Asaf Siniver

Power, Impartiality and Timing: Three Hypotheses on Third Party Mediation in the Middle East:

Despite the upsurge in the literature on third party intervention in recent years, particularly that relating to mediation, there is still a significant gap in the field. While some theoretical accounts content themselves with describing the qualities of an ideal mediator, other studies borrow examples from a variety of case studies to emphasise the wide range of the mediators functions or the tactics it can use. What is missing is a systematic, case study-driven analysis that draws on the theoretical literature while generating some fresh propositions about the conditions that are propitious for successful mediation. The article aims to achieve this by proposing three hypotheses about the impact of power, impartiality and timing on the mediation process: (1) The more power (leverage) the mediator has over the disputants, the more likely it is to succeed. (2) The more impartial the mediator is, the more likely it is to succeed. (3) Mediation is more likely to succeed when the conflict has reached an escalatory stage. These hypotheses will be tested against the experience of four successful cases of third party intervention in the Arab—Israeli conflict, which over the past six decades has experienced a multitude of mediators of different types.

Israeli Identities and the Politics of Threat: A Constructivist Interpretation

The paper attempts to offer an alternative analysis to the predominantly positivist-rationalist approaches exhibited by most studies of Israels policies towards the Palestinians. Rather than focusing on realist estimations of power and the national interest as dictating the foreign and defence policies of Israel since its establishment, this paper draws attention to the causes of these manifestations. Using a constructivist methodology, it examines the way in which historical, cultural and religious processes have created a unique Israeli collective identity that can be defined by a dual construct of exceptionalism and siege mentality. Recognizing the centrality of these constructs in political, public and educational discourses is thus imperative not only for a better understanding of Israels approach to security, but also for creating conducive steps towards reconciliation between Israel and her neighbours.

The Islamic State lexical battleground: US foreign policy and the abstraction of threat

This article suggests that President Obamas consistent references to the extremist Sunni group as ‘ISIL’ (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) is not a trivial matter of nomenclature. Instead, the Obama administrations deliberate usage of the ISIL acronym (as opposed to other commonly-used terms such as ‘Islamic State of Iraq and Syria’ or ‘ISIS’, ‘Islamic State’, ‘IS’, ‘so-called Islamic State’ and ‘Daesh’) frames the public perception of the threat to avoid engagement with the requirements of strategy and operations. Both the labelling and the approach could be defended as a response to the unique challenge of a transnational group claiming religious and political legitimacy. However, we suggest that the labelling is an evasion of the necessary response, reflecting instead a lack of coherence in strategy and operations—in particular after the Islamic States lightning offensive in Iraq and expansion in Syria in mid-2014. This tension between rhetoric, strategy and operations means that ‘ISIL’ does not provide a stable depiction of the Islamic State. While it may draw upon the post-9/11 depiction of ‘terrorism’, the tag leads to dissonance between official and media representations. The administrations depiction of a considered approach leading to victory has been undermined by the abstraction of ‘ISIL’, which in turn produced strategic ambiguity about the prospect of any political, economic or military challenge to the Islamic State.

Anti-Intellectualism and Israeli Politics

Abstract Anti-intellectualism is a discrete social phenomenon which eschews spatial or temporal boundaries. While it defies a restrictive definition, it is commonly understood as a populist disdain of individuals who speak of certain universal values and engage in the pursuit of knowledge from reason; conversely, an anti-intellectual is a person who is not a ‘dealer in ideas’ and is not committed to the ‘life of the mind’. This article focuses on anti-intellectualism as a defining characteristic of the Israeli ethos which predates the establishment of the Jewish state. The article begins with a terminological discussion and a brief historical survey of the prevalence of anti-intellectualism in contemporary societies. It then traces the roots of Israeli anti-intellectualism and examines their manifestations in the case of Abba Eban, Israel’s most quintessential diplomat, an orientalist scholar, a Cambridge don, a polyglot and a public intellectual. The article concludes by pointing to the uneasy fit between the political and intellectual spheres in Israeli politics and the challenges posed by the former to the latter.

Abba Eban and the Development of American–Israeli Relations, 1950–1959

Abba Eban, Israel’s ambassador in Washington and representative at the United Nations from 1950 to 1959, had a central role in the transformation of American–Israeli relations during a period of frequent discord over key strategic issues. This analysis examines the influence of one prominent actor upon bilateral ties that would eventually become the American–Israeli “special relationship.” Eban’s oratory talent, linguistic skills, and effective style of diplomacy augmented both Israel’s image in the view of the American public and relations with official Washington. The article explores several critical elements of these relations during the 1950s, re-examining both Eban’s involvement in events such as Israel’s approach toward the problem of borders, its policy of military retaliation, and the response to severe American pressure following the 1956 Sinai campaign. Whilst not attributing the development of close relations between the two Powers solely to the works of a single individual, evidence suggests that Eban was the right man in the right place and time to provide the necessary foundations for the elevation of American–Israeli relations to “special” in the following decade.

Change Nobody Believes In: Obama and the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict

Despite the promise of ‘change’ in President Barack Obamas early dealings with the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, the policy that has since emanated from the White House was in fact commensurate with those of preceding administrations. Rather than heralding a new direction for American engagement with the conflict, the Obama Administration had displayed more patterns of continuity than change in its dealings with both parties. Specifically, by continuing to act as “Israels attorney” during negotiations, the Obama team had in effect negated the presidents early pledges to act as an honest broker in the conflict. In assessing the (in)effectiveness of the Administrations management of the Israeli–Palestinian issue, it seems that on-going mediation efforts to revive the moribund peace process have exhausted their potential. Arbitration may be explored as a more effective method to resolve the Israeli–Palestinian territorial dispute.