Arne Dietrich

A review of EEG, ERP, and neuroimaging studies of creativity and insight.

Creativity is a cornerstone of what makes us human, yet the neural mechanisms underlying creative thinking are poorly understood. A recent surge of interest into the neural underpinnings of creative behavior has produced a banquet of data that is tantalizing but, considered as a whole, deeply self-contradictory. We review the emerging literature and take stock of several long-standing theories and widely held beliefs about creativity. A total of 72 experiments, reported in 63 articles, make up the core of the review. They broadly fall into 3 categories: divergent thinking, artistic creativity, and insight. Electroencephalographic studies of divergent thinking yield highly variegated results. Neuroimaging studies of this paradigm also indicate no reliable changes above and beyond diffuse prefrontal activation. These findings call into question the usefulness of the divergent thinking construct in the search for the neural basis of creativity. A similarly inconclusive picture emerges for studies of artistic performance, except that this paradigm also often yields activation of motor and temporoparietal regions. Neuroelectric and imaging studies of insight are more consistent, reflecting changes in anterior cingulate cortex and prefrontal areas. Taken together, creative thinking does not appear to critically depend on any single mental process or brain region, and it is not especially associated with right brains, defocused attention, low arousal, or alpha synchronization, as sometimes hypothesized. To make creativity tractable in the brain, it must be further subdivided into different types that can be meaningfully associated with specific neurocognitive processes.

The cognitive neuroscience of creativity

This article outlines a framework of creativity based on functional neuroanatomy. Recent advances in the field of cognitive neuroscience have identified distinct brain circuits that are involved in specific higher brain functions. To date, these findings have not been applied to research on creativity. It is proposed that there are four basic types of creative insights, each mediated by a distinctive neural circuit. By definition, creative insights occur in consciousness. Given the view that the working memory buffer of the prefrontal cortex holds the content of consciousness, each of the four distinctive neural loops terminates there. When creativity is the result of deliberate control, as opposed to spontaneous generation, the prefrontal cortex also instigates the creative process. Both processing modes, deliberate and spontaneous, can guide neural computation in structures that contribute emotional content and in structures that provide cognitive analysis, yielding the four basic types of creativity. Supportive evidence from psychological, cognitive, and neuroscientific studies is presented and integrated in this article. The new theoretical framework systematizes the interaction between knowledge and creative thinking, and how the nature of this relationship changes as a function of domain and age. Implications for the arts and sciences are briefly discussed.

Neurocognitive mechanisms underlying the experience of flow

Recent theoretical and empirical work in cognitive science and neuroscience is brought into contact with the concept of the flow experience. After a brief exposition of brain function, the explicit-implicit distinction is applied to the effortless information processing that is so characteristic of the flow state. The explicit system is associated with the higher cognitive functions of the frontal lobe and medial temporal lobe structures and has evolved to increase cognitive flexibility. In contrast, the implicit system is associated with the skill-based knowledge supported primarily by the basal ganglia and has the advantage of being more efficient. From the analysis of this flexibility/efficiency trade-off emerges a thesis that identifies the flow state as a period during which a highly practiced skill that is represented in the implicit systems knowledge base is implemented without interference from the explicit system. It is proposed that a necessary prerequisite to the experience of flow is a state of transient hypofrontality that enables the temporary suppression of the analytical and meta-conscious capacities of the explicit system. Examining sensory-motor integration skills that seem to typify flow such as athletic performance, writing, and free-jazz improvisation, the new framework clarifies how this concept relates to creativity and opens new avenues of research.

Transient hypofrontality as a mechanism for the psychological effects of exercise.

Although exercise is known to promote mental health, a satisfactory understanding of the mechanism underlying this phenomenon has not yet been achieved. A new mechanism is proposed that is based on established concepts in cognitive psychology and the neurosciences as well as recent empirical work on the functional neuroanatomy of higher mental processes. Building on the fundamental principle that processing in the brain is competitive and the fact that the brain has finite metabolic resources, the transient hypofrontality hypothesis suggests that during exercise the extensive neural activation required to run motor patterns, assimilate sensory inputs, and coordinate autonomic regulation results in a concomitant transient decrease of neural activity in brain structures, such as the prefrontal cortex, that are not pertinent to performing the exercise. An exercise-induced state of frontal hypofunction can provide a coherent account of the influences of exercise on emotion and cognition. The new hypothesis is proposed primarily on the strength of its heuristic value, as it suggests several new avenues of research.

Endurance Exercise Selectively Impairs Prefrontal-Dependent Cognition.

Two experiments are reported that examine the possibility that exercise selectively influences different types of cognition. To our knowledge, these experiments represent the first attempt to study higher-cognitive processes during exercise. Theoretical thinking was guided by the transient hypofrontality hypothesis. In both experiments, athletes who exercised at a sustained, moderate pace were compared to sedentary controls on two neuropsychological tests, one that is generally regarded as heavily dependent on prefrontal cognition and one that is relatively insensitive to prefrontal operation. Results showed that during exercise performance on tests demanding prefrontal-dependent cognition was impaired, while at the same time, cognitive processes requiring little prefrontal activity were unaffected.

The reticular-activating hypofrontality (RAH) model of acute exercise.

