Arthur Zillante

War of Attrition: Evidence from a Laboratory Experiment on Market Exit

We report an experiment designed to study whether inecient rms are systematically driven from overcrowded markets. We implement a series of 3800 wars of attrition of a type modeled in Fudenberg and Tirole (1986). Exit tends to be ecient and exit times conform reasonably well to point predictions of the model. Moreover, we nd that subjects respond similarly to implementations framed in terms of losses as they do to those framed in terms of gains.

An experimental test of alternative models of bidding in ascending auctions

The theory and behavior of the clock version of the ascending auction has been well understood for at least 20 years. The more widely used oral outcry version of the ascending auction that allows bidders to submit their own bids has been the subject of some recent controversy mostly in regard to whether or not jump bidding, i.e. bidders submitting bids higher than required by the auctioneer, should be allowed. Isaac, Salmon & Zillante (2005) shows that the standard equilibrium for the clock auction does not apply to the non-clock format and constructs an equilibrium bid function intended to match with field data on ascending auctions. In this study, we will use economic experiments to provide a direct empirical test of that model while simultaneously providing empirical evidence to resolve the policy disputes centered around the place of jump bidding in ascending auctions.

The Campus Parking Game: A Demonstration of Price Discrimination and Efficiency

This article presents a classroom game that allows students to directly experience the welfare improvements that can result from price discrimination. The demonstration uses a very familiar decision-making scenario, campus parking, to introduce the concept of price discrimination as well as reinforce the concepts of opportunity cost, consumer surplus, and search costs. This game can be used in a variety of classes, including principles, intermediate theory, industrial organization, or environmental economics, and can be conducted in a 50-minute class period with follow-up discussion in the next class.

Land Aggregation Using Contingent and Guaranteed Payments

This article explores the use of alternative payment mechanisms to overcome the holdout problem when multiple parcels of land must be acquired to complete a real-estate development project. Purchase offers contingent upon successful land aggregation are compared to combination offers containing both guaranteed and contingent payments to determine which approach better mitigates holdout. The distribution of gains between developers and landowners is also examined. The results of a series of economic experiments suggest that contingent offers expedite land aggregation but developer payoffs are higher when combination offers are used. The results offer insight to real-estate developers participating in land aggregation and inform government entities considering the necessity of public-sector intervention in real-estate markets to encourage desired development projects.

Corporate environmental claims: a game theory model with empirical results

Purpose - – This paper aims to examines whether firms’ eco-friendly advertising claims are supported by environmentally friendly behavior. Design/methodology/approach - – The paper develops a game theory model to determine the circumstances under which firms’ environmental claims will be supported by the adoption of best environmental practice. Least squares regression is used to test major theoretical implications. Findings - – The theoretical model suggests that the credence good nature of un-monitored environmental claims prohibits consumer validation; firms have an incentive to advertise green but no incentive to adopt best environmental practice. Third-party monitoring transforms the game, making eco-friendly outcomes possible. Empirical models based on North American data suggest that firm profit rates are related to verifiable environmental claims and to easily accessible external ratings of environmental performance. Originality/value - – Unlike previous game theoretical models for similar goods, the eco-friendly outcome does not require a repeated game. The importance of the single period game is that continued patronage is not required for the firm to produce goods containing the desired attributes.