Arnout Geeraert

Good governance in international sport organizations: an analysis of the 35 Olympic sport governing bodies

In this article, structural issues with regard to the quality of the self-governance of the 35 Olympic sport governing bodies (SGBs) are analysed. First, this article presents empirical evidence on the lack of accountability arrangements in SGBs. In particular, the watchdog function of their member organizations is severely undermined by the general absence of objective criteria and transparency in the distribution of funding to members. With regard to checks and balances, arguably the most topical issue is the complete lack of independent ethics committees. Second, our survey demonstrates that most SGBs have institutionalized athlete participation. However, in the overwhelming majority of the organizations, they have not been granted a share of formal decision-making power. Third, with regard to executive body members, there is the rather anachronistic dominance of the European continent and also the preponderance of male officials. In addition, the general lack of term limits poses serious threats with regard to the concentration of power, which is evidenced for instance by the overall number of years SGB presidents are in office. The empirical evidence clearly supports the recent calls for improved governance in sport, according to which SGBs need to agree upon, and act in accordance with, a set of well-defined criteria of good governance. Only then will the self-governance of sport be credible and the privileged autonomy of these organizations justifiable.

The governance network of European football: introducing new governance approaches to steer football at the EU level

The authors of this article aim at introducing a new approach in the academic debate on governance failures in professional football. In recent years, political, legal and economic driving forces have led to the emergence of a governance network in European football. We state that this provides the European Union (EU) with the opportunity, if not the duty, to get a grip on the football sector through meta-governance. Further improvement of the networks democratic legitimacy through the enhancement of its democratic anchorage via the introduction of more openness, stakeholder participation and meta-governance by the EU should help the network to deal with the growing complexity of the football world. This way, governance networks in sport can be the solution to the governance failures in the sector, just like governance networks were the solution to many examples of government and market failures in modern society.

The EU controls FIFA and UEFA: a Principal-Agent perspective

ABSTRACT This article demonstrates that the European Union (EU) can curtail the autonomy of the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) and the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) by building upon insights from the principal-agent model. It explores and explains the EUs control over these organizations by mapping the actors and instruments that define EU control of FIFA and UEFA and discussing their activation and mitigation. In this light, it introduces a new perspective (exogenous control) and instrument (steering). Whether or not the EU deploys the control instruments at its disposal is defined by a constant interplay between FIFA and UEFA, their political and football principals and their EU supervisors. Activating and mitigating control within this triangular set-up will dictate whether or not FIFA and UEFA can expect their autonomy to be curtailed if and when they break from good governance practices.

A rationalist perspective on the autonomy of international sport governing bodies: towards a pragmatic autonomy in the steering of sports.

International sport governing bodies (ISGBs) are built on the foundations of freedom of association and traditionally enjoy a large degree of autonomy in their decision-making. Their autonomy is increasingly confined, however, and their hierarchical self-governance is giving way to a more networked governance, in which different stakeholders exert power in different ways and in different contexts in a complex web of interrelationships. Taking a rationalist perspective on the autonomy of ISGBs, this article demonstrates that ISGBs are deploying strategies to safeguard their waning governing monopoly over international sport. Opting for an inductive approach, the authors present four possible conceptualizations of autonomy as applied to ISGBs, namely political autonomy, legal autonomy, financial autonomy and pyramidal autonomy. For each dimension, they describe the different strategies ISGBs wield in order to safeguard different dimensions of their autonomy. This article uses governance theories to hypothesize that the autonomy of ISGBs can be understood as ‘pragmatic autonomy’ since ISGBs only cede certain aspects of their autonomy under particular circumstances and when being subject to specific threats. Acting in a rationalist manner, they are able to keep control over governance developments in sport by using indirect and more subtle forms of governance.

The European sectoral social dialogue committee in professional football: power relations, legitimacy and control

By analysing the political arena of the European Sectoral Social Dialogue Committee in the Professional Football Sector, the aim of this paper is to offer a better understanding of the Committee and its opportunities and prospects. First and foremost, the normative, legal context of the Committee precludes the conclusion of agreements that deviate from the Fédération Internationale de Football Association transfer rules or are contrary to European Union (EU) law. Furthermore, while EU involvement in the matter of social dialogue in professional football is democratically legitimate, the lack of solid support from the European Parliament and the Council is problematic. Most importantly, the power relations between the actors are a decisive element for the prospects of the Committee. After analysing the added value of the Committee for the respective actors, it is clear that currently, hopes for a wider bargaining agreement in professional football are not realistic.