We present here a comprehensive, neurocognitive model to account for the psychological consequences of acute exercise. There is a substantial amount of disparate research and the proposed mechanistic explanation meaningfully integrates this body of brain and behavioral data into a single, unified model. The models central feature is a cascading, two-step process. First, exercise engages arousal mechanisms in the reticular-activating system. This activation process, which involves a number of neurotransmitter systems, has several interrelated effects on cognition and emotion but, in general, has evolved to facilitate implicit information processing. Second, exercise disengages the higher-order functions of the prefrontal cortex. This deactivation process, which is caused in part by resource limitations, also has several interrelated effects but, in general, has evolved to keep the inefficient explicit system and unhelpful emotional processes from compromising the implicit systems functioning when optimal motor execution is needed most. In this article, we review evidence in support of this reticular-activating hypofrontality (RAH) model of acute exercise and place it into a larger evolutionary context.

Imaging the imagination: the trouble with motor imagery.

Sports and exercise psychology finds itself in a most unfortunate situation these days. While all other branches of the psychological sciences help themselves freely to the glitzy new toys of modern neuroscience--MRI and PET, mostly--exploring the neural underpinnings of whatever cognitive function they are interested in exploring, the sport sciences are left out of the fun for the simple reason that these imaging instruments preclude motion--the very thing then that is the subject of interest to them. There are several legitimate ways around this problem but the one that seems to be most popular is, I think, not--legitimate, that is. The basic idea, unduly sharpened here, is the following. Neuroimaging studies have shown that imagined and actual motion share the same neural substrates or, alternatively, imagining an action corresponds to a subliminal activation of the same brain areas required for its execution. It follows from this, the arguments runs, that motor imagery can be used as a proxy for real motor performance, et voilà, the sports sciences can go wild with all the snazzy brain imaging tools after all--just like everyone else. This notion is, I believe, misbegotten, a house of cards that threatens to cast a long shadow over the field. The present article, then, is, to be frank, intended to put a machete to this kind of thinking. It does this by exposing this conclusion to be based on an unholy marriage of selective data reporting and gross overgeneralization. The result is a wild goose chase fueled by wishful thinking.

The role of (dis)inhibition in creativity: Decreased inhibition improves idea generation

There is now a large body of evidence showing that many different conditions related to impaired fronto-executive functioning are associated with the enhancement of some types of creativity. In this paper, we pursue the possibility that the central mechanism associated with this effect might be a reduced capacity to exert inhibition. We tested this hypothesis by exhausting the inhibition efficiency through prolonged and intensive practice of either the Simon or the Eriksen Flanker task. Performance on another inhibition task indicated that only the cognitive resources for inhibition of participants facing high inhibition demands were impaired. Subsequent creativity tests revealed that exposure to high inhibition demands led to enhanced fluency in a divergent thinking task (Alternate Uses Task), but no such changes occurred in a convergent task (Remote Associate Task; studies 1a and 1b). The same manipulation also led to a hyper-priming effect for weakly related primes in a Lexical Decision Task (Study 2). Together, these findings suggest that inhibition selectively affects some types of creative processes and that, when resources for inhibition are lacking, the frequency and the originality of ideas was facilitated.

Human creativity, evolutionary algorithms, and predictive representations: The mechanics of thought trials

Creative thinking is arguably the pinnacle of cerebral functionality. Like no other mental faculty, it has been omnipotent in transforming human civilizations. Probing the neural basis of this most extraordinary capacity, however, has been doggedly frustrated. Despite a flurry of activity in cognitive neuroscience, recent reviews have shown that there is no coherent picture emerging from the neuroimaging work. Based on this, we take a different route and apply two well established paradigms to the problem. First is the evolutionary framework that, despite being part and parcel of creativity research, has no informed experimental work in cognitive neuroscience. Second is the emerging prediction framework that recognizes predictive representations as an integrating principle of all cognition. We show here how the prediction imperative revealingly synthesizes a host of new insights into the way brains process variation-selection thought trials and present a new neural mechanism for the partial sightedness in human creativity. Our ability to run offline simulations of expected future environments and action outcomes can account for some of the characteristic properties of cultural evolutionary algorithms running in brains, such as degrees of sightedness, the formation of scaffolds to jump over unviable intermediate forms, or how fitness criteria are set for a selection process that is necessarily hypothetical. Prospective processing in the brain also sheds light on how human creating and designing – as opposed to biological creativity – can be accompanied by intentions and foresight. This paper raises questions about the nature of creative thought that, as far as we know, have never been asked before.

The mythconception of the mad genius

Take troubled Vincent van Gogh, famed 19th century painter who suffered from bipolar disorder, cut off part of his left ear, and eventually committed suicide. Or Isaac Newton, eccentric 17th century physicist, general headcase, and judging from his leviathan superego, a candidate for making the diagnostic criteria of at least half a dozen psychological disorders. No sooner do we contemplate this aberrant pair, a whole army of mad geniuses springs to mind led by such illustrious figures as autistic Wolfgang Amadeus, depressed Ludwig van, or tortured Edgar Allan. Like Franz Kafka, Robert Schumann, Michelangelo, Virginia Wolf, Richard Strauss, John Nash, or Ernest Hemingway, they were all, at some point in their lives, anguished, tormented, alcoholic, angst-ridden, manic, outright psychotic, or just plain weird. Add the mind-boggling savant syndrome, throw in a quote from a venerable ancient Greek for good measure—say, Aristotle: “No great mind has ever existed without a touch of madness”—and we have the making of mythconception (for more details, see Rothenberg, 1990; Schlesinger, 2009, 2012; Simonton, in press).