Their Impact on Trade and the Scope for International Policy Action.- Social Standards and Their Impact on Exports: Evidence from the Textiles and Ready-Made Garments Sector in Egypt.- Developing Country Responses to the Enhancement of Food Safety Standards.- Scope and Limitations for National Food Safety and Labeling Regimes in the WTO-Frame.

Contractual Dualism, Market Power and Informality

Two stylized representations are often found in the academic and policy literature on informality and formality in developing countries. The first is that the informal (or unregulated) sector is more competitive than the formal (or regulated) sector. The second is that contract enforcement is easier in the formal sector than in the informal sector, precisely because the formal sector comes under the purview of state regulation. The basic contention of this paper is that these two representations are not compatible with each other. We develop a search-theoretic model of contractual dualism in the labor market where the inability to commit to contracts in the informal sector leads to employer market power in equilibrium, while an enforced minimum wage in the formal sector provides employers with a commitment technology but which reduces their market power in equilibrium. The contributions of this paper are three-fold. It (i) provides the micro-underpinnings for endogenous determination of employer market power in the formal and informal sectors due to contractual dualism in the two sectors, (ii) offers a unified and coherent setup whereby a host of salient features of developing country labor markets can be explained together, and (iii) places the original Stiglerian prescription of the optimal (unemployment minimizing) minimum wage in the broader context of labor markets where formal job creation is costly, and where formal employment, informal employment, and unemployment co-exist.

The Elusive Productivity Effect of Trade Liberalization in the Manufacturing Industries of Emerging Economies

Using a model that admits variable returns and imperfect competition, we investigate the impact on total factor productivity of trade liberalization in six emerging economies. Regressions based on panel data for twenty-eight three-digit manufacturing industries show that productivity growth is insensitive to tariff reduction. These results are at variance with country-specific studies that, using firm-level data, generally find a positive association between liberalization and productivity growth. While aggregation effects may matter, our results can also be explained as follows: significant productivity gains by latecomers via technological assimilation do take time and require appropriate sequencing of reforms of trade and industrial policies.

Oligopsonistic Landlords, Segmented Labor Markets, and the Persistence of Tied-Labor Contracts

This article examines contractual labor arrangements in agrarian economies that persist as a consequence of market power on the part of landlords faced with output uncertainty. We show that a segmented labor market characterized by tied-labor contracts and involuntary unemployment in the lean season are optimal as compared to a labor hiring arrangement that guarantees full employment of labor in both seasons. Government intervention in the form of a specific subsidy targeted toward the hiring of permanent laborers may raise the welfare of all laborers while a specific subsidy directed toward the hiring of casual laborers or the institution of relief programs that absorb the rural unemployed in the lean season leads to the casual laborers in the economy being worse off. Copyright 2002, Oxford University Press.

Locational choice for free trade zones: a comment

Abstract In this comment we derive conditions under which there are no equilibria for the models investigated by Miyagiwa (1993).