Out-of-control Olympics: why the IOC is unable to ensure an environmentally sustainable Olympic Games

ABSTRACT Although the International Olympic Committee (IOC), the body responsible for overseeing the organisation of the Olympic Games, has placed a high premium on environmental sustainability for more than two decades, recent editions of the Olympic Games have fallen short of their sustainability goals, or have caused outright environmental harm. By applying a new (principal-agent) perspective and conceptualising the environmental harm caused by the Olympic Games as an agency cost, this article demonstrates that the mechanisms the IOC deploys to control Games organisers are ineffective because they fail to alter the incentives of Games organisers towards compliance with environmental sustainability objectives and that recently proposed changes through the IOC’s Agenda 2020 reforms fail to address this issue. In order to lower agency costs, the IOC must increase its control by involving qualified and independent third parties in its host selection process, provide for a clear mandate in the Host City Contract, and introduce credible sanctions that impose a significant cost on hosts for failing to adhere to environmental objectives.

Football is war: the EU's limits and opportunities to control FIFA

Legendary football coach Rinus Michels famously said that “top football is something like war. Whoever behaves too properly, is lost”. His metaphor perfectly captures the EU’s limits and opportunities to control the International Federation of Association Football (FIFA). There is a strong case for controlling FIFA, certainly within a European context. FIFA is however a highly autonomous organization and the importance of football in Europe even gives it leverage over EU member states. Since FIFA aims to have a constructive dialogue with the EU institutions, particularly the Commission, in an effort to consolidate favourable regulatory treatment, the EU seems to be in a unique position to influence FIFA’s conduct. Yet it fails to exploit its potential in full. EU institutions are highly respectful of sport organizations’ autonomous regulation of sport and FIFA has important means for mitigating EU control. Only when the EU demonstrates a comparable degree of proactive behaviour can it increase its leverage over FIFA.

Normative Market Europe: the EU as a force for good in international sports governance?

Abstract Focusing on legal and policy externalisation, this article demonstrates the necessity of an integrated perspective for understanding the EU’s unique identity in the governance of international sport. It shows that externalisation is characterised by a sequential stage process in which Normative Power Europe (NPE) and Market Power Europe (MPE) dynamics alternate and intertwine, bringing to life a Normative Market Europe. The EU’s NPE identity forms the basis for a unique operating mode, aimed at strengthening the ethical character of international sports governance. The EU’s potential to influence sport governing bodies like FIFA, however, emanates from its MPE identity, notably its large, regulated market. Yet interest contestation and lack of internal cohesiveness have often impeded the EU from becoming a force for good.

It’s Not That Easy Being Green The Environmental Dimension of the European Union’s Sports Policy

This article starts from the assumption that the European Union (EU) could play a leading part in reducing the negative environmental impacts of sport. The extent to which the EU fulfills its potential in this regard depends upon the integration of environmental objectives in EU sports policy. The article has a dual purpose. First, it analyzes the integration of environmental objectives at the different stages of the policy process. Second, it identifies the main barriers to the integration of environmental protection and explores the way forward. It is shown that establishing an Expert Group focusing solely on mitigating the environmental impact of sport is a suitable strategy for integrating environmental considerations at the heart of the decision-making process.

Governing in the Shadow of Bosman: A Principal-Agent Perspective on Sports Governance and the EU

This contribution investigates the EU’s (potential) role in sports governance by building upon insights from the Principal-Agent model. Highlighting the influence of Bosman, it explores the limitations and opportunities of the EU’s power in relation to sports governing bodies (SGBs). Two EU bodies, the Court of Justice of the European Union and the European Commission, are conceptualised as principals and SGBs are conceptualised as agents. It shows that the EU is able to use the shadow of Bosman to influence the behaviour of SGBs because these bodies fear the costs of the ultimate EU sanction: a second Bosman case. However, drawing from the literature on the EU as a market power, this contribution demonstrates that several factors negatively influence the credible occurrence and magnitude of sanctions, limiting the EU’s capacity to influence SGBs’ behaviour. Moreover, it shows how SGBs are able to diminish the shadow of Bosman through a variety of strategies. The chapter concludes by offering concrete policy advice, indicating that there is certainly room for a more ambitious EU sports policy- devised and supported by the Member States—directed at SGBs.