Arzu Kıbrıs

Funerals and Elections: The Effects of Terrorism on Voting Behavior in Turkey

This article empirically analyzes the effects of terrorism on the electoral choices of the Turkish voters in the 1991 and 1995 general elections. It relies on a unique data set that includes the date and the place of burial of Turkish soldiers and police officers who died in the fight against the terrorist organization PKK. The author uses the number of these security force terror casualties at the district level as a measure of the level of terrorism that the people of that district have been exposed to and analyzes whether and how exposure to terrorism affects people’s electoral choices. The results indicate that Turkish voters are highly sensitive to terrorism and that they blame the government for their losses. Moreover, exposure to terrorism leads to an increase in the vote share of the right-wing parties who are less concessionist toward the terrorist organization’s cause compared to their left-wing counterparts.

The Conflict Trap Revisited

This article analyzes the association between civil conflicts and educational achievement by studying the Turkish case. It combines the 2005 university entrance exam scores of more than 1.6 million students and a newly constructed data set on the casualties of the Turkish–Kurdish conflict to study the association between the conflict and educational achievement of Turkish students. The results reveal a significant negative association. Combined with the already well-established positive links between education and various measures of socioeconomic development like economic growth, social equality, and public health, the results in this article demonstrate that education is one of the channels through which civil conflicts damage the well-being of societies thereby creating the conditions that perpetuate them.

On the investment implications of bankruptcy laws

Axiomatic analysis of bankruptcy problems reveals three major principles: (i) proportionality (PRO), (ii) equal awards (EA), and (iii) equal losses (EL). However, most real life bankruptcy procedures implement only the proportionality principle. We construct a noncooperative investment game to explore whether the explanation lies in the alternative implications of these principles on investment behavior. Our results are as follows (i) EL always induces higher total investment than PRO which in turn induces higher total investment than EA; (ii) PRO always induces higher egalitarian social welfare than both EA and EL in interior equilibria; (iii) PRO induces higher utilitarian social welfare than EL in interior equilibria but its relation to EA depends on the parameter values (however, a numerical analysis shows that on a large part of the parameter space, PRO induces higher utilitarian social welfare than EA).

The Polarization Trap

This article studies the association between ethnic conflicts and political attitudes. It employs a new data set on the casualties of the ethnic conflict in Turkey to identify the effects of the Kurdish insurgency on the electoral behavior of the Turkish voters. The results indicate that the conflict leads to the political polarization of the society along ethnic nationalist lines. Further investigation of the data also provides some empirical support for the constructivist argument that the salience of ethnic identities is subject to change in response to external stimuli, of which ethnic conflict constitutes a drastic example.

The flight of white-collars: Civil conflict, availability of medical service providers and public health.

Civil conflicts devastate public health both in the short run and in the long run. Analyzing novel data sets that include yearly information on public health and the availability of health professionals across provinces in Turkey in the 1964-2010 period, we provide empirical evidence for our theoretical argument that a major mechanism through which civil conflicts exert their long term negative influences on public health is by discouraging medical personnel to practice in conflict regions. We also assess the effectiveness of certain policy measures that Turkish governments have tried out over the years to counteract this mechanism. Our results reveal that the long running civil conflict in Turkey has been driving away doctors and other highly trained medical personnel from conflict areas and that mandatory service requirements do help counteract this flight.

Introduction to the Proceedings of the 15th Jan Tinbergen European Peace Science Conference

This special issue collects selected proceedings of the 15h Jan Tinbergen European Peace Science Conference, the annual meeting of the Network of European Peace Scientists (NEPS) held in Warwick, June 22-24 2015.2 The Jan Tinbergen conference offers an international forum where scholars present, discuss, and exchange their works and ideas on peace and conflict. In line with the multidisciplinary tradition of the conference this year’s contributions came from a wide range of theoretical and methodological approaches including qualitative studies, statistical and econometric models, as well as strictly theoretical work. The 15 short articles selected for this special issue reflect this diversity. All these letters aim at conveying theoretical discussions and empirical findings from ongoing research projects and as such are showcases of the various strands of current research in conflict and peace science literature.

State-Society Relations in Civil Conflicts

ABSTRACT Civil conflicts are conceptualized as asymmetric, population-centric military struggles. The argument is that insurgencies, even though they are no match in military power to their state adversaries in many cases, resort to armed struggle nonetheless as a tool to impair state capacity, the quality of governance, and the ability of the state to honor the “social contract” in order to eventually destroy state authority and render the state irrelevant for the society. Note that this argument implies that state-society relations do react to the military course of the conflict. In this article, we provide empirical evidence for this implication. Introducing a new panel dataset on the long-running civil conflict in Turkey, we first conduct a micro-level analysis and demonstrate the significant impact rebel presence has upon state-society relations across localities and time. We then analyze the results of semi-structured interviews we had conducted with a group of experts from the conflict regions to decipher the possible mechanisms behind the association we observe in the data. The interviews support our motivating theoretical argument.

On surplus-sharing in partnerships

For investment or professional service partnerships (in general, for partnerships where measures of the partners’ contributions are available), we consider a family of partnership agreements commonly used in real life. They allocate a fixed fraction of the surplus equally and the remains, proportional to contributions; and they allow this fraction to depend on whether the surplus is positive or negative. We analyze the implications of such partnership agreements on (i) whether the partnership forms in the first place, and if it does, (ii) the partners’ contributions as well as (iii) their welfare. We then inquire which partnership agreements are productively efficient (i.e. maximizes the partners’ total contributions) and which are socially efficient, (i.e. maximizes the partners’ social welfare as formulated by the two seminal measures of egalitarianism and utilitarianism).

On the Dynamics of Extremist Violence

Abstract Many modern armed conflicts contain more than two fighting parties, or armed opposition groups that have factions within them. It is the moderates in an armed opposition that governments negotiate with. But the agreement’s fate depends on the approval of all other significant actors within the opposition. We construct a dynamic model of conflict in which such an actor is to decide whether to accept a peace agreement signed by the moderates or not. Using this model we analyze the behavior of our decision maker, focusing on outcomes like the optimal settlement strategy, expected duration of the conflict, and the decision maker’s expected payoff from conflict. We then determine how these outcomes are affected by changes in the conflict environment. Finally, we extend our model to analyze the implications of commitment problems, and the possibility that the conflict ends with military victory of either side.